Essays in Behavioral Economics of Education. Experimental and Empirical Studies on Information, Beliefs, and Educational Decisions by Fischer, Mira
Essays in Behavioral Economics of Education:
Experimental and Empirical Studies
on Information, Beliefs,
and Educational Decisions
Inauguraldissertation
zur
Erlangung des Doktorgrades
der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät
der Universität zu Köln
2018
vorgelegt von
Mira Fischer, M.A.
aus
Aachen
Referent: Prof. Dr. Dirk Sliwka
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Bernd Irlenbusch
Tag der Promotion: 14.03.2018
Acknowledgments
First and foremost I would like to thank my PhD advisor, Dirk Sliwka, for supporting
me and for allowing me to grow as a researcher during these past five years. The hard
work and long discussions on our project have allowed me to learn how to conduct
experimental research and to appreciate theory. He has given me the freedom to
follow my own interests in various projects and it has been a greatly enriching
experience to work under his guidance. I am also grateful for him being a role
model as a sincere and committed researcher who is curious, and deeply interested
in the questions he studies.
I would also like to thank the other members of my thesis committee, Bernd
Irlenbusch, for support and advice over several years, and Matthias Heinz for being
my primary source for practical advice on how to survive in academia.
I am grateful to Patrick Kampkötter and Valentin Wagner, co-authors on projects
contained in this thesis. At different stages of my PhD, they have taught me much
hands-on knowledge related to empirical research and running field experiments and
it was very motivating to have such dedicated co-authors.
I would like to thank Alex Bryson, John List, Alexander Cappelen and Bertil
Tungodden for being great hosts during my research stays in London, Chicago and
Bergen. All of these three stays have allowed me to experience exciting and stimu-
lating new research environments and to gain many new insights and ideas.
I would also like to thank current and past colleagues: Gari Walkowitz for many
open discussions about research and lots of other things. Lea Cassar for conversa-
tions on meditation and for trying to maneuver bureaucracy with me in order to run
a field experiment. Anja Bodenschatz, Gönül Doğan, Florian Engl, Rainer Michael
Rilke, Marina Schröder, Caroline Stein and Timo Vogelsang for thought-provoking
discussions, advice, and support. Tobias Danzeisen, Lucas Grunwitz, Mirjam Reetz,
Theresa Schwan, and Carolin Wegner for their great help with programming and
running lab experiments.
1
I particularly want to thank my partner Rogier for his love and support, for proof-
reading this thesis, for endless conversations and for always being by my side. I would
like to thank my grandfather Paul for always being interested in my intellectual
development, be it in Philosophy or in Economics. Lastly, I would like to thank my
parents for their unconditional love and for always enabling me to freely choose my
path in life.
2
Contents
1 Introduction 11
2 Effects of German Universities’ Excellence Initiative on Ability Sorting
of Students and Perceptions of Educational Quality 20
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.1 Determinants of Quality of Admissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.2 Determinants of Perceived Quality of Education . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4 Quality of Admissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4.1 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.5 Perceived Quality of Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5.1 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.7 Appendix to Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.7.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.7.2 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.7.3 Further Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3 Effects of Timing and Reference Frame of Feedback: Evidence from a
Field Experiment in Secondary Schools 49
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3
3.3 Motivation and Pre-test of Treatments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3.1 Motivation of Treatments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3.2 Pre-test of Treatments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4 Experimental Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.5.1 Randomization and Self-selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.5.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5.3 Effects of Feedback on Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5.4 Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.5.5 Sub-group Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.7 Appendix to Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.7.1 Results of Pre-experimental Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.7.2 Feedback Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.7.3 Balance and Randomization Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.7.4 Graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.7.5 Check for Spillovers and Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.7.6 Mechanisms: Effort-effectiveness Belief and Self-esteem . . . . . . . 90
3.7.7 Sub-group Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4 Salience of Ability Grouping and Biased Belief Formation 98
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.3 Experimental Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.4 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.4.1 Effects of Salience of Ability Grouping and Group Assignment on
Confidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.4.2 Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.4.3 Effects of Salience of Ability Grouping and Group Assignment on
Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4
4.7 Appendix to Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.7.1 Details on the Experimental Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.7.2 Summary Statistics and Balance Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.7.3 Simulations and Further Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5 Confidence in Knowledge or Confidence in the Ability to Learn: An
Experiment on the Causal Effects of Beliefs on Motivation 136
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
5.3 An Illustrative Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.4 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
5.4.1 Stages of the Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.5 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.5.1 Descriptive Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.5.2 Effect of the Feedback Manipulation on Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.5.3 Causal Effect of Beliefs on Learning Investments . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.5.4 Causal Effect of Beliefs on Test Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
5.7 Appendix to Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
5.7.1 Descriptive Statistics and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
5.7.2 OLS Regressions of Beliefs on Behavior and Outcomes . . . . . . . . 166
5.7.3 Reduced Form Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
5.7.4 Results Without Session Dummies and Demographic Control Vari-
ables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
5.7.5 Timeline of the Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
5.7.6 Details on the Tests, Feedback, Elicitation of Beliefs, and Investment
Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
Bibliography 178
5
List of Tables
2.1 Excellence Status and Quality of Admissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.2 Quality of Admissions - Interaction with Field of Study . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.3 Perceived Quality of Education – Experience-related Items . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4 Perceived Quality of Education – Expectations-related Items . . . . . . . . 39
2.5 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.6 Excellence Status and Quality of Admissions (Results When Excluding One
Excellence University) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.7 Excellence Status and Quality of Admissions (Results When Excluding
Summer Term Admissions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.8 Marginal Effects of the Excellence Dummy for the Models Reported in Table
2.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.9 Marginal Effects of the Excellence Dummy for the Models Reported in Table
2.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.10 Excellence Status and Emotions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.11 Survey Items and Scales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.1 Descriptive statistics of provided feedback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2 Effects of Feedback in Early Timing and Late Timing . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.3 Change Frame vs. Level Frame vs. Control - Class-Level Treatment:
Early Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.4 Change Frame vs. Level Frame vs. Control - Class-Level Treatment:
Late Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.5 Treatment Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.6 Randomization Check Class-Level Treatments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.7 Randomization Check Student-Level Treatments - Early Timing . . . . . 81
6
3.8 Randomization Check Student-Level Treatments - Late Timing . . . . . . 82
3.9 Check for Spillover Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.10 Robustness Checks - Class-Level Treatments - Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.11 Robustness Checks - Class-Level Treatments - Grade . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.12 Robustness Checks - Student-Level Treatments in Early Timing - Points 87
3.13 Robustness Checks - Student-Level Treatments in Early Timing - Grade . 88
3.14 Robustness Checks - Student-Level Treatments in Late Timing - Points . 89
3.15 Robustness Checks - Student-Level Treatments in Late Timing - Grade . 89
3.16 Change Frame vs. Level Frame vs. Control - Dep. var. effort
effectiveness belief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.17 Change Frame vs. Level Frame vs. Control - Dep. var. state
self-esteem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.18 Change Frame vs. Level Frame vs. Control - Dep. var. state
self-esteem (by gender) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.19 Change Frame vs. Level Frame vs. Control - Class-Level Treatment:
Early Timing (Interaction with gender) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.20 Change Frame vs. Level Frame vs. Control - Class-Level Treatment:
Late Timing (Interaction with gender) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.21 Change Frame vs. Level Frame vs. Control - Class-Level Treatment:
Early Timing (Interaction with preference for competition) . . . . . . . . 95
3.22 Change Frame vs. Level Frame vs. Control - Class-Level Treatment:
Early Timing (Interaction with confidence in math ability) . . . . . . . . 96
3.23 Change Frame vs. Level Frame vs. Control - Class-Level Treatment:
Early Timing (Interaction with locus of control) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.1 Information by Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.2 Effects of Salience of Ability Grouping and Group Assignment on Confidence112
4.3 Effects of Salience of Ability Grouping and Group Assignment on Performance124
4.4 Message by Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.5 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.6 Balance Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.7 Effort Intensity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
7
4.8 Correlation between Confidence and Subsequent Performance . . . . . . . . 135
5.1 First Stage Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.2 Confidence on Investment (IV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.3 Confidence on Rank and Probability of Passing Final Test (IV) . . . . . . . 160
5.4 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
5.5 Confidence on Investment (OLS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
5.6 Confidence on Outcomes (OLS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
5.7 Noise Terms on Investment (OLS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
5.8 Noise Terms on Outcomes (OLS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
5.9 First Stage Regressions Without Additional Control Variables . . . . . . . 168
5.10 Confidence on Investment (IV) Without Additional Control Variables . . . 168
5.11 Confidence on Rank and Probability of Passing Final Test (IV) Without
Additional Control Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
8
List of Figures
2.1 Mean Grades by Cohort for Excellence and Non-excellence Universities . . . 47
3.1 Pretest - Predicted Emotions and Motivation by Reference Frame of Feedback 77
3.2 Feedback Note - Control Group [translated from German] . . . . . . . . . 77
3.3 Feedback Note - Change Frame Treatment [translated from German] . . 78
3.4 Feedback Note - Level Frame Treatment [translated from German] . . . . 78
3.5 Distribution of points in Test 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.6 Distribution of points in Test 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.7 Distribution of points in Test 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.8 Feedback in Change Frame Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.9 Feedback in Level Frame Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.1 Effects of Salience of Ability Grouping and Group Assignment on Confidence111
4.2 Information Content of Feedback and Distribution of Beliefs . . . . . . . . . 116
4.3 Comparison of Beliefs in Non-Transparent grouping (A) . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.4 Comparison of Beliefs in Transparent grouping (Extreme Feedback) (B) . . 120
4.5 Comparison of Beliefs in Transparent grouping (Ambivalent Feedback) (C) 122
4.6 Effects of Salience of Ability Grouping and Group Assignment on Performance123
4.7 Test 1 (Test Phase) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.8 Test 1 (Learning Phase) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.9 Sample Feedback: Non-salient Grouping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.10 Sample Feedback: Salient Grouping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.11 Sample Feedback: No Grouping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.12 Test 2 (Test Phase) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.13 Test 2 (Learning Phase) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.14 Expected Ranks by Feedback Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
9
5.1 Learning Investments as a Function of Perceived Ability and Knowledge . . 146
5.2 Timeline of the Experimental Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.3 Actual Ranks Versus Rank Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.4 Association of Confidence in Learning Ability and in Prior Knowledge with
Investment in Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
5.5 Rank Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
5.6 Investment (in Euros) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
10
Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis investigates people’s educational decisions. It consists of four research
papers that apply a broad range of research methods to different educational set-
tings. All papers have in common that they put students as decision-makers center
stage and focus on how they incorporate information into their beliefs and behavior.
The classical economic approach to education assumes that people choose their
investments in human capital to maximize their lifetime utility (Hanushek, 1979;
Todd and Wolpin, 2003). Empirical evidence suggests, however, that people often
make educational decisions that may not benefit them in the long run. For example,
many students drop out of education but later regret having done so (Bridgeland
et al., 2006) or procrastinate on preparation even for very important exams (Steel,
2007). Such “mistakes” in one’s educational decisions may imply large individual and
social costs as educational attainment is a strong predictor for happiness (Oreopoulos
and Salvanes, 2011), health (Silles, 2009; Buckles et al., 2016), and behavior towards
others (Milligan et al., 2004; Heckman et al., 2006).
Levitt et al. (2016) have pointed out that it is important to do “basic research” in
economics of education that is able to identify single factors in the educational pro-
cess in order to inform policy making and educational interventions, and behavioral
economics may have particularly much to contribute to this endeavor (Lavecchia
et al., 2016). While some of the best known economic field experiments targeting ed-
ucational outcomes have studied the effectiveness of (monetary and non-monetary)
incentives (Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Kremer et al., 2009; Fryer, 2011; Bettinger,
11
2012; Levitt et al., 2016), with mixed results, education economists in recent years
have increasingly focused on factors influencing the process of human capital for-
mation that are not captured by the classical economic approach, such as beliefs,
preferences and character traits (Heckman and Kautz, 2012). For example, whether
someone is motivated to do their best at school, to pursue a college degree or to ap-
ply for a demanding job may depend on their beliefs about their abilities (Benabou
and Tirole, 2002, 2016; Heckman et al., 2006), their perceived benefits of education
(Reuben et al., 2017), their risk aversion (Davies et al., 2002), their conscientiousness
and openness to new experience (Noftle and Robins, 2007), and their preference for
competition (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2010).While individual characteristics, such
as gender and family background are known to be correlated with, for example, peo-
ple’s beliefs about their abilities (Filippin and Paccagnella, 2012) and their labor
market expectations (Dawson, 2017; Reuben et al., 2017), the mechanisms under-
lying these differences are not well understood. The aim of the studies comprised
in this thesis is to contribute to their understanding and the promising field of
behavioral economics of education.
Economists have recently started to focus on the formation of students’ beliefs
(Alan et al., 2016; Kosse et al., 2016) as well as on the effects of social comparisons
(Tran and Zeckhauser, 2012; Azmat et al., 2016) in education. Following these two
strands of research, the articles in this thesis focus on how beliefs about academic
ability or the quality of education and relative performance evaluations affect stu-
dents’ educational decisions. The scope of this thesis reaches from an empirical
investigation, providing quasi-experimental evidence on the effects of the German
universities Excellence Initiative on ability sorting and perceived educational quality,
and a randomized field experiment in secondary schools, testing the effects of differ-
ent types of relative performance information on high-stakes educational outcomes,
to economic laboratory experiments, investigating the psychological mechanisms
underlying the motivation to invest in human capital. The different chapters are
summarized below.
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Chapter 2 investigates potential spillover effects of the German Excellence Ini-
tiative on university education. It is co-authored with Patrick Kampkötter and
is forthcoming as “Effects of German Universities’ Excellence Initiative on Abil-
ity Sorting of Students and Perceptions of Educational Quality” in the Journal of
Institutional and Theoretical Economics. Using data from a nationally representa-
tive student survey commissioned by Germany’s Federal Ministry of Education and
Research, we apply a difference-in-differences strategy to study the effects of this
excellence competition on the quality of a university’s enrollments and it’s perceived
quality of education. In the first part of the paper, we study the effects of increased
differentiation in research reputation and research funding on ability sorting of stu-
dents among universities. The announcements of the winning institutions of the
Excellence Initiative are rare and highly publicized events in which information on
the universities that are considered the best research universities in the country sud-
denly becomes common knowledge. Thus, they are suitable for studying whether a
university’s reputation has an effect on its success in recruiting talented students.
We find that the award of excellence status allows a university to enroll significantly
better students in three subsequent admissions terms, which increases differences in
student ability between “excellent” and “non-excellent” universities.
In the second part of the paper, we study an important factor of enrollment decisions
– the perceived quality of a university’s education – by analyzing whether a signal of
research quality influences students’ perceptions of educational quality, as measured
by their satisfaction ratings. We are able to study how students’ perceptions respond
to the award of the label itself because students were surveyed immediately after
universities received excellence status and before research money tied to it could be
used for organizational changes. Our results show a positive and highly significant
effect of the excellence label on the students’ perceptions of quality of education and,
consistently, on perceived job opportunities after graduation. We also find that none
of the items referring to the students’ satisfaction with their personal life that are
unrelated to their university show any significant response to the award of the label.
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This indicates that improvements in a university’s student ratings due to the label
occur not because students identify with an “excellent” institution (and the positive
emotions this might involve) but because students update their beliefs about the
quality of their university’s vis-à-vis other (non-excellent) universities’ education.
However, when students are surveyed three years later, student ratings largely return
to previous levels, although the universities still enjoy excellence status. Overall,
we find that the research competition resulted not only in stronger competition
for (and more inequality of) research funds, which was its declared aim, but also
in a more unequal distribution of talented students across universities, an effect
that has been found to contribute to increasing wage inequality among graduates
(see, e.g., Hoxby and Terry, 1999; Bergh and Fink, 2009). The excellence status
seems to attract more students to apply to an institution because it is perceived
as a signal of high educational quality and, consequently, better job prospects. As
universities have limited capacity and high school grades generally are the most
important selection criterion, “excellent” universities can have more competitive
admissions. Our results thus shed light on an important side-effect of competition
policies for public universities.
Chapter 3 studies the effects of a randomized feedback intervention on high-
stakes educational outcomes in a field experiment and is co-authored with Valentin
Wagner. In order to study the role of reference frame and timing for the effectiveness
of feedback, students aged 11-12 years in 19 classes in 7 secondary schools received
private written feedback from their teachers. The feedback notes either contained
(i) information about their absolute rank in the last math exam, (ii) information
about their change in ranks between the two previous math exams, or (iii) no in-
formation. Students received the feedback either (a) 1-3 days or (b) immediately
before the last exam of the semester. Students were provided with relative perfor-
mance information as people are strongly motivated by it, even in the absence of any
tangible benefits (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Azmat and Iriberri, 2010). However,
rank feedback that compares one’s level of performance to one’s peers’ levels does
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not capture individual progress well, especially when there are large ability differ-
ences within the same class. Feedback that compares students not in terms of their
performance levels but in terms of their changes in performance might help to mit-
igate this problem while maintaining the motivational effects of social comparison.
Additionally, feedback was given at different points in time because outcomes in
the workplace or educational settings may be influenced by different types of effort
exerted at different times. While earlier feedback may have a stronger impact on
preparation efforts, feedback given more immediately before a task may potentially
have a stronger effect on effort at the task itself. The timing of feedback may also
matter if feedback influences both expectations and emotions and the latter have
stronger effects on motivation in the short run than in the long run (Lempert and
Phelps, 2014).
We find that feedback is only effective to increase subsequent performance when
given a few days before the last exam, possibly by countering students’ tendency
to procrastinate and start preparations too late, and that both change and level
feedback work equally well to increase performance. These effects are driven by
boys and by students who recently suffered a decrease in their performance while
differences in self-reported competitiveness do not explain behavior. In contrast, any
feedback given to students immediately before the exam tends to lower subsequent
performance but the overall effects are not significant. Our results give interesting
insights into how relative performance feedback works in educational settings and
has implications for the design of feedback in other situations where the ability
to motivate people is crucial, such as the workplace or health care. Our findings
indicate that relative feedback may be particularly motivating when one has recently
got worse and should be given early enough such that one still has a chance to make
up for it.
Chapter 4 investigates the effects of peer group ability on confidence in own abil-
ity in a laboratory experiment and is single-authored. Understanding how within-
group and between-group information affect ability beliefs is crucial for settings in
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which ability groups are deliberately formed to increase individual performance,
such as the classroom and the workplace. Although there are literatures studying
the effects of either within-group (Murphy and Weinhardt, 2014; Elsner and Ispho-
rding, 2017) or between-group (Coffman, 2014; Dee, 2014) information, it is not yet
well explored how both interact to influence ability beliefs and motivation. The net
effect of assignment to a weaker group (versus a stronger group) on confidence in
own ability may be negative or positive, depending on how each type of information
is interpreted. In our experimental setting, group assignment depends imperfectly
on ability such that the ability distributions of the two groups overlap and the ability
signal from group assignment is noisy. This generates randomness of group assign-
ment that allows for the causal identification of the effect of group assignment on
ability beliefs and on subsequent performance. We randomly vary whether subjects
only receive information about their performance relative to their group or whether
they learn additionally whether they were assigned to a weaker or a stronger group
and that group assignment depends imperfectly on ability. This allows us to study
the causal effects of assignment to a weaker or a stronger group, and its interaction
with salience of the group assignment mechanism, on confidence in ability and on
subsequent test outcomes.
Our results show that when the group assignment mechanism is non-salient, it does
not matter for subjects’ confidence whether they are assigned to the weaker or the
stronger group, however, when the group assignment mechanism is salient, weaker
group assignment makes people less confident. We also find that subjects are on
average less confident when the group assignment mechanism is salient than when it
is non-salient. This is found to be the case due to weaker group assignment making
people more underconfident than stronger group assignment making people over-
confident, indicating that people overweigh negative information as compared to
positive information. When grouping is non-salient, subjects on average give quite
correct estimates of their ability rank. However, when grouping is salient, subjects’
beliefs are significantly decalibrated, indicating that people overweigh ability sig-
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nals coming from between-group information. With respect to test outcomes, we
find that salient ability grouping has a positive effect on the performance of lower
ability individuals while it has a negative effect on the performance of higher abil-
ity individuals. This is driven by opposite effects for these groups when they are
assigned to the weaker group. While the performance of lower ability individuals
increases when learning they were assigned to the weaker group, the performance of
higher ability individuals decreases when learning they were assigned to the weaker
group. Overall, our results suggest that ability grouping may have negative effects
on people’s confidence in their ability and that the positive effect of worse peers on
confidence if relative ability between groups is non-salient may be greatly outweighed
by the negative effect of having worse peers when relative ability between groups is
salient. In settings where ability grouping is done visibly, our results also suggest
that forming ability groups may harm those people who are negatively surprised by
weaker group assignment more than it may benefit those who are positively sur-
prised by stronger group assignment. These findings may help to understand the
effects of ability grouping in the field and may inform the design of educational and
workplace settings.
Finally, Chapter 5 studies the causal effects of beliefs on motivation in a labo-
ratory experiment and is co-authored with Dirk Sliwka. The key purpose of this
paper is to distinguish two dimensions of confidence – confidence in one’s level of
prior knowledge and confidence in one’s learning ability – and to study causal effects
of changes in these dimensions of a person’s confidence on investments in human
capital. Reinforcement of confidence in these two dimensions likely has very differ-
ent effects, as the first dimension is related to one’s ex-ante probability of passing a
test while the second one is related to how much one’s passing probability increases
when exerting learning efforts. We first illustrate these belief dimensions in a simple
formal model and then study the effects of variations in both dimensions experi-
mentally. To investigate the causal effects of the two dimensions of confidence, we
exogenously vary feedback scores subjects receive about their performance in two
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prior tests. One of these tests measures their prior knowledge, the other test mea-
sures their ability to memorize information. The random component in the feedback
scores generates exogenous variation in the agents’ confidence in the two dimensions,
which we use as instrumental variables to estimate causal effects of confidence on
investment decisions and test outcomes.
We find that a higher confidence in learning ability raises learning investments ir-
respective of the level of prior knowledge. Confidence in knowledge, however, has
a negative effect on investments of individuals with above average prior knowledge
and a positive effect on investments of individuals with below average prior knowl-
edge. With respect to test outcomes, we find that raising the confidence in learning
of individuals with below average prior knowledge improves their rank in the fi-
nal test and their probability of passing it, however, we do not find a beneficial
effect for individuals who already had above average prior knowledge. Mirroring
the effects of confidence in knowledge on learning investments, we find that raising
confidence in knowledge of individuals with above average prior knowledge decreases
their outcomes in the final test whereas it has the opposite effect on individuals with
below average prior knowledge. The motivational role of confidence has attracted
substantial interest from different fields in economics in recent years. Our results
may help to explain why confidence in one’s abilities may sometimes be positively
(Benabou and Tirole, 2002, 2003; Heckman et al., 2006) and sometimes negatively
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) related to a person’s
outcomes. Insights about the different effects of confidence in learning ability and
confidence in prior knowledge have implications not only for the design of inter-
ventions aimed at positively affecting academic motivation but also for subjective
performance evaluation policies in firms and other organizations. Our results imply
that rater leniency when assessing someone’s ability to acquire a certain skill or
achieve a future outcome can be beneficial, while rater leniency with respect to past
achievements can be detrimental.
Overall, the results from the four studies presented in this thesis contribute to
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our understanding of how people incorporate different types of information into
their beliefs and educational decisions and we may in particular gain the following
insights, ranging from more practical to more theoretical: (1) Students respond to
signals about a university’s research quality when deciding at which institution to
pursue a degree and for this reason policies intended to foster research competition
between universities may have side-effects on universities’ quality of admissions.
A university’s excellence status also influences student satisfaction ratings but the
effect is transient. (2) High stakes educational outcomes may be influenced by
giving feedback about past performance, especially if it recently decreased, however
the timing of feedback is crucial and it should be given early enough. (3) It is
important to distinguish between beliefs in different ability dimensions as fostering
some ability beliefs may raise the motivation to learn while fostering others may
lower it. (4) People may overweigh ability signals from between-group comparisons,
especially when they are negative, and for this reason ability grouping may lead to
a decalibration of ability beliefs.
The studies outlined above will be presented in detail in the following.
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Chapter 2
Effects of German Universities’ Excellence
Initiative on Ability Sorting of Students and
Perceptions of Educational Quality
Co-authored with Patrick Kampkötter1
2.1 Introduction
In the past two decades, intensified competition among universities for funds and
students has been widely observable in many countries (The Economist, 2015) . In
Europe, this competition is fostered by the Bologna process that began in 1999 and
aims to render educational institutions and degrees more comparable and compat-
ible. In its wake, many countries adopted policies to raise the quality of higher
education and research by promoting a more efficient use of resources in public uni-
versities. Stronger competition for students has also resulted from the availability
and increased prominence of a number of national and international university rank-
ings in recent years. In 2005, in order to foster competition in research, the German
federal government and federal states jointly launched the Excellence Initiative, a
contest that promises substantial amounts of additional funds and the prestigious
title of “university of excellence” to successful institutions. The aim of this contest
is to strengthen academic research and international visibility by promoting compe-
1My co-author and I contributed equally to the design of the study, to the data analysis, and
to writing the paper.
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tition in research among universities. It consists of three lines of funding: graduate
schools, “clusters of excellence” to promote interdisciplinary research on socially rel-
evant topics, and, so-called “future concepts” (or “institutional strategies”) - the
most important line of funding - which are “aimed at developing top-level university
research in Germany and increasing its competitiveness at an international level“
(German Research Foundation, 2016a). To be eligible to compete for the “future
concepts” line of funding, a university must have been granted funding for at least
one graduate school and at least one cluster of excellence. The program had an
initial budget of 1.9 billion euros for the three funding lines and an additional bud-
get of 2.7 billion euros was granted for the second phase of the program starting in
2012 (German Research Foundation, 2016b). All funds are to be spent on research
only. Universities who were successful in the “future concepts” line of funding were
awarded the label “university of excellence” and subsequently received up to an ad-
ditional 70 million euros over a five year period. In this paper, we focus on the
“future concepts” line of funding as it was tied to the largest amounts of money
and the label “university of excellence” and was only awarded to a small number of
institutions. This label evidently brought these institutions considerable public at-
tention , and they have used the label for public relations. Our aim is to test for two
particular spillover effects from this competition on higher education. In the first
part of the paper, we study the effects of increased differentiation in research repu-
tation and research funding on ability sorting of students among universities. The
announcements of the winning institutions of the Excellence Initiative are rare and
highly publicized events in which information on the universities that are considered
the best research universities in the country suddenly becomes common knowledge.
Thus, they are suitable for studying whether a university’s reputation has an effect
on its success in recruiting talented students. We find that the award of excellence
status allows a university to enroll significantly better students in three subsequent
admissions terms, which increases differences in student ability between “excellent”
and “non-excellent” universities. In the second part of the paper, we study an impor-
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tant factor of enrollment decisions - the perceived quality of a university’s education
- by analyzing whether a signal of research quality influences students’ perceptions of
educational quality, as measured by their satisfaction ratings. We are able to study
how students’ perceptions respond to the award of the label itself because students
were surveyed immediately after universities received excellence status and before
research money tied to it could be used for organizational changes. Our results
show a positive and highly significant effect of the excellence label on the students’
perceptions of quality of education and, consequently, on perceived job opportuni-
ties after graduation. We also find that none of the items referring to the students’
satisfaction with their personal life that are unrelated to their university show any
significant response to the award of the label. This indicates that improvements in
a university’s student ratings due to the label occur not because students identify
with an “excellent” institution (and the positive emotions this might involve) but
because students update their beliefs about the quality of their university’s vis-à-vis
other (non-excellent) universities’ education. However, when students are surveyed
three years later, student ratings largely return to previous levels, although the
universities still enjoy excellence status.
2.2 Related Literature
2.2.1 Determinants of Quality of Admissions
An important line of research in the economics of higher education focuses on the
institutional factors influencing student choice. In particular, students are interested
in how much they will enjoy attending a university and how much their education
will earn them in the labor market. Hence, both expectations of personal experi-
ence and development (DesJardins and Toutkoushian, 2005) and of job opportunities
(Schaafsma, 1976; Lazear, 1977) are important drivers of enrollment in higher edu-
cation. Thus, higher education can be described as having both an experience and
a credence good property. The experience good property derives from the fact that
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students generally only know what it “feels” like to pursue a certain academic pro-
gram at a certain university once they have already (at least partially) completed
it. The credence good property derives from the non-transparency of educational
production and students’ uncertainty about the labor market’s valuation of the hu-
man capital they acquire at a certain university. Generally, credence and experience
good properties create a situation of asymmetric information, in which the producer
knows more about the properties of a good than the consumer (Akerlof, 1970; Wolin-
sky, 1995; DesJardins and Toutkoushian, 2005). This situation creates a demand
for expert advice - for example expressed by quality labels - that allows consumers
to reduce their uncertainty about the properties of such a good (Dulleck and Ker-
schbamer, 2006). The decision to attend a particular university affects the course of
a person’s life and often poses a once-in-a-lifetime choice. These kinds of decisions
are particularly difficult to make, which is why people tend to be bad at making
them (Benartzi and Thaler, 2007). Hence, quality signals, such as a high rank
or the award of a label, which are easier for better universities to acquire, may be
used by prospective students as a signal of a university’s quality and may guide their
enrollment decisions. Indeed, there is robust evidence that the reputation of an insti-
tution reflected by its rank in a league table is an important factor in student choice
(Hossler et al., 1989; Weiler, 1996; Abbott and Leslie, 2004; Mueller and Rockerbie,
2005) and particularly affects the matriculation probability of high-ability students
(Griffith and Rask, 2007; Gibbons et al., 2015). Hoxby (2009) has shown that due
to increased student mobility and decreased information costs, U.S. students’ col-
lege preferences have become more responsive to resources and peers, resulting in
stronger ability sorting between colleges. In the U.K., Broecke (2015)has found that
a worsening of a university’s rank leads to a small, but statistically significant re-
duction in the number of applications and in the quality of accepted applicants. In
Germany, the factors affecting student choice have received little attention Obermeit
(2012). Recent studies have focused on few subjects, such as medicine and pharma-
ceutics, for which there is centralized matching of students with institutions by the
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clearing house for university admissions, and the role of distance between students’
hometown and the nearest university in application decisions (Braun et al., 2010;
Spiess and Wrohlich, 2010; Hüber and Kübler, 2011). Horstschräer (2012) has in-
vestigated how the application likelihood of high-ability students to medical schools
is influenced by the Excellence Initiative and has found that becoming a “univer-
sity of excellence” significantly increases the application likelihood of high-ability
students. The first part of our analysis draws a more comprehensive picture of the
effects of the Excellence Initiative than Horstschräer (2012) by covering students of
all subjects of study and investigating changes in the actual composition of students
over time. Additionally, Bruckmeier et al. (2014) is closely related to our study, and
these authors show that the loss of excellence university status within the Excel-
lence Initiative negatively affects the number of enrolled first-year students in the
subsequent winter term at universities in the federal state of Baden-Wuerttemberg.
They also present evidence that this result is driven by the loss in reputation due to
the withdrawal of excellence status and not due to a decrease in university quality.
Conversely, being awarded excellence status had no significant effect on enrollment
quantity. Whereas Bruckmeier et al. (2014) focus on the number of newly enrolled
graduates, we analyze the effects of the excellence initiative on ability sorting.
2.2.2 Determinants of Perceived Quality of Education
Since education is a credence and experience good, potential students are likely to
use quality labels or rankings provided by external bodies to reduce information
asymmetries. If research quality and educational quality are positively correlated,
and evidence suggests that this is indeed the case (Ford et al., 1999; Dahl and Smi-
mou, 2011), it is rational to interpret “excellence status” - although awarded to
universities solely based on research merits - as a signal of educational quality. As
students were surveyed in the same semester in which some universities received
excellence status, and as the disbursement of research funds began later during that
semester, any potential effects of the new status on student ratings are likely driven
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by the label “university of excellence” and not by any institutional changes. Be-
cause students likely care little about research quality and a lot about educational
quality when making their enrollment decision, students’ belief in this correlation is
assumed when analyzing the effect of the label on enrollment. Many studies in the
field of consumer psychology have shown that labels affect beliefs about a product’s
non-observable properties (Teisl et al., 2008). However, we are not aware of any pre-
vious studies analyzing how a new signal about a university’s research quality affects
students’ perceptions of educational quality. Showing that current students’ ratings
of educational quality respond to a label awarded for research will also help us to
shed light on the psychological mechanism by which the research competition might
affect the enrollment decisions of new students. A rationale for the existence of such
an effect is that as students rate their university on a given scale, they implicitly rate
it relative to other universities with which they have little or no experience. When
their institution receives a label they interpret as revealing information about the
institution’s high educational quality relative to other institutions, they update their
belief about the relative quality of the institution’s education and rate it higher on
the given scale, although no actual changes have taken place. One can distinguish
between experience-related factors (ratings of teaching, course content, supervision,
acquired skills, etc.) and expectations-related factors (expected labor market out-
comes) of perceived quality of education. There is evidence from the U.S. that job
opportunities are significantly better and starting salaries are significantly higher for
graduates of more respected institutions (Black et al., 2005). We thus also expect
students’ labor market expectations to respond to the label: first, because higher
perceived quality of education implies better perceived acquired qualifications, and
second, because students may hold the belief that the label also independently af-
fects potential employers’ expectations with respect to the quality of graduates. Our
analysis of responses in students’ perceptions will be organized according to this dis-
tinction between experience-related factors and expectations-related factors and will
focus on common items typically used in student surveys.
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2.3 Data
We use data from a national student survey administered by the University of Kon-
stanz on behalf of Germany’s Federal Ministry of Education and Research. The data
set comprises a representative sample of German students in tertiary education and
covers 18 universities and 15 polytechnics (Fachhochschulen). Twelve waves of data
were collected between winter semester 1982/1983 and winter semester 2012/2013,
although not all 33 institutions are included in all waves as some institutions were
included later and data collection in other institutions was discontinued. The data
are collected every two to three years from a new random sample of students at
covered institutions, with approximately 8,000 students per wave (Simeaner et al.,
2013). The data set is representative of students at German universities and poly-
technics with respect to attributes such as gender, subject of study, and age and
institutions were selected to guarantee a representative coverage of federal states
(Multrus, 2004). In winter semester 2012/2013, the last available wave, the re-
sponse rate amounted to 18.6 percent. The survey data consist of information on
student characteristics, including university attended, field of study, type of degree
program, number of semesters, admission to a program during a summer or a winter
term, full-time or a part-time student status, and demographics such as gender, age,
and parents’ highest level of education. The data also contain information on the
grade point average (GPA) of the Abitur, the German high school diploma, which is
a measure of a student’s academic ability that is still the most important admission
criterion for the vast majority of programs at German universities. Furthermore,
information is available on a large number of items measuring student attitudes and
satisfaction, such as ratings of content, supervision, acquired skills, and practical
relevance of education, as well as expected labor market outcomes (see Table 2.11 in
the Appendix for a description of the survey items). In our analysis, we use data on
full-time and part-time students who enrolled after 1990 contained in 7 waves col-
lected in winter semesters 1994/1995 through 2012/2013, i.e., the waves surrounding
the first, second and third round of the Excellence Initiative. There are two sur-
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vey waves coinciding with the first (2006) and third (2012) round of the Excellence
Initiative. We restrict the data set to universities and exclude polytechnics because
only the former were eligible to participate in the excellence competition. We also
restrict the sample to universities that are present in at least three different waves.
This leaves us with a total of approximately 37,000 students enrolled at 15 different
universities . The data set contains information on two successful universities from
the first round, one successful university from the second round, and one successful
university from the third round of the competition: “university of excellence” status
was announced for the University of Karlsruhe and the University of Munich (LMU)
on October 13, 2006, for the University of Freiburg on October 19, 2007, and for
the Technical University of Dresden on June 15, 2012. Descriptive statistics are
shown in Table 2.5 in the Appendix. The average proportion of female students in
our sample is 55 percent, the average number of semesters is 6.6, and the average
high school diploma GPA is 2.2. The majority of the students are enrolled in the
humanities and the social sciences.
2.4 Quality of Admissions
2.4.1 Empirical Strategy
To examine whether becoming a “university of excellence” affects the competitive-
ness of admissions (and student demand for a given university) in subsequent ad-
mission terms, we use the average high school GPA of newly enrolled students as
the dependent variable. We estimate the following baseline specification of an OLS
regression model:
GPA(z − score)ijt = α + βExcellent(A)jt + γUniversityj+
δCohortt + ζIndividualControlsijt + εijt (2.1)
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where GPA(z − score)ijt is the standardized school GPA of student i who en-
rolled at university j in year t. We standardize grades over the entire sample to
zero mean and unit variance to abstract from the German grading scale (1.0 =
excellent, 4.0 = sufficient, less than 4.0 = fail) and to make the effect sizes interna-
tionally comparable. The Excellent(A)jt dummy is equal to 1 for all the students
who enrolled (= were in their first semester) in a university after the university was
labeled excellent and is equal to 0 otherwise. We include fixed effects for university
to control for time-constant heterogeneity among universities and fixed effects for
cohort to control for time-varying heterogeneity constant over universities, both po-
tentially influencing the competitiveness of admissions. Since Excellent(A)jt varies
within the awarded universities (Dresden, Freiburg Karlsruhe, and Munich) over
time cohorts and stays constant in the non-awarded universities, this dummy, given
university and time fixed effects, identifies the difference-in-differences effect of the
award of excellence status on admissions. Furthermore, we include the following
individual-level control variables: age, gender, parents’ level of education, field of
study, full-time or part-time student status, degree program (e.g., bachelor’s, mas-
ter’s, state examination, Diplom), and whether the student was admitted during
the summer term. The degree program dummies allow us to control for the gradual
conversion from the former German system to the international system of bachelor’s
and master’s programs during the Bologna process. The summer term admission
dummy allows us to identify students who did not enroll during the main winter term
admissions and instead enrolled during summer term admissions. Summer term ad-
missions account for 14.3 percent of total admissions in our sample and might have
different admission criteria. In a further specification, we interact Excellent(A)jt
with separate dummies for the years following the competition to account for time
trends in the selectivity of universities after receiving excellence status. For example,
Excellent(A)jt∗1stY earjt identifies students who enrolled during the first year (sum-
mer or winter semester) after the university was awarded excellence status. This
specification allows us to investigate when the effect begins and whether or after
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how much time it wanes. To investigate whether the selectivity of universities was
more responsive to excellence status in some fields than in others, we include interac-
tion effects between Excellent(A)jt and FieldOfStudyijt in a further specification.
This allows us to investigate whether certain fields of study drive the response of
admissions to the award of the label. For all the specifications, we present results
both with and without controls for the presence of tuition fees (TuitionFee(A)jt)
and double high school graduation cohorts (DoubleCohort(A)jt) in some German
federal states at the time of admission. We consider it important to test whether
our results are robust to these reforms because both of them might have affected the
number of applicants at universities and hence, the competitiveness of admissions.
The presence of tuition fees at some universities might drive students to apply to
universities in other federal states without tuition fees or might affect the transi-
tion from high school to university (Dwenger et al., 2012; Hübner, 2012; Bruckmeier
et al., 2013; Bruckmeier and Wigger, 2014). The presence of a double cohort in a
federal state likely drives up the number of applicants at universities located in that
federal state. For all the regressions, standard errors clustered on university level
are reported.
2.4.2 Results
Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 contain OLS regression results estimating the impact of
the Excellence Initiative on the quality of admissions, measured by the GPA of the
students’ high school diploma. In our baseline regression, five cohorts after the first
wave of the Excellence Initiative are included. Column (1) of Table 2.1 presents
the results from our baseline regression with standardized GPA. The coefficient of
the excellence dummy (Excellent(A)) is negative and statistically significant. Note
that in the German grading system, a smaller grade is a better grade. The results
indicate that in the six years following the award of university of excellence status,
a university’s admissions were, on average, 0.125 standard deviations better than
the admissions of universities without the excellence label. This is a sizeable effect
29
compared to the between university difference in grades and comparable in size to
the effects of randomized controlled interventions in higher education. Long-term
field experiments in schools report similar effect sizes (Angrist et al., 2006; Fryer,
2014). These results are also consistent with evidence showing a sorting of more
able students into higher quality education institutions (Black et al., 2005). In
column (2), we also control for tuition fees and double cohorts, which only slightly
decreases the coefficient of interest. Column (3) presents the regression results for
the interaction between the excellence dummy and six dummies identifying each
year since the receipt of the award, again with additional controls for tuition fees
and double cohorts in column (4). The results reveal that the overall effect of the
award of excellence status on admissions is driven by the first three years after the
award. This can also be observed by looking at the change in raw average grades
before and after the award (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). The positive effect
on admissions seems slightly larger in the second and third years than in the first
year: however, Wald tests show that only the coefficients of the first and the third
year are significantly different from each other (β1stY ear = β2ndY ear : p = 0.198;
β1stY ear = β3rdY ear : p = 0.053; β2ndY ear = β3rdY ear : p = 0.633). After the
third year, the effect seems to wane. The negative (but insignificant) interaction
coefficient identifying the 6th year after the original award is a weak indication
that the renewal of excellence status, similar to the original award, has a positive
(but noisier) effect on admissions. In principle, the effect of excellence status on
admissions could be driven by universities’ restricting their capacities in the years
after the award in order to become more “elite” and allow only a handful of students
with very good GPAs to enroll. However, legal regulations prevent public universities
in Germany from freely adjusting their capacity. Rather, the education ministries
of the federal states determine how many places for new enrollment each university
has to supply each semester. This means that a change in the competitiveness of
admissions is driven by student demand for places at a given university. The evidence
thus suggests that the effects of the Excellence Initiative on overall admissions are
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driven by an increase in medium-term student demand for places and that it is the
novelty of the excellence status (and the media attention it entails) rather than the
status alone that allows universities to recruit better students.
Table 2.1: Excellence Status and Quality of Admissions
Dependent variable:
GPA Abitur (standardized) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Excellent –0.125** –0.100**
(0.0489) (0.0453)
Excellent × 1st year –0.0961** –0.0813**
(0.0340) (0.0366)
Excellent × 2nd year –0.183** –0.157*
(0.0758) (0.0735)
Excellent × 3rd year –0.204** –0.175**
(0.0695) (0.0644)
Excellent × 4th year 0.0140 0.0299
(0.0750) (0.0764)
Excellent × 5th year 0.0340 0.0696
(0.0927) (0.0798)
Excellent × 6th year –0.0863 –0.0551
(0.0677) (0.0738)
Tuition fees –0.0431** –0.0413**
(0.0168) (0.0161)
Double cohort –0.0073 –0.0360
(0.0547) (0.0571)
Observations 38,904 38,904 38,904 38,904
Adjusted R2 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173
Note: We regress school GPA (standardized with zero mean and unit variance
over the entire sample) on a dummy that indicates whether a student enrolled in
a university after the university was labeled excellent. In columns (3) and (4),
this dummy is separated into six dummies for each year following the award of
excellence status. Columns (2) and (4) also control for tuition fees and double
cohorts. All the regressions contain a constant and cohort and university fixed
effects. Additionally, all the regressions control for field of study, degree program,
summer-term admissions, part-time study, age, gender, and parents’ highest level
of education. Robust standard errors clustered on university level are reported
in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
To further investigate whether certain study subjects are driving the identified
effect of the excellence status on admissions, we interact the excellence dummy
with dummies for different fields of study. As observed in Table 2.2, enrollment in
economics responds most strongly to the award of excellence status , with student
ability significantly improving more than half a standard deviation, followed by en-
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rollment in medicine, law, and the social sciences (compared to the baseline group
humanities). A considerably weaker response to the excellence status is detectable
for admissions in the natural sciences. It is, however, unlikely that the stronger com-
petitiveness of admissions in economics is the reason why these admissions respond
more strongly to the excellence label than admissions in the natural sciences because,
as observed in the coefficients of the field of study dummies, economics students on
average have a worse GPA than students in the natural sciences . Additionally, the
effect cannot be explained by the label revealing more information about the quality
of research in economics than in the natural sciences, as the excellence universities in
our sample qualified to compete for the third line of funding (and the label) because
they all had won excellence funds for graduate schools and research clusters (only) in
the natural sciences (and none in economics). However, the difference in response to
the label might be driven by economics students’ placing more weight than students
in the natural sciences on the alleged benefits of attending an excellent university,
for example with respect to labor market signaling. Further analyses of the items
asking about motivation to choose a certain program or university support this ra-
tionale: the economics students were more concerned about their earnings prospects
when choosing a program and attached greater importance to a university’s “tradi-
tion and reputation” when choosing at which university to study than the natural
sciences students. To rule out that any one university alone is driving our results,
we also run robustness checks excluding each excellence university in turn, which
does not alter the results. We also rule out that summer term admissions are driving
our results. (See Tables 2.6 and 2.7 in the Appendix.) Overall, our results suggest
that there is a significant and sizeable medium-run effect of the Excellence Initiative
on ability sorting at German universities, that this effect is strongest for economics
students, and that “excellent” universities are able to recruit better school leavers
at the expense of universities that did not succeed in this competition for three
years after the award of excellence status. However, we do not find evidence that
successful universities benefit in terms of better enrollments in the longer run.
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Table 2.2: Quality of Admissions - Interaction with Field of Study
Dependent variable:
GPA Abitur (standardized) (1) (2)
Excellent 0.0829 0.110**
(0.0502) (0.0482)
Excellent × Social sciences –0.240*** –0.241***
(0.0393) (0.0398)
Excellent × Law –0.330*** –0.329***
(0.0454) (0.0446)
Excellent × Economics –0.537*** –0.539***
(0.113) (0.113)
Excellent × Medicine –0.325*** –0.324***
(0.0319) (0.0314)
Excellent × Natural sciences –0.176** –0.178**
(0.0592) (0.0605)
Excellent × Engineering –0.147 –0.153
(0.132) (0.133)
Excellent × Other –0.102 –0.104
(0.171) (0.171)
Social sciences –0.0056 –0.0052
(0.0499) (0.0497)
Law –0.125*** –0.125***
(0.0349) (0.0352)
Economics 0.0670 0.0678
(0.0570) (0.0570)
Medicine –0.444*** –0.443***
(0.0502) (0.0503)
Natural sciences –0.140*** –0.140***
(0.0311) (0.0310)
Engineering 0.0832* 0.0838*
(0.0439) (0.0439)
Other 0.125* 0.124*
(0.0661) (0.0661)
Tuition fees –0.0431**
(0.0170)
Double cohort –0.0034
(0.0566)
Observations 38,904 38,904
Adjusted R2 0.174 0.174
Note: We regress school GPA (standardized with zero mean and unit
variance over the entire sample) on interaction terms between a dummy
that indicates whether a student enrolled in a university after the uni-
versity was labeled excellent and dummies for the field of study. Hu-
manities is the reference category. Column (2) also controls for tuition
fees and double cohorts. Both regressions contain a constant and co-
hort and university fixed effects. Additionally, all the regressions con-
trol for degree program, summer-term admissions, part-time study, age,
gender, and parents’ highest level of education. Robust standard errors
clustered on university level are reported in parentheses; *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 33
2.5 Perceived Quality of Education
2.5.1 Empirical Strategy
To investigate whether the award of excellence status immediately affects students’
perceptions of the quality of an institution’s education, we study the relationship
between recently having been named a “university of excellence” and an institution’s
student evaluations. We estimate the following baseline specification of an ordered
logit model:
StudentEvaluationijt = α + βExcellent(B)jt + γExcellent(B)jt+1+
δUniversityj + ζWavet + ηIndividualControlsijt + εijt (2.2)
where StudentEvaluationijt denotes different survey items measuring student
i’s evaluation of the educational quality of university j, which she is attending at
the time of survey wave t. The items are chosen to match criteria for student satis-
faction used by internationally known university rankings such as the CHE ranking,
the Times Higher Education World University Rankings, the Academic Ranking of
World Universities (Shanghai Ranking), or the U.S. News & World Report’s college
rankings. (See Table 2.11 in the Appendix for a precise definition of each item.) To
ensure comparability between the different item scales in the regression models, the
items are standardized to zero mean and unit variance. The Excellent(B)jt dummy
is equal to 1 if a rating was given by a student in the winter semester immediately
after the university in which he or she is enrolled was awarded excellence status
and is equal to 0 otherwise. The Excellent(B)jt+1 dummy identifies the ratings of
students at universities with excellence status collected in the following survey wave
(3 years later). We include fixed effects for university and survey wave to control for
time-constant heterogeneity among universities and time-varying heterogeneity con-
stant over universities potentially influencing student ratings. Since Excellent(B)jt
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varies within the awarded universities over the survey waves and remains constant
in the non-awarded universities, this dummy, given university and wave fixed effects,
identifies the difference-in-differences effect of the award of the excellence label on
student ratings before the research funds tied to the award could be used for orga-
nizational changes. Longer-term effects of the “excellence label” cannot be cleanly
identified because the research funds tied to the label could have caused actual
changes. We thus focus on the short-term effects of excellence status on student sat-
isfaction ratings. However, it is still interesting to see whether student ratings are
affected in the next survey wave, i.e., three years after the university was awarded
excellence status. Consequently, we also include an Excellent(B)jt+1 dummy to
identify potential long-term effects. We cannot study the isolated labeling effect on
students at the University of Freiburg because its excellence status was announced
in October 2007, and there was no survey wave during the semester immediately
following the announcement. Hence, identification of the Excellent(B)jt effect relies
on the three remaining universities of Karlsruhe, Munich, and Dresden , whereas the
Excellent(B)jt+1 effect also includes the University of Freiburg. Furthermore, we
include the following individual-level control variables: age, gender, parents’ level
of education, field of study, full-time or part-time student status, degree program,
school GPA, number of semesters a student has attended university, and whether
a student was admitted during the summer term. Dummies for the field of study
control for the potentially different experiences of students in different subjects; for
example, due to class size. We also control for school GPA because students’ abil-
ity levels differ between universities, and less academically able students may rate
their educational experience worse than their more academically able counterparts.
Furthermore, both tuition fees and double cohorts might have an effect on student
ratings: The presence of tuition fees might raise students’ expectations concerning
the quality of education and the intensity of personal support, whereas an instan-
taneous surge in the number of newly enrolled students due to double high school
graduation cohorts might strain a university’s facilities and likewise lead to lower
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satisfaction ratings. The dummy TuitionFee(B)jt indicates whether a tuition fee
was collected at the university, whereas the dummy DoubleCohort(B)jt indicates
whether there was a double graduation cohort in the federal state in which the
university is located during the time of the survey. Again, we present results both
with and without controls for the presence of tuition fees and double high school
graduation cohorts and report robust standard errors clustered on university level
for all regressions.
2.5.2 Results
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 present ordered logit regression results with student ratings of edu-
cational quality and job market expectations as the dependent variables, which were
standardized to zero mean and unit variance. We differentiate between experience-
related items reflecting the educational experience of students and expectations-
related items reflecting expected job opportunities and other labor market out-
comes. Table 2.3 presents the estimation results for the experience-related items.
The dummy variable Excellent(B) identifies students’ perceptions of quality of ed-
ucation at universities that were recently announced “excellent”. The results reveal
that these students rated their university’s quality of education significantly better
during that semester on dimensions such as quality of curriculum content, quality
of teaching, and supervision. Moreover, perceptions of the quality of professional
knowledge and practical skills the students acquired while attending university as
well as the practical relevance of the material taught was also rated significantly
better at recently awarded excellence universities.
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Table 2.3: Perceived Quality of Education – Experience-related Items
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var.: Content Teaching Supervision Professional Practical Practical
quality quality knowledge skills relevance
Excellentt 0.247*** 0.192** 0.222*** 0.170** 0.146** 0.141**
(0.0749) (0.0826) (0.0620) (0.0705) (0.0689) (0.0598)
Excellentt+1 0.0943 0.0160 0.110 0.0824 0.149** 0.243***
(0.0709) (0.0778) (0.101) (0.0669) (0.0700) (0.0709)
GPA Abitur –0.133*** –0.0609** –0.0721*** –0.346*** –0.0966*** –0.0728***
(0.0254) (0.0248) (0.0275) (0.0201) (0.0204) (0.0220)
# Semesters –0.0534*** –0.0411*** –0.0110 0.0357*** 0.0507*** –0.0701***
(0.0049) (0.0055) (0.0081) (0.0050) (0.0075) (0.0046)
Tuition fees 0.0358 0.0513 0.195*** 0.0709 0.0427 0.0243
(0.0611) (0.0685) (0.0461) (0.0672) (0.0739) (0.104)
Double co-
hort
0.328** 0.267* 0.0327 0.117 0.0621 0.138
(0.150) (0.144) (0.138) (0.0867) (0.0983) (0.0967)
Observations 36,865 36,847 36,833 36,881 36,861 36,694
Pseudo R2 0.029 0.025 0.037 0.030 0.031 0.034
Note: We regress different survey items (standardized with zero mean and unit variance)
on a dummy that identifies ratings of students collected immediately after these univer-
sities were awarded excellence status (viz., winter semester 2006/2007 for Munich and
Karlsruhe, and winter semester 2012/2013 for Dresden). All the regressions contain wave
and university fixed effects. Additionally, all the regressions control for subject of study,
degree program, summer-term admissions, part-time study, number of semesters a stu-
dent has attended university, age, gender, and parents’ highest level of education. Robust
standard errors clustered on university level are reported in parentheses; *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Similarly, students at universities that recently received excellence status also
significantly adjusted their expectations with respect to their job opportunities. As
presented in Table 2.4, the three items show a response of similar magnitude. Since
all these items were formulated negatively - for example, by asking about expected
difficulties in finding a job - the negative coefficients indicate that the students
increased their job expectations. To help with the interpretation of the results, Ta-
bles 2.8 and 2.9 in the Appendix report the marginal effects of the Excellent(B)jt
dummy at the means of the categories of the respective dependent variable for the
models reported in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. The results show that while students whose
university was recently labeled excellent are less likely to select a worse category
on the questions referring to educational quality or job market expectations, they
are more likely to select a better category. For instance, students whose university
was recently labeled excellent were 4.3 percentage points more likely than students
whose university was not labeled excellent to select response category 6 on a scale
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from 1 to 7 (very bad to very good) answering the following question: “What have
been your experiences during your studies with respect to the quality of the curricu-
lum’s content?” As hypothesized, the students’ ratings of both the quality of their
education and their job market expectations show significant positive short-term re-
sponses to the excellence label. Thus, as students update their beliefs with respect
to the quality of their education, they also update their job market expectations. A
possible explanation for the fact that the students’ ratings of their past educational
experiences respond to the excellence label is that the students implicitly benchmark
their university against other universities with which they have no or little experi-
ence. To corroborate this explanation, we tested whether the students’ emotional
response to the label - for example, because they identify with their university and
feel proud and happy about “being excellent” - might partially drive the positive
nature of their ratings and expectations. However, we find that none of the items
in the data referring to students’ satisfaction unrelated to their belief about their
university, such as emotional stress (for example fears and depression) and worries
about their personal relationships and financial situation, exhibit any significant re-
sponse to the award of the excellence label (see Table 2.10 in the Appendix). This
finding indicates that students’ perceived quality of education response is indeed
driven by an update of their beliefs about the relative quality of their institution
and not by emotions. The data set also allows us to study whether excellence status
has a positive effect on student satisfaction in the long run, i.e., three years after
the award when the next wave of data are collected. A possible long-term effect is
likely driven not only by the label, but also by the money tied to the award and
by the organizational and cultural changes the university underwent due to its new
status. As observed in the coefficient of the lead dummy variable Excellent(B)jt+1
in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, the evidence that excellence status affects student satisfaction
positively in the long run is rather weak. Only the practical skills acquired during
one’s studies and the practical relevance of one’s studies are rated significantly bet-
ter three years later. The students’ responses to all the other experience-related and
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expectations-related questions are not significantly more positive three years later,
although the universities still enjoy excellence status. However, as shown in Table
2.10 in the Appendix, three years after a university was awarded excellence status,
students report more emotional stress from fears and depression, for instance, and
seem to worry more about their financial situation. This is an interesting finding
the causes of which are worth investigating in further research.
Table 2.4: Perceived Quality of Education – Expectations-
related Items
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var.: Difficulties in Insecure Employment
finding a job job prospects worries
Excellentt –0.140** –0.128*** –0.115***
(0.0669) (0.0364) (0.0386)
Excellentt+1 0.124 –0.0295 –0.0744
(0.116) (0.0678) (0.0777)
GPA Abitur 0.189*** 0.104*** 0.268***
(0.0222) (0.0144) (0.0185)
# Semesters 0.0446*** 0.0840*** 0.0315***
(0.0051) (0.0024) (0.0036)
Tuition fees 0.0445 0.00564 0.102**
(0.130) (0.0616) (0.0437)
Double cohort –0.0328 –0.0329 –0.0360
(0.164) (0.113) (0.105)
Observations 33,290 36,810 36,588
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.035 0.049
Note: We regress different survey items (standardized with zero
mean and unit variance) on a dummy that identifies ratings of stu-
dents collected immediately after these universities were awarded ex-
cellence status (viz., winter semester 2006/2007 for Munich and Karl-
sruhe, and winter semester 2012/2013 for Dresden). All the regres-
sions contain wave and university fixed effects. Additionally, all the
regressions control for subject of study, degree program, summer-
term admissions, part-time study, age, gender, and parents’ highest
level of education. Robust standard errors clustered on university
level are reported in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Our findings for students’ perceptions in this section also illustrate an impor-
tant mechanism underlying the results for admissions in section 4.2. It seems that
excellence status causes more students to apply to a university because the award
is perceived as a signal of high educational quality and, consequently, better job
prospects. As universities have limited capacity and high school grades generally
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are the most important selection criterion, “excellent” universities can have more
competitive admissions.
2.6 Conclusion
Using data from a representative student survey, we investigated whether being suc-
cessful in the German universities’ Excellence Initiative, a competition for research
funding, and the accompanying label “university of excellence” allow a university to
enroll better students. We found that designated “universities of excellence” recruit
students with better high school grades. This effect is statistically significant for
three years following the award of excellence status, indicating that the award has
a positive effect on student selection for successful universities and increases the
ability differences of students at “excellent” and “non-excellent” universities in the
medium term. We do not find evidence that the award has a positive effect on the
enrollments of successful universities in the longer term. We also investigated an
important factor of enrollment decisions: the perceived quality of a university’s ed-
ucation. Our findings show that the label “university of excellence” in itself, before
any organizational changes due to additional research funds can take effect, has a
strongly positive and significant effect on students’ satisfaction ratings. Interest-
ingly, this effect is observed even though these ratings refer to past experiences. We
hypothesize that this is due to students implicitly comparing their university with
other universities with which they have no or little experience when responding to
survey items measuring student satisfaction. The award of the label thus causes
students to update their beliefs about the relative educational quality of their in-
stitution. The fact that following the award of the label, students also adjust their
job market expectations but not their satisfaction in areas unrelated to education
further supports the hypothesis that the excellence label is perceived as a signal of a
university’s quality of education vis-à-vis other universities. The actual quality of a
university’s education, however, does not seem to benefit from the privileged status
because ratings of educational quality largely return to previous levels three years
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after the award, whereas excellence status persists. By studying a rare and highly
publicized event in which information on which universities are considered the best
research universities in a country suddenly becomes common knowledge, we provide
evidence that there is a clear link between a university’s research reputation and
student satisfaction ratings. Overall, we find that the research competition resulted
not only in stronger competition for (and more inequality of) research funds, which
was its declared aim, but also in a more unequal distribution of talented students
across universities, an effect that has been found to contribute to increasing wage in-
equality among graduates (see, e.g., Hoxby and Terry, 1999; Bergh and Fink, 2009).
Our results thus shed light on an important implication of competition policies for
public universities that has, until now, received little attention in the public debate.
So far, however, we can only detect a transitory effect. It remains to be seen whether
the effect is reinforced by more universities having their status renewed in further
waves of the German Excellence Initiative.
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2.7 Appendix to Chapter 2
2.7.1 Summary Statistics
Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
GPA Abitur 37,642 2.198 0.633 1 4
GPA Abitur (stand.) 37,642 0.000 1.000 –1.901 2.822
Excellent(A) 37,967 0.042 0.200 0 1
Excellent(B) 37,967 0.038 0.191 0 1
Excellent(B)t+1 37,967 0.041 0.198 0 1
Student Perceptions
Content quality 37,761 4.849 1.310 1 7
Professional knowledge 37,773 4.484 1.168 1 7
Practical skills 37,753 2.433 1.625 1 7
Practical relevance 37,611 2.330 1.593 1 7
Teaching quality 37,741 4.324 1.351 1 7
Supervision 37,727 4.074 1.496 1 7
Difficulties to find a job 34,104 2.148 0.973 1 4
Insecure job prospects 37,721 2.594 1.915 1 7
Employment worries 37,483 3.578 1.963 1 7
Stress financial situation 37,800 2.706 2.016 1 7
Emotional stress 37,746 2.218 1.895 1 7
Stress relationship 37,227 1.523 1.985 1 7
Field of Study
Humanities 37,865 0.223 0.416 0 1
Social sciences 37,865 0.138 0.345 0 1
Law 37,865 0.075 0.264 0 1
Economics 37,865 0.126 0.332 0 1
Medicine 37,865 0.102 0.302 0 1
Natural sciences 37,865 0.190 0.392 0 1
Engineering 37,865 0.121 0.326 0 1
Other fields 37,865 0.025 0.158 0 1
Degree Program
Bachelor’s 37,738 0.121 0.327 0 1
Master’s 37,738 0.038 0.192 0 1
Diplom 37,738 0.384 0.486 0 1
Magister 37,738 0.119 0.323 0 1
State examination 37,738 0.305 0.460 0 1
Other program 37,738 0.020 0.140 0 1
Not defined 37,738 0.008 0.091 0 1
Age 37,898 23.873 4.055 17 83
Female 37,895 0.550 0.497 0 1
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Table 2.5 (continued)
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Summer admission 37,967 0.144 0.351 0 1
Part-time student 37,782 0.235 0.424 0 1
Semester 37,967 6.637 4.316 1 20
Tuition fees(A) 37,967 0.166 0.372 0 1
Double cohort(A) 37,967 0.012 0.110 0 1
Tuition fees(B) 37,967 0.266 0.442 0 1
Double cohort(B) 37,967 0.026 0.160 0 1
Parents’ Highest Level of Education
Lower secondary (Hauptschule) 37,904 0.090 0.286 0 1
Upper secondary (Realschule) 37,904 0.178 0.383 0 1
High school (Abitur) 37,904 0.143 0.350 0 1
Polytechnic (Fachhochschule) 37,904 0.128 0.335 0 1
University 37,904 0.451 0.498 0 1
Other 37,904 0.010 0.100 0 1
University
TU Berlin 37,967 0.065 0.247 0 1
Bochum 37,967 0.070 0.255 0 1
TU Dresden 37,967 0.096 0.295 0 1
Duisburg-Essen 37,967 0.045 0.208 0 1
Frankfurt 37,967 0.069 0.253 0 1
Freiburg 37,967 0.086 0.280 0 1
Hamburg 37,967 0.088 0.283 0 1
Karlsruhe (KIT) 37,967 0.083 0.276 0 1
Kassel 37,967 0.029 0.169 0 1
Leipzig 37,967 0.094 0.292 0 1
Magdeburg 37,967 0.042 0.200 0 1
LMU Munich 37,967 0.117 0.321 0 1
Oldenburg 37,967 0.020 0.141 0 1
Potsdam 37,967 0.047 0.211 0 1
Rostock 37,967 0.049 0.215 0 1
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2.7.2 Robustness Checks
Table 2.6: Excellence Status and Quality of Admissions (Results
When Excluding One Excellence University)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Excluding Excluding Excluding Excluding
GPA Abitur (standardized) Dresden Freiburg Karlsruhe Munich
Excellent × 1st year –0.0659 –0.103*** –0.0744* –0.0796*
(0.0391) (0.0341) (0.0376) (0.0449)
Excellent × 2nd year –0.135* –0.192** –0.0904** –0.215**
(0.0727) (0.0886) (0.0416) (0.0981)
Excellent × 3rd year –0.150** –0.206*** –0.126* –0.198*
(0.0643) (0.0595) (0.0693) (0.101)
Excellent × 4th year 0.0694 0.103 0.0103 0.00305
(0.0683) (0.0696) (0.0816) (0.0930)
Excellent × 5th year 0.101 0.0111 0.0476 0.0952
(0.0827) (0.0801) (0.0908) (0.0876)
Excellent × 6th year –0.0487 –0.0557 –0.0752 –
(0.0818) (0.0758) (0.0757) –
Tuition fees –0.0299* –0.0423** –0.0384** –0.0427**
(0.0147) (0.0169) (0.0177) (0.0178)
Double cohort –0.0216 –0.0399 –0.0113 –0.0262
(0.0585) (0.0632) (0.0631) (0.0639)
Observations 35,296 35,479 35,569 34,318
Adjusted R2 0.176 0.167 0.174 0.183
Note: We regress school GPA (standardized with zero mean and unit variance over
the whole sample) on six dummies for each year following the award of excellence
status. All regressions control for tuition fees and double cohorts, and contain a
constant and cohort and university fixed effects. Additionally, all regressions control
for field of study, degree program, summer-term admissions, part-time study, age,
gender, and parents’ highest level of education. Robust standard errors clustered
on university level are reported in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 2.7: Excellence Status and Quality of Admissions (Results
When Excluding Summer Term Admissions)
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3)
GPA Abitur (standardized)
Excellent –0.0903* 0.103*
(0.0467) (0.0502)
Excellent × 1st year –0.0820*
(0.0384)
Excellent × 2nd year –0.147*
(0.0740)
Excellent × 3rd year –0.175**
(0.0640)
Excellent × 4th year 0.0898
(0.0875)
Excellent × 5th year 0.104
(0.0875)
Excellent × 6th year –0.0809
(0.0747)
Excellent × Social sciences –0.261***
(0.0373)
Excellent × Law –0.245***
(0.0432)
Excellent × Economics –0.526***
(0.111)
Excellent × Medicine –0.285***
(0.0381)
Excellent × Natural sciences –0.157**
(0.0684)
Excellent × Engineering –0.131
(0.136)
Excellent × Other 0.0767
(0.0964)
Tuition fees –0.0777*** –0.0755*** –0.0775***
(0.0218) (0.0204) (0.0221)
Double cohort –0.0387 –0.0770* –0.0361
(0.0498) (0.0419) (0.0524)
Observations 33,112 33,112 33,112
Adjusted R2 0.171 0.172 0.172
Note: We regress school GPA (standardized with zero mean and unit variance
over the whole sample) on a dummy that indicates whether a student enrolled
in a university after the university was labeled excellent. In column (2) this
dummy is separated into six dummies for each year following the award of ex-
cellence status. Column (3) contains interaction terms between the excellence
dummy and fields of study. Humanities is the reference category. All regres-
sions control for field of study, tuition fees, and double cohorts, and contain a
constant and cohort and university fixed effects. Additionally, all regressions
control for degree program, part-time study, age, gender and parents’ highest
level of education. Robust standard errors clustered on university level are re-
ported in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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2.7.3 Further Results
Table 2.8: Marginal Effects of the Excellence Dummy for the Models Reported in
Table 2.3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Content Professional Practical Practical Teaching Supervision
quality knowledge skills relevance quality
dy/dx P > |z| dy/dx P > |z| dy/dx P > |z| dy/dx P > |z| dy/dx P > |z| dy/dx P > |z|
1 –0.002 0.001 –0.001 0.014 –0.015 0.036 –0.015 0.019 –0.004 0.016 –0.009 0.000
2 –0.009 0.001 –0.002 0.027 –0.017 0.034 –0.017 0.018 –0.013 0.019 –0.019 0.000
3 –0.021 0.001 –0.005 0.015 –0.005 0.030 –0.003 0.021 –0.020 0.022 –0.022 0.000
4 –0.020 0.001 –0.016 0.017 0.008 0.033 0.010 0.019 –0.011 0.020 –0.004 0.000
5 –0.003 0.001 –0.019 0.014 0.015 0.032 0.013 0.019 0.019 0.021 0.023 0.000
6 0.043 0.001 0.016 0.015 0.010 0.038 0.008 0.017 0.026 0.020 0.024 0.000
7 0.012 0.001 0.026 0.016 0.004 0.039 0.003 0.023 0.003 0.020 0.007 0.001
Table 2.9: Marginal Effects of the Excellence
Dummy for the Models Reported in Table 2.4
(1) (2) (3)
Difficulties in Insecure Employment
finding a job job prospects worries
dy/dx P > |z| dy/dx P > |z| dy/dx P > |z|
1 0.026 0.034 0.018 0.000 0.009 0.003
2 0.001 0.048 0.011 0.000 0.008 0.003
3 –0.014 0.036 0.003 0.000 0.006 0.003
4 –0.013 0.034 –0.003 0.000 0.006 0.003
5 –0.009 0.000 –0.001 0.003
6 –0.011 0.000 –0.010 0.003
7 –0.008 0.001 –0.017 0.003
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Table 2.10: Excellence Status and Emotions
(2) (3) (4)
Stress financial Emotional Stress
situation stress relationship
Excellent –0.0248 –0.0261 0.0374
(0.105) (0.0476) (0.0418)
Excellentt+1 0.155* 0.155** 0.0581
(0.0918) (0.0606) (0.0598)
GPA Abitur 0.359*** 0.155*** –0.0389**
(0.0219) (0.0176) (0.0184)
# Semesters 0.0260*** 0.0181*** –0.0191***
(0.0054) (0.0039) (0.0037)
Tuition fees –0.0011 –0.127** –0.0039
(0.146) (0.0641) (0.0537)
Double cohort –0.0441 –0.0215 –0.103
(0.115) (0.0949) (0.0831)
Observations 36,883 36,830 36,333
Pseudo R2 0.029 0.011 0.009
Note: We regress different survey items (standardized with zero mean and
unit variance) on a dummy that identifies ratings of students collected
immediately after these universities were awarded excellence status (viz.,
winter semester 2006/2007 for Munich and Karlsruhe and winter semester
2012/2013 for Dresden). All regressions contain wave and university fixed
effects. Additionally, all regressions control for subject of study, degree pro-
gram, summer-term admissions, part-time study, age, gender, and parents’
highest level of education. Robust standard errors clustered on university
level are reported in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Figure 2.1: Mean Grades by Cohort for Excellence and
Non-excellence Universities
Note: Blue dots (upper): mean grades by cohort of non-
excellence universities; yellow dots (lower): mean grades by
cohort of excellence universities.
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Table 2.11: Survey Items and Scales
Item [variable names in italics] Scale
What have been your experiences during your studies with respect 1–7
to ... (very bad–very good)
... the quality of the curriculum’s content? [content quality]
... the way lectures are given? [teaching quality]
... supervision and counseling by lecturers? [supervision]
Please indicate to what extent your studies have promoted your knowl-
edge and skills in the following areas ...
1–7
(not at all–very much)
... professional knowledge. [professional knowledge]
... practical skills. [practical skills]
How strongly, from your point of view, is your subject of study at
your university characterized by ...
1–7
(not at all–very much)
... good professional preparation/strong practical relevance?
[practical relevance]
Which of the following options best describes your job prospects after
graduation? [difficulties in finding a job]
1–4
(hardly any difficulties in finding a job–
difficulties in finding any job at all)
How much do you personally feel stressed by ... 1–7
... insecure job prospects? [insecure job prospects] (not at all–very much)
... your current financial situation? [stress financial situation]
... personal problems (e.g., fears, depression)? [emotional stress]
... the lack of a stable relationship? [stress relationship]
What do you think is important for improving your personal situation
as a student?
1–7
(not at all–very much)
... improvement of employment outlook for students of your subject
of study [employment worries]
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Chapter 3
Effects of Timing and Reference Frame of
Feedback: Evidence from a Field Experiment in
Secondary Schools
Co-authored with Valentin Wagner1
3.1 Introduction
Students and employees are often given feedback about their past performance be-
cause it is thought to positively influence their future performance. Feedback2 has
indeed sometimes been found to improve performance (Azmat and Iriberri, 2010;
Blanes i Vidal and Nossol, 2011; Tran and Zeckhauser, 2012) and may have ad-
vantages over monetary incentives as it can be used when the latter are difficult
to implement or not socially accepted. However, feedback is also frequently found
to backfire (Barankay, 2012; Ashraf et al., 2014; Azmat et al., 2016; Bradler et al.,
2016a) or to be ineffective (Eriksson et al., 2009).3 Asking which factors are crucial
for its success is therefore important.
The influence of a small number of factors on the effectiveness of feedback has al-
1My co-author and I contributed equally to the design and implementation of the study, to the
data analysis, and to writing the paper.
2Economists have investigated different kinds of feedback, such as process feedback (by allowing
subjects to observe the behaviors of other people performing the same task, see e.g. Falk and Ichino,
2006; Mas and Moretti, 2009) or outcome feedback (by providing a quantitative measures of past
performance such as a test score or rank, see e.g. Tran and Zeckhauser, 2012; Azmat et al., 2016).
We will focus on outcome feedback in this study.
3See also Kluger and DeNisi (1998) for evidence from the psychological literature.
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ready been investigated. For example, it has been found that the effects of feedback
depend on whether a pay-for-performance or a flat incentive scheme is present (Az-
mat and Iriberri, 2016), or whether the information provided is sufficiently precise
(Hannan et al., 2008). Furthermore, relative feedback, such as a performance rank,
has been found to be more effective than performance information referring to an
absolute standard, such as test score (Azmat and Iriberri, 2010). There are mixed
findings about whether giving rank information in public or private is more effective
(Tran and Zeckhauser, 2012; Hannan et al., 2013; Tafkov, 2013; Ashraf et al., 2014;
Gill et al., 2016).4 Besides these findings, the question of what makes feedback effec-
tive has received rather little attention, leaving many aspects that could be relevant
for its success as a motivational tool unstudied. This paper begins to fill this gap
by studying whether the timing and the reference frame of feedback influence its
effectiveness.
In this paper, we study a field experiment in secondary schools in which we
exogenously vary whether students receive private rank feedback, when they receive
it and what its standard of comparison (reference frame) is. Students aged around
11-12 years in secondary school classes received private written feedback from their
teachers and it either contained (i) information about their absolute rank in the last
math exam (level feedback), (ii) information about their change in ranks between
the two previous math exams (change feedback), or (iii) no information. Students
received the feedback either (a) 1-3 days or (b) immediately before the last math
exam of the school year. As mathematics is a core subject of the curriculum and
students write six exams in this subject during a school year, their performance
in the final exam influences whether they will be allowed to stay in their current
educational track and to progress to the next grade.
We chose to provide students with relative performance information as people
are strongly motivated by it, even in the absence of any tangible benefits (Charness
and Rabin, 2002; Azmat and Iriberri, 2010; Kuziemko et al., 2014; Gill et al., 2016).
4See also ? for a summary of the findings in the tournament literature.
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If individuals are on average overconfident with respect to their performance level,
as has often been found in other settings (Krueger and Mueller, 2002; Hoelzl and
Rustichini, 2005; Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Park and Santos-Pinto, 2010), level
feedback should make them less confident in already having done “enough”, which
has been found to positively influence performance (Azmat et al., 2016). However,
due to strong complementarities of skill formation at different stages of the education
production function, the differences in academic skills increase over time (Cunha
and Heckman, 2007) such that large ability differences can often already be found
at the ages we study. We know from the literature on tournaments (Gürtler and
Harbring, 2010) that revealing information about performance levels may reduce
motivation when there is large heterogeneity among them. Feedback that compares
students not in terms of their levels but in terms of their changes in performance
may alleviate this problem while possibly maintaining the motivational effects of
social comparison. More importantly, feedback about how one’s performance has
changed in the past may also help to promote the belief that skills can be developed
by exerting effort, also called a “growth mindset” in the psychological literature (see
O’Rourke et al., 2014; Paunesku et al., 2015, which is closely related to the concept
of “grit”, recently investigated by Alan et al., 2016).
Timing is potentially crucial for the effects of feedback because outcomes in
the workplace or educational settings may be influenced by effort exerted at differ-
ent times – on preparation and on the task itself (cf. Levitt et al., 2016; Wagner,
2016). While earlier feedback may influence preparation effort, possibly by counter-
ing students’ tendency to procrastinate and start preparations too late (Steel, 2007),
feedback given more immediately before a task may potentially have a stronger ef-
fect on effort at the task itself due to people’s tendency to place a greater weight
on more recent information (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992). Furthermore, timing of
feedback may also matter if it influences both expectations and emotions (Loewen-
stein, 2000; Lane et al., 2005; Kräkel, 2008; Bradler et al., 2016b) and the latter
have stronger effects on motivation in the short run than in the long run (Lempert
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and Phelps, 2014). For example, someone who learns that his past performance is
worse than expected may realize that he has to work harder to attain his desired
outcome. However, having this overconfidence corrected may involve (temporary)
negative emotions that decrease the enjoyment of a task or distract from it (Benabou
and Tirole, 2016) and may thus decrease performance in the short run.5
We find that feedback increases subsequent performance when given a few days
before the exam and that change and level feedback are equally effective. In classes
with early feedback, students receiving feedback about their rank level significantly
increase their performance by 0.2 grade points (3.9 percentage points) compared to
students receiving no feedback, while students receiving feedback about rank changes
significantly increase their performance by 0.3 grade points (3.8 percentage points).
We find it to be particularly beneficial to inform students who became worse about
their negative change in performance a few days before the exam as this significantly
improves these students’ outcomes by 0.6 grade points (8.1 percentage points). In
contrast, any feedback given to students immediately before the exam tends to
lower subsequent performance but the overall effects are not significant. However,
informing students who became worse about their negative change in performance
immediately before the exam decreases these students’ outcomes significantly by 0.3
grade points (but the effects on these students exam scores are not significant).
To shed light on the mechanisms that drive the effects of feedback on perfor-
mance, we elicit students’ belief in the effectiveness of their effort and their emotions
captured by their state self-esteem. Our findings show that change feedback, but
not level feedback, has a weakly significant positive effect on students’ belief that
they can affect their outcomes by exerting effort. We also find that both types of
feedback tend to have a negative effect on students’ state self-esteem. Subgroup
analyses reveal that the positive response to early feedback is mostly driven by boys
and that boys’ self-esteem is strongly reduced by feedback while we do not find
5The importance of timing is also supported by the dual-process theory that has found its way
into behavioral economic models in recent years (Loewenstein, 2000; Alos-Ferrer and Strack, 2014):
People’s immediate “hot state” response to information likely differs from their longer term “cold
state” response.
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negative effects of feedback on the self-esteem of girls. Furthermore, we do not find
significant heterogeneity in the effects of feedback by confidence in mathematics
abilities, locus of control, or preference for competition.
To our knowledge, this is the first study identifying causal effects of timing of
feedback and the first to compare the causal effects of two generic types of feedback
(about relative levels and relative changes of performance). As far as we know, it is
also the first study to use experimental variation to cleanly identify the causal effects
of feedback information in schools. Our results are not only relevant for educators
but the general findings extend to other settings where feedback is given with the
intention to increase motivation, such as the workplace or the healthcare system.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief overview of the
related literature. In section 3.3 we motivate the treatment variation and report
the results of a survey conducted prior to the experiment in which we test whether
students of our target age group understand and how they perceive the two types
of feedback. Section 3.4 describes our experimental procedure. Section 3.5 presents
the results and investigates potential behavioral mechanisms driving these results.
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
Besides screening for talent6, economists traditionally focus on the introduction of
incentives to raise performance. In recent years, field experiments on monetary
(Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Kremer et al., 2009; Fryer, 2011; Bettinger, 2012; Fryer
et al., 2012; Levitt et al., 2016) and non-monetary (Jalava et al., 2015; Wagner
and Riener, 2015; Levitt et al., 2016) incentives for teachers and/or students have
produced mixed results.7
Few studies so far have investigated at the effects of feedback in the context
6Surprisingly little of the large heterogeneity of teacher effectiveness can be explained by ob-
servable teacher characteristics (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2006), which makes it difficult to improve
educational outcomes by screening for good teachers.
7Damgaard and Nielsen (2017) recently review the use of behaviorally motivated interventions
in education.
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of education and among those we are aware of, all but one (Azmat and Iriberri,
2010) have relied on university student samples. Tran and Zeckhauser (2012) pro-
vide Vietnamese students participating in an experiment involving an English test
either with private feedback (by phone) or private plus public feedback (postings on
the university’s noticeboard and website) about their ranking in in-course mock ex-
ams. Overall, the authors find a positive effect of feedback on the final English test
and that private plus public feedback tends to outperform private feedback alone.
This difference, however, was only marginally significant.8 A more recent study by
Bandiera et al. (2015) exploits data of a natural experiment in the UK where some
university students were provided with private, absolute feedback on their past exam
performance and others were not. Feedback on exam performance improved future
performance mostly for more able students and for students who initially had less
information about the academic environment. Azmat et al. (2016) provide college
students with feedback on their position in the grade distribution every six months
over a period of three years. They find that students who received feedback suffered
a decrease in their performance relative to a control group. This effect is driven by
students who underestimated their relative performance in the absence of feedback.
While these studies analyze the effect of feedback on performance among univer-
sity students, we are aware of only one study on school aged children which exploits
data from a natural field experiment and there is – to our knowledge – no ran-
domized controlled field experiment on the effectiveness of performance feedback on
educational outcomes of children. Azmat and Iriberri (2010) study the motivational
effect of relative performance feedback among high school students in Spain (aged
14 - 18) in a natural field experiment. For one school year, a high school in the
Basque Country adopted a new system of producing report cards providing stu-
dents with information on whether they were performing above or below the class
average as well as the distance from this average. Before and after this change,
report cards informed students only about their own grade point average. The new
8In contrast to Tran and Zeckhauser (2012), Ashraf et al. (2014) find that private plus public
feedback reduces performance of health workers in Zambia in a nationwide training program.
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relative performance feedback had positive effects and increased students’ grades by
5 %. However, the effect disappeared as soon as the information was removed.
The paper by Azmat and Iriberri (2010) is the one most similar to ours with
respect to the population studied. With respect to the dimensions of feedback –
timing and social reference frame – manipulated in our design, we are not aware of
any similar studies.
3.3 Motivation and Pre-test of Treatments
3.3.1 Motivation of Treatments
We varied both the type as well as the timing of feedback as we expected both
dimensions to matter for how feedback affects behavior. We expected that level
feedback influences students’ empirical beliefs in different ways than change feed-
back. Building on a model by Fischer and Sliwka (Chapter 5) we expected that two
types of beliefs matter for how much effort a student invests in the exam, (i) confi-
dence in her past level of math performance and (ii) confidence in the effectiveness
of her effort (i.e. her ability to improve her math performance). Assuming that
students at different parts of the ability distribution each strive for exam outcomes
within their reach, the model predicts that increasing a student’s confidence in her
past level of math performance decreases the necessity to invest additional effort
in exam preparation to reach the desired outcome in the next exam. Furthermore,
according to this model, confidence in the effectiveness of effort reduces a person’s
perceived effort costs. Thus, raising confidence in the effectiveness of effort increases
effort. Fischer and Sliwka (Chapter 5) find that people’s effort in a lab experiment
responds as predicted by their model.
In our classroom setting, the effect of feedback about one’s level of past perfor-
mance depends on whether a person ex-ante is overconfident or underconfident with
respect to her level of past performance. If she is overconfident, learning about the
true level of past performance is disappointing and thus will lower her confidence
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in her level of performance (and increase the perceived necessity of effort), if she is
overconfident learning the same information will be positively surprising and raise
her confidence in her level of performance (and decrease the perceived necessity of
effort). Likewise, the effect of feedback about one’s changes in performance depends
on how it affects a person’s beliefs. The psychological literature on the so called
“growth mindset” (O’Rourke et al., 2014; Paunesku et al., 2015) argues that making
changes in past performance salient strengthens confidence that one’s outcomes can
be influenced by one’s effort, i.e. confidence in the effectiveness of effort (which
increases effort).
In recent years, economists have started to consider the role of emotions in
decision making. Possibly emotions besides information processing may mediate
the effort response to feedback. Disappointing feedback likely worsens a person’s
emotional state, which may decrease the enjoyment of a given task and effort (Lane
et al., 2005; Benabou and Tirole, 2016). Emotions are generally considered to be
short lived (Lempert and Phelps, 2014). For this reason the short-run response to
feedback may differ from the longer-run response(Loewenstein, 2000; Alos-Ferrer
and Strack, 2014), which implies that the timing of feedback may be relevant for
the observed response. While the longer-run behavior may be driven by the rational
response to new performance information, the short-run response may be driven
by a combination of rational and emotional response. For example, in the short
run disappointing performance feedback raises the necessity to exert more effort
(strengthening extrinsic motivation) but may at the same time worsen the emotional
state (weakening intrinsic motivation). Thus while disappointing information likely
increases effort in the longer run, the emotional response attenuates the incentive
effect and may even dominate it in the short run.
3.3.2 Pre-test of Treatments
When teachers return the graded exams to students, they often provide them with a
statistic about the frequency of grades in their class. Students therefore have some
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imprecise information about how their performance compares to the performance
of other students. Students in our sample are quite young and in order to test
whether they understand our feedback (to disentangle lack of understanding and
ineffectiveness of the information) and how they interpret it (to enable us to interpret
possible effects), we conducted a survey in 6 classes in 4 schools with a total of
151 students of the same age group as our experimental sample before implementing
the field experiment. This was a convenience sample gathered through personal
contacts.
The survey consisted of a two-page questionnaire. On the front of the page
students saw a feedback note of a fictitious student named “Paul” and were asked
to imagine themselves in his position. The feedback note contained either level or
change feedback, and both of them were varied (good ranks to bad ranks, positive
and negative change in ranks). On the back of the page, students had to shortly
summarize the information on the front of the page and answer a quiz to test whether
they understood it correctly. They were also asked to give their guess of how Paul
feels (“very good” to “very bad”) after having read the feedback note and of how
highly motivated (“not at all” to “very strongly”) Paul will be to exert effort in the
next exam. We also asked students whether they knew the size of their class, which
is crucial for correctly interpreting rank feedback.
Most students correctly understand the feedback notes. 85.56% of the students
could correctly calculate by how much Paul’s rank changed and 94.74% could cor-
rectly determine the position of Paul’s rank when given level feedback. Moreover,
86.09% of students know the exact size of their class. The mean responses to the
questions concerning Paul’s emotions and motivation are presented in Figure 3.1 in
Appendix 3.7.1.9 Students believe that bad feedback (negative change in ranks or
rank level below median) makes a student feel worse than good feedback but that
the student’s motivation to exert effort is quite high (above 3 on a 5 point scale)
9The results indicate that students believe that Paul would be more motivated when receiving
change feedback than when receiving level feedback while they do not indicate that the two feedback
types affect emotions differently. Note that the difference in reported motivation between the
change feedback and the level feedback may be driven by the chosen ranks.
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and approximately the same with negative and positive feedback.
Overall, the results of the pre-experimental survey indicate that most students
of our target age group correctly understand the information contained in two types
of feedback and that they perceive their content as affecting emotions but do not
believe that more negative feedback will generally be less motivating than more
positive feedback.
3.4 Experimental Intervention
The experiment was conducted in 19 classes (grades 5 and 6) in 7 secondary schools
in the German cities of Bonn, Cologne, and Düsseldorf and was approved by the
ethics committee of the University of Düsseldorf. 352 students received parents’
consent (73.9% per class) and participated in the experiment during May and June
2016.10 Researchers were never present in the classroom to maintain a natural ex-
amination situation and the feedback was given to students by their math teacher
to maximize its credibility.11 To train teachers how to conduct the experiment, we
visited the schools in the run-up of the experiment. During this meeting, the inter-
vention was explained and teachers’ questions were answered. We sent teachers two
envelopes with material needed to run the experiment. A first envelope contained
written teacher instructions outlining the time schedule and steps of the interven-
tion, consent forms to be signed by parents and templates for providing results of
the fourth and the fifth math exams of the school year, consisting of the classes’
grades and points in each of the two exams and the maximum number of points
reachable. For those students whose parents consented, teachers provided us with
names, enabling us to print personalized feedback notes by calculating students’
ranks in the last math exam and their change in ranks from the second last to the
10We contacted 142 secondary schools in the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW)
using a list of schools that is publicly available from the Ministry of Education of NRW. 23% of the
schools responded and 39% (13 out 33) of these schools were generally interested in participating.
After further consultation with schools, 7 schools finally participated.
11The credibility of the source has a substantial effect on how feedback is interpreted. Ilgen et al.
(1979) identified two components of source credibility: expertise and trustworthiness.
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last math exam. A second envelope was sent to schools a few days before the third
exam. It contained the personalized feedback notes, which were sheets of paper
that were folded and had the name of the student it referred to clearly written on
its outside. The envelope also contained a result template for the third exam and
student questionnaires.
Treatments
We want to test how relative performance feedback affects a student’s performance
in a high-stakes math exam. As described above, relative feedback has often proven
effective in raising performance but has also been found to backfire and there is little
evidence on the effects of feedback in schools. Rank feedback also seems promising in
light of recent findings that a student’s rank within their class or cohort affects later
achievement independently of underlying ability (Murphy and Weinhardt, 2014;
Elsner and Isphording, 2017).12 Based on a 2 X 3 design, we vary both the timing
of feedback and the reference frame of feedback independently. We are not aware
of any studies that have looked at the effect of timing, although it is potentially
very important because test outcomes are influenceable both by learning and test
taking effort, exerted at different times. Furthermore, feedback can be given in
terms of individual levels of performance (rank in last test) and in terms of changes
of performance (change in rank between second last and last math test). While all
prior studies on rank feedback we are aware of have used levels, the tournament
literature points towards this being harmful in settings where ability differences
are large (Gürtler and Harbring, 2010), such as in many classrooms. There is also
evidence from the psychological literature that promoting the belief that own skills
are changeable improves a student’s motivation (O’Rourke et al., 2014; Paunesku
et al., 2015).
12Murphy and Weinhardt (2014) find that students with a one standard deviation higher rank
in primary school will score 0.08 standard deviations better at age 14 and Elsner and Isphording
(2017) find that high school students with a higher rank have higher expectations about their future
career outcomes, are more optimistic and self-confident and, indeed, have a higher likelihood of
going to college.
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The timing of feedback was randomized on class level. Students either received
feedback 1-3 days before the exam (Early Timing) or immediately before the
exam sheets were handed out (Late Timing). The reference frame of feedback
was randomized at student level. Within the same class, students with parents’
permission to participate received personalized written feedback about their rank
in the last math exam (Level Frame), about their change in rank between the
second last and the last math exam (Change Frame), or a personalized note that
only wished them good luck (Control). In all treatments, teachers gave a folded
feedback note to each student that had the student’s name written on its outside.
To personalize the feedback, the note addressed the student by their first name and
was signed with the teacher’s name (see Appendix 3.7.2 for English translations of
the exact wording and layout of the notes). While students in Control received no
information about their past performance, in Change Frame, students received
information about their change in rank between the two previous exams but no
information on their absolute ranks in these tests (“I compared the points of each
student in the class in the last two exams. Relative to your classmates, you improved
(worsened) your performance in the last math exam by XX places.”). Students in
Level Frame were informed about their relative rank in the last exam but received
no information on their performance in the second last exam or about how their
performance changed (“I looked at the points of each student in the class in the last
exam. Relative to your classmates you achieved, with your performance in the last
math exam, the XX th place.”). As students had received their grades in the last
two exams after the teachers had graded them (i.e. approximately 2 and 4 months
before the last exam, respectively), the feedback information served as a reminder
that contained more detailed information about different aspects of their relative
performance.
In Early Timing, students had to fill in a questionnaire immediately after
receiving the feedback notes, while in Late Timing students had to fill in a ques-
tionnaire immediately after completing the exam. Due to time constraints, in Late
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Timing, the questionnaire was shorter and did not include all scales included in the
Early Timing questionnaire. The questionnaire elicited effort-effectiveness beliefs,
preference for competition, character traits, and demographic information. It en-
ables us to study whether the feedback possibly affects test outcomes by changing
beliefs about how easily outcomes can be affected by effort. Furthermore, feedback
can possibly have heterogeneous effects on students with different gender (Buser and
Yuan, 2016) and character traits (Ilgen et al., 1979; Lam and Schaubroeck, 2000;
Noe, 2000; Fedor et al., 2001). The questionnaire enables us to explore these possible
differences. Questions on character traits are based on validated questionnaires and
measured locus of control ( adapted from PISA, based on Rotter, 1966), confidence
in math ability (adapted from PISA, based on Bandura 1986) and self-esteem (Ger-
man version by von Collani and Herzberg (2003)of the Rosenberg self-esteem scale
(Rosenberg, 1965), slightly adapted for age). Additionally we elicited preference for
competition with questions adapted from PISA.13
After students filled in the questionnaires, teachers collected them, while students
were required to crumble the feedback notes and throw them in a garbage bin.14
Upon sending the results of the final exam as well as the filled-in questionnaires,
teachers were asked to fill in a short online survey.
3.5 Results
This section presents the results and is organized as follows: First, we describe our
randomization strategy and discuss concerns about non-random self-selection into
treatment groups. Thereafter, we present our data and descriptive statistics before
analyzing the impact of feedback on students’ performance. We first investigate the
effects of timing and then of the reference frame of feedback.
13For the measures adapted from the PISA studies also see Marsh et al. (2006).
14This was to prevent the feedback notes from being shown to other students (with Early
Timing) and from teachers finding them in the exam booklets when they graded the exams (with
Late Timing).
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3.5.1 Randomization and Self-selection
Blocked on school level, classes were randomized either into the Early Timing
treatment or the Late Timing treatment. With respect to these class-level treat-
ments non-random self-selection was possible as parents learned whether feedback
would be given 1-3 days before the exam or immediately before the exam. This was
necessary to receive parents’ fully informed consent. Within classes, students were
then randomized into the Control group, Change Frame treatment or Level
Frame treatment. Parents did not learn to which of the three treatments their child
was assigned as randomization into student-level treatments took place only after
we obtained parents’ consent and students only learned it when they received their
feedback notes. Hence, non-random self-selection into the student-level treatments
was not possible.
Overall, randomization for both class-level and student-level treatments was suc-
cessful as no significant differences between treatments are found in any relevant di-
mensions (prior test scores and grades, gender, student demographics). In the follow-
ing we will discuss the randomization checks in detail. Table 3.6 in Appendix 3.7.3
reports differences between Early Timing and Late Timing. Student and teacher
observables do not differ significantly between these class-level treatments, except
with respect to the share of students per class who participated and teacher ex-
perience. Fewer students per class participate in Early Timing as compared to
Late Timing and teachers in Early Timing are more experienced than teachers
in Late Timing.
Surprisingly, the share of participants turned out to be significantly lower in
the Early Timing treatment as compared to the Late Timing treatment. We
expected the opposite as parents might be concerned about larger negative (emo-
tional) effects on exam outcomes of their children when feedback is given shortly
before the exam.15 This could be an indication that parents were not concerned
15Overall, 26.1% students did not get their parents’ consent to participate in the experiment
(22.5% in the Late Timing treatment and 29.7% in the Early Timing treatment). In 16 out of
19 classes, more than 50% of the students within the class participated.
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about the timing of the feedback and that the difference in participation rates is
just a coincidence, in particular because all relevant characteristics are balanced.
Furthermore, as the treatment groups are balanced on student characteristics, we
do not expect teacher experience to influence our results. Teacher characteristics,
such as education or experience, do not explain much of the variation in educational
outcomes (Rivkin et al., 2005). Moreover, our analysis controls for teacher grading
by accounting for prior test scores and by standardizing test scores on class level.
Randomization checks for student-level treatments (Change Frame, Level
Frame, Control) can be found in Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 in Appendix 3.7.3. As
mentioned above, self-selection into these treatments was not possible, as students
had no information on assignment prior to the intervention, and student observables
in the student-level treatments are not significantly different from each other.
To summarize, a lower proportion of students participate in the Early Timing
treatment. However, student characteristics and prior performance measures do not
differ significantly between the class-level and the student-level treatments.
3.5.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our data consist of pre and post intervention performance measures provided by the
teachers as well as information from student questionnaires. Importantly, we have
detailed information on students’ past performance as we know students’ grades
and points in the two last exams before the interventions as well as the maximum
score possible in the exams. This information can be treated as exogenous, and
may be use in the analysis to control for heterogeneity in ability, because students
wrote the exams several months before teachers learned about the study. Students
are on average 11.60 years old and have 1.33 siblings. 46.42% of the students are
female and 38.04% of students have a non-German first and family name, hinting at
a recent migration experience in their family. The average grade in exam 1 is 2.74
and 2.59 in exam 2 on a scale from 1 to 6, where 1 is the highest and 6 is the lowest
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grade.16 Table 3.1 summarizes the feedback students received by treatment and
reveals that the range and standard deviation of feedback received in the Change
Frame and Level Frame treatments are of similar magnitude. Figures 3.8 and
3.9 in Appendix 3.7.5 show the distribution of given feedback pooled over class-level
treatments.
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of provided feedback
Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min. Max.
Change Frame Early Timing 59 0.763 8.052 -21 +21Late Timing 57 0.842 8.239 -19 +19
Level Frame Early Timing 64 13.922 8.407 1 30Late Timing 60 13.233 8.208 1 30
Control Early Timing 55 - - - -Late Timing 55 - - - -
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics of the feedback given to students by
class-level and student-level treatments.
3.5.3 Effects of Feedback on Performance
In the following we investigate the effects of our intervention. We first analyze the
effect of timing of feedback (Early Timing versus Late Timing) on performance,
which was randomized at the class level. Then we will analyze the overall effect
of the reference frame of feedback (Change Frame versus Level Frame versus
Control), which was randomized at the student level. The following tables present
results from linear regressions (OLS) that include prior performance as linear control
variables and student characteristics as dummy variables, as well as a constant.
Furthermore, all regressions contain class fixed effects. The advantage of including
class fixed effects is that we can control for heterogeneity of the class environments
and the identified effects of feedback are based on comparing students within the
same class. For all presented results, the reported standard errors are clustered at
the class level and corrected using bias-reduced linearization (Bell and McCaffrey,
16Approximate translation of German grades to American grades: 1.0 to 1.3 =A;>1.3 to 2.3=B;
>2.3 to 3.3=C; >3.3 to 4.0= D; >4.0=F
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2002; Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Cameron et al., 2008; Cameron and Miller, 2015)
to allow for cluster-robust inference with a small number of clusters.
First, we study the effect of timing of feedback on performance to learn whether
students receiving the intervention 1-3 days before the exam had different outcomes
than students receiving the intervention immediately before the exam. Then, we
will look at the Early Timing and the Late Timing groups separately to study
the effect of reference frame of feedback. This will allow us to explain whether a
possible difference between the Early Timing and the Late Timing groups is
driven by the effects of the Change Frame, or the Level Frame, or by both.
The Role of Timing of Feedback
We will investigate how timing affects the effectiveness of feedback by comparing
students who receive feedback with students who did not receive any feedback within
both Early Timing and Late Timing classes. To investigate whether there were
spillover effects of our intervention on the control group in Early Timing classes
(which was not possible in Late Timing classes) we will then compare the results
of the control groups of Early Timing and Late Timing classes.
To analyze whether receiving feedback was beneficial at either or both points
in time, we estimate the following OLS model separately for classes who had the
intervention early and classes who had the intervention late:
PointsTest3i (GradeTest3)i = α + β Feedbacki + γ PointsTest1i + δ PointsTest2i+
+ η Covariatesi + θ Classj + εij (3.1)
PointsTest3i are the percentage points in the final math exam of student i,
PointsTest1i and PointsTest2i are the percentage points in the second last and
the last exam of student i, Covariatesi is a vector of characteristics of student i:
student i’s gender, whether student i has a non-German name (to capture migration
65
background), whether student i has siblings, and whether student i has his own
room at home. Feedbacki indicates whether student i received feedback or not
while Classj controls for class fixed effects such that Feedbacki identifies the effect
of feedback by comparing the results of students who received feedback with those
of their classmates who did not. εij is a stochastic i.i.d. error term. While the
number of points attained by a student in the final exam captures his level of math
knowledge, which is the socially relevant outcome, the student himself might only
care about his grade. For this reason, we re-estimate the model with students’ grades
in the final exam (GradeTest3i) as dependent variable to investigate whether the
intervention affected the outcome that may be most relevant for the student.
Table 3.2: Effects of Feedback in Early Timing and Late Timing
Dep. Var.: Points in Exam 3 Dep. Var.: Grade in Exam 3
If Early Timing If Late Timing If Early Timing If Late Timing
Feedback 0.038∗∗ -0.012 -0.238∗∗ 0.142
(0.017) (0.016) (0.093) (0.096)
Points Exam 1 0.358∗∗∗ 0.127 -2.588∗∗∗ -1.529∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.121) (0.438) (0.574)
Points Exam 2 0.296∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ -1.980∗∗∗ -2.814∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.110) (0.516) (0.499)
Female 0.005 -0.040 -0.019 0.154
(0.028) (0.030) (0.181) (0.156)
ClassFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pupil Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 160 159 160 159
adj. R2 0.520 0.362 0.547 0.396
Note: This table presents the effect of feedback timing on performance in the last exam
using a linear regression model including class fixed effects. Columns 1 and 3 present
results for classes in which some students received feedback 1-3 days before the exam
while columns 2 and 4 present results for classes in which some students received feedback
immediately before the exam. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is percentage
points in exam 3. The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is grades in exam 3. (Larger
grades are worse grades.) Covariates: percentage points exam 1, percentage points exam
2, gender, own room, foreign name, siblings. Standard errors are reported in parentheses,
clustered on class level and corrected using bias-reduced linearization. The number of
clusters is 10 in model 1 and 9 in model 2. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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The first and the third column of Table 3.2 show that students who received
feedback 1-3 days prior to the exam had on average 3.8 percentage points more
and about 0.2 better grades, on a scale from 1.0 (best grade) to 6.0 (worst grade),
than students who did not receive any feedback. These effects are both significant
at the 5% level. However, when looking at the second and the fourth column, we
can see that students who received feedback immediately before the exam did not
have significantly different results from students who did not receive any feedback.
Results when excluding class fixed effects, prior performance measures, and student
characteristics can be found in Table 3.10 in Appendix 3.7.5.
Possible spillover effects Note that the above analyses identify the effects of
timing on performance by comparing students who received feedback in the Early
Timing classes with their classmates who did not receive any feedback and by com-
paring students who received feedback in the Late Timing classes with their class-
mates who did not receive any feedback. No spillover effects of feedback are possible
in late timing classes as students could not find out anything about the feedback
other students received (all students were already seated separately to write the
exam and received sheets formatted in the same way). However, the positive effect
of feedback in early timing classes could possibly be driven by spillover effects of
our intervention on students who did not receive any feedback. For example, stu-
dents who found out after our intervention but before the exam that their classmates
received feedback while they did not could have been discouraged, leading them to
perform worse in the exam compared to a situation where their classmates were not
treated. This would cause the positive effect of feedback to be overestimated. Al-
ternatively, the spillover effects could go in the other direction and students who did
not receive any feedback in the early treatment could, by interacting with those who
did receive feedback, become more motivated and perform better in the exam. This
would cause us to underestimate the benefits of feedback in the early treatment. To
address the question of whether there were spillover effects in early timing classes,
we compare the results of students in the control groups of early timing (where
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spillover effects were possible) and late timing classes (where spillover effects were
not possible).
As can be seen in Table 3.9 in Appendix 3.7.5, there are no significant differences
between the control groups of classes who received the intervention 1-3 days before
the exam and classes who received the intervention immediately before the exam
in terms of points or grades in the final exam. Interestingly, the results indicate
that students in the control group in classes where spillover effects were possible
(Early Timing) tended to have better outcomes than their counterparts in classes
where not spillover effects were possible (Late Timing). We infer from this that,
if anything, spillover effects of our intervention on the control group were positive
and that the positive effects of early feedback reported in Table 3.2 are lower bound
estimates, i.e. we tend to underestimate these effect.
In the next section we will analyze whether the different reference frames of
feedback matter for its effectiveness.
The Role of Reference Frame of Feedback
In order to investigate the role of reference frame of feedback, we will estimate the
following model:
PointsTest3i (GradeTest3)i = α + β ChangeFeedbacki + γ LevelFeedbacki+
δ PointsTest1i + ζ PointsTest2i + η Covariatesi + θ Classj + εij
(3.2)
PointsTest3i are the percentage points and GradeTest3i is the grade student i
in the final math exam.PointsTest1i and PointsTest2i are the percentage points
in the second last and the last exam of student i, Covariatesi is the same vector of
characteristics of student i as in equation 3.1. Classj controls for class fixed effects
and εij is a stochastic i.i.d. error term.
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We will analyze this model separately for classes who had the intervention 1-3
days before and classes who had the intervention immediately before the exam in
order to investigate why students seem to benefit from receiving feedback 1-3 days
but not from receiving feedback immediately before the exam.
Change and level feedback given early Table 3.3 presents the results with
respect to the reference frame of feedback for classes that were treated 1-3 days
before the exam. As can be seen in the first and fourth column (“All”), when given
early, both types of feedback lead to higher exam scores and better grades than
those of students who did not receive any feedback. Students who received change
and students who received level feedback have 3.8 and 3.9 percentage points higher
outcomes (0.2 and 0.3 better grades) , respectively, than students in the control
group. These effects are significant at the 10% and the 5% level (at the 10% and
the 1% level).
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Table 3.3: Change Frame vs. Level Frame vs. Control - Class-Level Treat-
ment: Early Timing
Dep. Var.: Points in Exam 3 Dep. Var.: Grade in Exam 3
All If Improved If Worsened All If Improved If Worsened
Change Frame 0.038∗ 0.002 0.081∗∗∗ -0.220∗ 0.048 -0.588∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.051) (0.027) (0.130) (0.353) (0.171)
Level Frame 0.039∗∗ 0.026 0.053∗∗ -0.254∗∗∗ -0.181 -0.386∗∗
(0.016) (0.037) (0.025) (0.092) (0.237) (0.164)
Points Exam 1 0.358∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗ -2.581∗∗∗ -2.367∗∗ -3.655∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.149) (0.127) (0.440) (1.096) (0.939)
Points Exam 2 0.297∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.161 -1.988∗∗∗ -2.407∗∗ -0.543
(0.067) (0.128) (0.121) (0.511) (0.967) (0.980)
Female 0.005 -0.006 0.020 -0.017 -0.005 -0.072
(0.029) (0.051) (0.022) (0.184) (0.325) (0.125)
ClassFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pupil Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 160 87 73 160 87 73
adj. R2 0.517 0.426 0.611 0.544 0.481 0.632
Note: This table presents the effect of change frame and level frame feedback when given
1-3 days in advance using a linear regression model including class fixed effects. Column
1 and 4 present the results for the whole sample, columns 2 and 5 present the results for
students whose rank improved from exam 1 to exam 2, and columns 3 and 6 present results
for students whose rank worsened from exam 1 to exam 2. The dependent variable in
columns 1, 2, and is percentage points in exam 3. The dependent variable in columns 4, 5,
and 6 is grades in exam 3. (Larger grades are worse grades.) Covariates: percentage points
exam 1, percentage points exam 2, gender, own room, foreign name, siblings. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses, clustered on class level and corrected using bias-reduced
linearization. The number of clusters is 10. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Since the effects of change feedback may depend on whether it reported a positive
or a negative change, columns 2 and 3 and columns 5 and 6 further investigate
whether there are heterogeneous effects of change feedback depending on its sign.
We can see that the overall positive effect of change feedback is driven by stu-
dents who received negative change feedback. Columns 3 and 6 show that telling
students who decreased their relative performance by how much their relative per-
formance decreased increases their performance in the final test by 8.1 percentage
points and by almost two thirds of a grade (0.6 grade points on a 6 point scale) as
compared to their classmates who dropped in rank but received no feedback. These
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effects are significant at the 1% level. Students who became worse and who received
level feedback have a 5.3 percentage points and 0.4 grade points better outcome than
students who received no feedback. These effects are significant at the 5% level.17
Results when excluding class fixed effects, prior performance measures, and student
characteristics can be found in Tables 3.12 and 3.13 in Appendix 3.7.5. Our results
thus provide evidence in favor of hypothesis 1a: We find that, indeed, early level
feedback significantly improves exam performance. However, our results contradict
hypothesis 1b: Those who receive negative change feedback have a significant im-
provement in their performance (we expected it to worsen), while those who receive
positive change feedback do not have a significant change in their performance, with
a coefficient almost equal to zero (we expected it to improve). We will try to further
explain the effects of change feedback in Section 3.5.4 by investigating whether it
influenced student’s effort effectiveness belief as described in Section 3.3.
Change and level feedback given late Table 3.4 presents the results with
respect to the reference frame of feedback for classes that were treated immediately
before the exam. As we saw above in Table 3.2 we did not find an overall significant
effect of feedback given late. Looking at Table 3.4, neither feedback with a change
frame nor feedback with a level frame had a significant effect on students knowledge
at the exam as captured by their test scores. The first column shows that the
overall effect of the change feedback is very close to zero. However, there seems to
be heterogeneity in effects. The coefficient of the change feedback treatment dummy
has a positive sign for students who improved (second column) and a negative sign
for students who got worse (third column), although none of them are significant.
However when looking at students grades we find a negative effect of 0.3 grade points
of receiving negative change feedback immediately before the exam on one’s grade.
This effect is significant at the 5% level. This indicates that the effect of change
feedback given immediately before the exam depends on whether the feedback is
17F-tests show that the coefficients of the change feedback and the level feedback in column 3
and column 6, respectively, are not significantly different from each other.
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positive or negative and that while positive feedback tends to have no effect, negative
feedback tends to have a negative effect.
Table 3.4: Change Frame vs. Level Frame vs. Control - Class-Level Treat-
ment: Late Timing
Dep. Var.: Points in Exam 3 Dep. Var.: Grade in Exam 3
All If Improved If Worsened All If Improved If Worsened
Change Frame -0.002 0.022 -0.029 0.105 -0.037 0.312∗∗
(0.018) (0.040) (0.023) (0.106) (0.240) (0.149)
Level Frame -0.022 -0.009 -0.023 0.176 0.025 0.271
(0.020) (0.031) (0.046) (0.121) (0.181) (0.289)
Points Exam 1 0.125 0.105 0.382∗∗∗ -1.522∗∗∗ -2.171 -2.832∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.293) (0.129) (0.580) (1.399) (0.813)
Points Exam 2 0.437∗∗∗ 0.429 0.256∗ -2.818∗∗∗ -2.161 -1.743∗∗
(0.110) (0.269) (0.137) (0.499) (1.353) (0.797)
Female -0.041 -0.047 -0.021 0.159 0.135 0.093
(0.031) (0.039) (0.028) (0.160) (0.162) (0.205)
ClassFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pupil Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 159 76 83 159 76 83
adj. R2 0.361 0.204 0.456 0.393 0.289 0.436
Note: This table presents the effect of change frame and level frame feedback when given
immediately before the exam using a linear regression model including class fixed ef-
fects.Column 1 and 4 present the results for the whole sample, columns 2 and 5 present
the results for students whose rank improved from exam 1 to exam 2, and columns 3 and 6
present results for students whose rank worsened from exam 1 to exam 2. The dependent
variable in columns 1, 2, and is percentage points in exam 3. The dependent variable in
columns 4, 5, and 6 is grades in exam 3. (Larger grades are worse grades.) Covariates:
percentage points exam 1, percentage points exam 2, gender, own room, foreign name, sib-
lings. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered on class level and corrected
using biased-reduced linearization. The number of clusters is 9. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
Note that the signs of the coefficient for change feedback in the third and the sixth
column of Table 3.4 is the reverse of the signs of the coefficient for change feedback in
the respective columns of Table 3.3, indicating that while negative change feedback
has a positive effect on educational outcomes when it is given 1-3 days before the
exam, negative change feedback has the opposite effect when given immediately
before the exam.
Additionally, all the signs of the coefficients of level feedback when it is given late
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are the reverse to when it is given early: When level feedback is given 1-3 days before
the exam we found it to have a generally positive effect while the same feedback when
given immediately before the exam seems to have a negative effect, although it is
smaller in magnitude and not significant. Results when excluding class fixed effects,
prior performance measures, and student characteristics can be found in Tables 3.14
and 3.15 in Appendix 3.7.5. We do not find any significant effects of level feedback
when given late feedback. However, the signs of the coefficients are in line with
hypothesis 2a (when given late, level feedback has a negative effect). Although we
do not find that student’s exam scores are influenced by change feedback when it is
given late, we find that feedback about negative changes negatively influences grades.
This partly confirms hypothesis 2b (when given late, positive change feedback has
a positive effect and negative change feedback has a negative effect).
3.5.4 Mechanisms
In this section we explore several behavioral mechanisms that might contribute
to explaining our results. First, we look at whether the effects of feedback on
outcomes can be explained by changes in the belief about the effectiveness of learning
effort. Then, we will investigate whether feedback influenced emotions captured by
students’ state self-esteem.
Effects of feedback on students’ effort effectiveness belief The “growth
mindset” hypothesis described in section 3.3 predicts that making changes in past
performance salient reinforces the belief that one’s outcomes can be influenced by
one’s effort. We expected level feedback not to influence this belief. Table 3.16 in
Appendix 3.7.6 shows that students who received change feedback report a weakly
significant 0.16 standard deviations higher effort-effectiveness belief than the control
group.18 Furthermore, the results show that level feedback tends not to influence
this belief.
18Note that, unlike in the regressions with test scores as dependent variables, we do not have
pre-intervention information on students’ effort effectiveness belief (or self-esteem) to control for
level differences.
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Effects of feedback on students’ self-esteem We expected that level feedback
as well as negative change feedback would on average be disappointing to students
while positive change feedback would cheer them up. Table 3.17 in Appendix 3.7.6
shows that feedback tends to have a negative effect on students’ self-esteem.
3.5.5 Sub-group Analyses
In the following we investigate whether effects of our feedback intervention is mod-
erated by students’ gender, preference for competition, math confidence and locus
of control.
Interaction with gender Remarkably, as shown in Table 3.19 in Appendix 3.7.7,
the overall positive effect of both change and level feedback in the early treatment
is driven by the response of boys. Boys have 5.9 and 7.4 percentage points better
results in the change and level treatments, respectively, than in the control group. At
the same time, there is no significant difference for girls in any of the two treatment
groups and the control group. This could possibly be driven by boys being more
overconfident with respect to their prior knowledge than girls, as the literature
suggests that (adult) males are more overconfident than (adult) females (Barber
and Odean, 2001; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). Indeed, when we look at the
effects of feedback on self-esteem of boys and girls separately, we find that it strongly
reduces boys’ self-esteem, while girls’ self-esteem tends to be increased ( Table 3.18
in Appendix 3.7.6 ). This indicates that boys were on average disappointed by the
feedback they received while girls were not.
Furthermore, looking at improvers and worseners separately reveals a positive
effect of level feedback on boys who improved but no effect of any type of feedback on
girls who improved, as F-tests show that the combined coefficients of the treatment
dummies and the female indicators are not significantly different from zero. However,
we find that both boys and girls respond positively to feedback about negative
changes, as the coefficient of the interaction term of change feedback and female is
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very small and insignificant. Analyses for classes that received feedback late reveal
that neither the results of boys nor the results of girls are influenced by late feedback.
Interactions with preference for competition and character traits The
psychological literature suggests that individual differences in character matter for
how people react to (positive and negative) feedback (Ilgen et al., 1979). For example
people with a more external locus of control may think that a bad outcome is due
to factors they cannot control and may therefore not react to negative feedback by
increasing their effort (Lam and Schaubroeck, 2000). People with high self-efficacy,
i.e. a strong belief that they have the skills to complete a particular task, have been
found to be more motivated by feedback than people who have low self-efficacy (Noe,
2000).
We do not find evidence that students’ preference for competition (Table 3.21),
confidence in math ability (Table 3.22) or locus of control (Table 3.23) explain their
response to change or level feedback.
3.6 Conclusion
We investigated factors that may explain why feedback about past performance
sometimes has positive and sometimes negative effects on performance. To do so we
implemented a randomized feedback intervention in secondary schools. We varied
the timing and reference frame of relative performance feedback to analyze its causal
effect on performance in a high-stakes exam. With respect to timing, we compare
students who received feedback either 1-3 days before the last math exam of the
semester to students receiving the feedback immediately before the exam started.
Concerning the reference frame of feedback students within the same class received
either a level feedback, about their absolute rank in the preceding exam, or a change
feedback, about their change in ranks between the two preceding exams, or no
feedback
We expected that feedback affects both students expectations and emotions. We
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find that level feedback and negative change feedback significantly improve outcomes
in the final exam when given early but tend to decrease outcomes when given late.
We do not find significant effects of positive change feedback. Our results also show
that change (but not level) feedback strengthens the belief that one’s outcomes can
be influenced by one’s effort and that feedback has an overall negative effect on
students’ emotions. Feedback has particularly strong effects on boys, while it is also
boys’ emotional state that is negatively affected by feedback. The results suggest
that negatively surprising information about past performance may significantly
improve performance in a high-stakes environment when it is given early enough,
however, when it is given too late a negative emotional effect may dominate a
positive incentive effect of information provision. Our results give interesting insights
into the psychological and behavioral effects of relative performance feedback in an
educational setting and has implications for the design of feedback in other situations
where the ability to motivate people is crucial.
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3.7 Appendix to Chapter 3
3.7.1 Results of Pre-experimental Survey
Figure 3.1: Pretest - Predicted Emotions and Motivation by Reference Frame of
Feedback
Note: This graph shows the results of a pretest separately for change feedback (left) and
level feedback (right). Dark bars are mean responses to the question How do you think
does Paul feel after reading the note?, gray bars are mean responses to the question How
much do you think is Paul motivated to exert effort in the upcoming math exam?. Both are
measured on a 1 to 5 scale. Feedback notes in the pretest were varied such that students
faced either a change in Paul’s rank of -6, -3, 0, 3 or 6 or the ranks 5, 15 or 25. Differences
between emotions and motivation were tested with a mean-comparison tests.
3.7.2 Feedback Notes
Figure 3.2: Feedback Note - Control Group [translated
from German]
Fischer and Wagner – Sweet Treats or Bitter Pills? On Timing and Content of Rank Feedback 08/02/17 15/38
Feedback Notes – translated from German
Dear [Student Name],
I looked at the points of each student in the class in the
last exam.
Relative to your classmates, you achieved with your
performance in the last math exam, the XX th place.
I wish you great succes in your exam!
[Teacher Name]
Change Feedback Level Feedback
Control Group
Dear [Student Name],
I compared the points of each student in the class in the
last two exams.
Relative to your classmates, you improved/worsened
your performance in the last math exam by XX places.
I wish you great succes in your exam!
[Teacher Name]
Dear [Student Name],
I wish you great success in your exam!
[Teacher Name]
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Figure 3.3: Feedback Note - Change Frame Treatment
[translated from German]
Fischer and Wagner – Sweet Treats or Bitter Pills? On Timing and Content of Rank Feedback 09/02/17 16/38
Feedback Notes – translated from German
Dear [Student Name],
I looked at the points of each student in the class in the
last exam.
Relative to your classmates, you achieved with your
performance in the last math exam, the XX th place.
I wish you great success in your exam!
[Teacher Name]
Change Feedback Level Feedback
Control Group
Dear [Student Name],
I compared the points of each student in the class in the
last two exams.
Relative to your classmates, you improved/worsened
your performance in the last math exam by XX places.
I wish you great success in your exam!
[Teacher Name]
Dear [Student Name],
I wish you great succes in your exam!
[Teacher Name]
Figure 3.4: Feedback Note - Level Frame Treatment
[translated from German]
Dear [Student Name],
I looked at the points of each student in the class in the
last exam.
Relative to your classmates you achieved, with your
performance in the last math exam, the XXth place.
I wish you great success in your exam!
[Teacher Name]
Fischer and Wagner – Timing and Reference Frame of Feedback 906/11/2017
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3.7.3 Balance and Randomization Checks
Table 3.5: Treatment Observations
Class Level Randomization
Late-Feedback Treatment Early-Feedback Treatment Total Observations
P
up
il
Le
ve
l
R
an
do
m
iz
at
io
n
Change Treatment 57 59 116
Level Treatment 61 64 125
Control Treatment 56 55 111
Total Observations 174 178 352
Note: This table summarizes the number of participants by treatment groups. In total,
352 children in 19 classes in 7 schools received parents’ consent and participated.
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Table 3.6: Randomization Check Class-Level Treatments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Late-Feedback
Treatment
Early-
Feedback
Treatment
Overall (1) vs. (2),
p-value
Female Teacher 0.793 0.781 0.787 0.781
(0.031) (0.031) (0.022)
Class Size 27.782 27.242 27.509 0.123
(0.244) (0.250) (0.175)
Age 23.667 24.708 24.193 0.363
(0.816) (0.802) (0.572)
Points Exam1 0.712 0.681 0.696 0.105
(0.014) (0.014) (0.010)
Points Exam2 0.719 0.730 0.725 0.554
(0.014) (0.013) (0.009)
Rank Exam1 0.495 0.490 0.493 0.889
(0.022) (0.021) (0.015)
Rank Exam2 0.467 0.493 0.481 0.399
(0.021) (0.022) (0.015)
Change in Rank 0.523 −0.028 0.243 0.505
(0.592) (0.577) (0.413)
Share Worsen 0.506 0.455 0.480 0.343
(0.038) (0.037) (0.027)
Share Participants 0.775 0.703 0.739 0.000
(0.015) (0.012) (0.010)
Female Pupil 0.480 0.449 0.464 0.570
(0.038) (0.037) (0.027)
Single Room 0.655 0.596 0.625 0.370
(0.046) (0.048) (0.033)
Internet 1.115 1.022 1.068 0.366
(0.072) (0.073) (0.051)
A-Level 2.034 2.056 2.045 0.879
(0.103) (0.099) (0.071)
Car 1.333 1.303 1.318 0.785
(0.078) (0.078) (0.055)
Siblings 1.299 1.489 1.395 0.165
(0.094) (0.099) (0.068)
Teacher Exp. 9.902 12.833 11.513 0.008
(0.647) (0.831) (0.548)
Books at Home 1.983 2.140 2.063 0.314
(0.110) (0.111) (0.078)
N 174 178 352
Proportion 0.494 0.506 1.000
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.7: Randomization Check Student-Level Treatments - Early Timing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Control Change Level Overall (1) vs. (2),
p-value
(1) vs. (3),
p-value
(2) vs. (3),
p-value
Female Teacher 0.782 0.780 0.781 0.781 0.978 0.994 0.983
(0.056) (0.054) (0.052) (0.031)
Class Size 27.255 27.322 27.156 27.242 0.914 0.874 0.784
(0.452) (0.429) (0.424) (0.250)
Age 23.750 23.415 23.286 23.478 0.820 0.761 0.930
(1.069) (1.005) (1.080) (0.604)
Points Exam1 0.691 0.661 0.690 0.681 0.422 0.967 0.407
(0.025) (0.027) (0.021) (0.014)
Points Exam2 0.733 0.732 0.727 0.730 0.976 0.845 0.866
(0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.013)
Rank Exam1 0.472 0.510 0.488 0.490 0.487 0.751 0.678
(0.038) (0.038) (0.035) (0.021)
Rank Exam2 0.482 0.487 0.508 0.493 0.934 0.637 0.687
(0.041) (0.038) (0.037) (0.022)
Change in Rank −0.382 0.763 −0.453 −0.028 0.424 0.959 0.400
(0.959) (1.048) (0.988) (0.577)
Share Worsen 0.455 0.458 0.453 0.455 0.974 0.988 0.960
(0.068) (0.065) (0.063) (0.037)
Share Participants 0.710 0.701 0.699 0.703 0.751 0.706 0.959
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.012)
Female Pupil 0.418 0.424 0.500 0.449 0.953 0.376 0.401
(0.067) (0.065) (0.063) (0.037)
Single Room 0.765 0.759 0.707 0.742 0.948 0.500 0.536
(0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.034)
Internet 1.100 1.315 1.241 1.222 0.129 0.345 0.628
(0.096) (0.102) (0.111) (0.060)
A-level 2.347 2.453 2.582 2.465 0.500 0.130 0.292
(0.132) (0.088) (0.085) (0.059)
Car 1.471 1.648 1.518 1.547 0.255 0.731 0.363
(0.106) (0.113) (0.088) (0.059)
Siblings 1.462 1.288 1.466 1.407 0.170 0.975 0.145
(0.093) (0.084) (0.086) (0.051)
Teacher Exp. 12.638 12.980 12.870 12.833 0.870 0.910 0.957
(1.471) (1.466) (1.409) (0.831)
Books at Home 2.231 2.679 2.379 2.429 0.057 0.481 0.205
(0.144) (0.182) (0.151) (0.093)
N 55 59 64 178
Proportion 0.309 0.331 0.360 1.000
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.8: Randomization Check Student-Level Treatments - Late Timing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Control Change Level Overall (1) vs. (2),
p-value
(1) vs. (3),
p-value
(2) vs. (3),
p-value
Female Teacher 0.782 0.789 0.800 0.791 0.922 0.813 0.889
(0.056) (0.054) (0.052) (0.031)
Class Size 27.782 27.877 27.667 27.773 0.874 0.852 0.730
(0.429) (0.421) (0.437) (0.247)
Age 22.667 22.075 22.429 22.382 0.712 0.885 0.823
(1.174) (1.086) (1.136) (0.650)
Points Exam1 0.745 0.708 0.703 0.718 0.264 0.179 0.871
(0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.013)
Points Exam2 0.730 0.712 0.717 0.719 0.581 0.681 0.881
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.014)
Rank Exam1 0.438 0.502 0.522 0.489 0.253 0.105 0.706
(0.039) (0.040) (0.034) (0.022)
Rank Exam2 0.457 0.470 0.475 0.467 0.800 0.728 0.924
(0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.021)
Change in Rank −0.600 0.842 1.250 0.523 0.342 0.190 0.777
(1.044) (1.091) (0.943) (0.592)
Share Worsen 0.527 0.544 0.467 0.512 0.862 0.520 0.408
(0.068) (0.067) (0.065) (0.038)
Share Participants 0.778 0.772 0.770 0.773 0.861 0.812 0.953
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.015)
Female Pupil 0.418 0.544 0.475 0.480 0.186 0.549 0.460
(0.067) (0.067) (0.066) (0.038)
Single Room 0.745 0.811 0.804 0.787 0.421 0.474 0.919
(0.062) (0.054) (0.054) (0.032)
Internet 1.235 1.255 1.411 1.304 0.898 0.220 0.278
(0.107) (0.108) (0.095) (0.059)
A-level 2.511 2.320 2.604 2.480 0.251 0.518 0.059
(0.113) (0.119) (0.091) (0.063)
Car 1.431 1.491 1.655 1.528 0.694 0.168 0.309
(0.106) (0.106) (0.120) (0.064)
Siblings 1.220 1.245 1.268 1.245 0.866 0.742 0.874
(0.108) (0.104) (0.097) (0.059)
Teacher Exp. 9.795 9.725 9.930 9.820 0.966 0.933 0.897
(1.159) (1.132) (1.098) (0.647)
Books at Home 2.160 2.189 2.382 2.247 0.900 0.361 0.409
(0.167) (0.155) (0.173) (0.095)
N 55 57 60 172
Proportion 0.320 0.331 0.349 1.000
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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3.7.4 Graphs
Figure 3.5: Distribution of points in Test 1
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Note: This graph shows the distribution of points in test 1.
Figure 3.6: Distribution of points in Test 2
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Note: This graph shows the distribution of points in test 2.
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Figure 3.7: Distribution of points in Test 3
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Note: This graph shows the distribution of points in test 3.
Figure 3.8: Feedback in Change Frame Treatment
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Note: This graph shows kernel density estimates for the
feedback students received in the Change Treatment.
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Figure 3.9: Feedback in Level Frame Treatment
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Note: This graph shows kernel density estimates for the
feedback students received in the Level Treatment.
3.7.5 Check for Spillovers and Robustness Checks
Table 3.9: Check for Spillover Effects
(1) (2)
Points in Exam 3 (Control Group) Grade in Exam 3 (Control Group)
Early Timing 0.042 -0.161
(0.033) (0.193)
Points Exam 1 0.271 -2.452∗∗∗
(0.164) (0.847)
Points Exam 2 0.395∗∗ -2.512∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.860)
Female 0.014 -0.116
(0.027) (0.184)
SchoolFE Yes Yes
Pupil Controls Yes Yes
N 101 101
adj. R2 0.274 0.370
Note: This table presents the differences in outcomes of the control groups of classes who
had the intervention early and classes who had the intervention late. In column 1 the
dependent variable percentage points in exam 3, while in column 2 the dependent variable
is grades in exam 3. Covariates: percentage points exam 1, percentage points exam 2,
gender, own room, foreign name, siblings. Standard errors are reported in parentheses,
clustered on class level and corrected using bias-reduced linearization. The number of
clusters 19. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.10: Robustness Checks - Class-Level Treatments - Points
Dep. Var.: Points in Exam 3
If Early Timing If Early Timing If Early Timing If Late Timing If Late Timing If Late Timing
Feedback 0.026∗ 0.026 0.032∗ -0.032 -0.029∗ -0.013
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.014)
Points Exam 1 0.314∗∗∗ 0.182
(0.044) (0.113)
Points Exam 2 0.281∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.106)
Female -0.007 -0.042
(0.030) (0.027)
ClassFE No Yes No No Yes No
Pupil Controls No No Yes No No Yes
N 160 160 160 159 159 159
adj. R2 -0.001 0.160 0.411 0.000 0.141 0.315
Note: This table presents the effect of feedback timing on performance in the last exam
using a linear regression model. Dependent variable: percentage points in exam 3. Models
1 and 4 do not contain any control variables. Models 2 and 5 contain class fixed effects but
no other control variables. Models 3 and 6 control for percentage points exam 1, percentage
points exam 2, gender, own room, foreign name, and siblings but do not contain class fixed
effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered on class level and corrected
using bias-reduced linearization. The number of clusters is 10 in models 1, 2, and 3 and 9
in models 4, 5, and 6. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 3.11: Robustness Checks - Class-Level Treatments - Grade
Dep. Var.: Grade in Exam 3
If Early Timing If Early Timing If Early Timing If Late Timing If Late Timing If Late Timing
Feedback -0.133 -0.144 -0.187∗∗ 0.282∗ 0.253∗ 0.175∗∗
(0.105) (0.112) (0.091) (0.146) (0.129) (0.083)
Points Exam 1 -2.218∗∗∗ -1.870∗∗∗
(0.441) (0.536)
Points Exam 2 -1.855∗∗ -2.645∗∗∗
(0.838) (0.459)
Female 0.062 0.153
(0.198) (0.151)
ClassFE No Yes No No Yes No
Pupil Controls No No Yes No No Yes
N 160 160 160 159 159 159
adj. R2 -0.003 0.158 0.403 0.006 0.117 0.358
Note: This table presents the effect of feedback timing on performance in the last exam
using a linear regression model. Dependent variable: grade in exam 3. Models 1 and 4
do not contain any control variables. Models 2 and 5 contain class fixed effects but no
other control variables. Models 3 and 6 control for percentage points exam 1, percentage
points exam 2, gender, own room, foreign name, and siblings but do not contain class fixed
effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered on class level and corrected
using bias-reduced linearization. The number of clusters is 10 in models 1, 2, and 3 and 9
in models 4, 5, and 6. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.12: Robustness Checks - Student-Level Treatments in Early Timing -
Points
Dep. Var.: Points in Exam 3
All All All If Improved If Improved If Improved If Worsened If Worsened If Worsened
Change Frame 0.027 0.024 0.033 -0.031 -0.033 -0.014 0.095∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.053) (0.055) (0.048) (0.024) (0.018) (0.035)
Level Frame 0.025 0.029 0.030∗ -0.009 0.001 0.016 0.066∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗ 0.053
(0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.036) (0.041) (0.039) (0.018) (0.029) (0.034)
Points Exam 1 0.314∗∗∗ 0.191 0.511∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.132) (0.150)
Points Exam 2 0.280∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.081
(0.106) (0.084) (0.187)
Female -0.006 -0.005 -0.009
(0.030) (0.046) (0.038)
ClassFE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Pupil Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
N 160 160 160 87 87 87 73 73 73
adj. R2 -0.008 0.155 0.407 -0.019 0.082 0.363 0.028 0.264 0.482
Note: This table presents the effect of change frame and level frame feedback when given
1-3 days in advance using a linear regression model. Dependent variable: percentage points
in exam 3. Models 1, 4, and 7 does not contain any control variables. Models 2, 5, and
8 contains class fixed effects but no other control variables. Models 3, 6, and 9 controls
for percentage points exam 1, percentage points exam 2, gender, own room, foreign name,
and siblings but does not contain class fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses, clustered on class level and corrected using bias-reduced linearization. The
number of clusters is 10. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.13: Robustness Checks - Student-Level Treatments in Early Timing -
Grade
Dep. Var.: Grade in Exam 3
All All All If Improved If Improved If Improved If Worsened If Worsened If Worsened
Change Frame -0.124 -0.113 -0.177 0.310 0.310 0.173 -0.634∗∗∗ -0.663∗∗∗ -0.599∗∗
(0.136) (0.131) (0.120) (0.378) (0.377) (0.337) (0.213) (0.124) (0.268)
Level Frame -0.142 -0.172 -0.196∗ 0.074 -0.000 -0.100 -0.405∗∗∗ -0.499∗∗∗ -0.343
(0.126) (0.134) (0.101) (0.250) (0.280) (0.253) (0.152) (0.172) (0.271)
Points Exam 1 -2.214∗∗∗ -1.524 -3.652∗∗∗
(0.439) (0.991) (1.096)
Points Exam 2 -1.859∗∗ -3.069∗∗∗ -0.342
(0.832) (0.796) (1.512)
Female 0.063 0.023 0.099
(0.201) (0.289) (0.262)
ClassFE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Pupil Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
N 160 160 160 87 87 87 73 73 73
adj. R2 -0.009 0.153 0.399 -0.012 0.091 0.382 0.025 0.284 0.440
Note: This table presents the effect of change frame and level frame feedback when given
1-3 days in advance using a linear regression model. Dependent variable:grade in exam 3.
Models 1, 4, and 7 does not contain any control variables. Models 2, 5, and 8 contains
class fixed effects but no other control variables. Models 3, 6, and 9 controls for percentage
points exam 1, percentage points exam 2, gender, own room, foreign name, and siblings but
does not contain class fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered
on class level and corrected using bias-reduced linearization. The number of clusters is 10.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.14: Robustness Checks - Student-Level Treatments in Late Timing -
Points
Dep. Var.: Points in Exam 3
All All All If Improved If Improved If Improved If Worsened If Worsened If Worsened
Change Frame -0.018 -0.018 -0.001 -0.028 -0.012 0.015 -0.006 -0.025 -0.011
(0.023) (0.021) (0.017) (0.030) (0.031) (0.037) (0.044) (0.030) (0.025)
Level Frame -0.044∗∗ -0.040∗∗ -0.025 -0.035 -0.016 -0.024 -0.059 -0.064∗ -0.015
(0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.028) (0.028) (0.034) (0.043) (0.036) (0.038)
Points Exam 1 0.180 0.139 0.391∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.258) (0.126)
Points Exam 2 0.462∗∗∗ 0.435∗ 0.346∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.248) (0.116)
Female -0.044 -0.055 -0.027
(0.029) (0.043) (0.029)
ClassFE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Pupil Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
N 159 159 159 76 76 76 83 83 83
adj. R2 -0.001 0.138 0.314 -0.019 0.043 0.183 -0.000 0.242 0.354
Note: This table presents the effect of change frame and level frame feedback when given
1-3 days in advance using a linear regression model. Dependent variable: percentage points
in exam 3. Models 1, 4, and 7 does not contain any control variables. Models 2, 5, and
8 contains class fixed effects but no other control variables. Models 3, 6, and 9 controls
for percentage points exam 1, percentage points exam 2, gender, own room, foreign name,
and siblings but does not contain class fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses, clustered on class level and corrected using bias-reduced linearization. The
number of clusters is 9. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 3.15: Robustness Checks - Student-Level Treatments in Late Timing - Grade
Dep. Var.: Grade in Exam 3
All All All If Improved If Improved If Improved If Worsened If Worsened If Worsened
Change Frame 0.213 0.204 0.124 0.247 0.182 -0.022 0.166 0.234 0.266
(0.177) (0.156) (0.105) (0.222) (0.237) (0.209) (0.339) (0.240) (0.177)
Level Frame 0.347∗∗ 0.299∗∗ 0.223∗∗ 0.116 0.019 0.092 0.614∗ 0.545∗ 0.324
(0.162) (0.144) (0.104) (0.170) (0.159) (0.177) (0.335) (0.284) (0.251)
Points Exam 1 -1.860∗∗∗ -2.196∗ -2.888∗∗∗
(0.543) (1.225) (0.853)
Points Exam 2 -2.652∗∗∗ -1.923 -1.956∗∗∗
(0.462) (1.164) (0.630)
Female 0.158 0.165 0.098
(0.156) (0.171) (0.214)
ClassFE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Pupil Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
N 159 159 159 76 76 76 83 83 83
adj. R2 0.002 0.113 0.355 -0.019 -0.012 0.282 0.023 0.200 0.375
Note: This table presents the effect of change frame and level frame feedback when given
1-3 days in advance using a linear regression model. Dependent variable:grade in exam 3.
Models 1, 4, and 7 does not contain any control variables. Models 2, 5, and 8 contains
class fixed effects but no other control variables. Models 3, 6, and 9 controls for percentage
points exam 1, percentage points exam 2, gender, own room, foreign name, and siblings but
does not contain class fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered
on class level and corrected using bias-reduced linearization. The number of clusters is 9.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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3.7.6 Mechanisms: Effort-effectiveness Belief and Self-esteem
Table 3.16: Change Frame vs. Level Frame vs. Con-
trol - Dep. var. effort effectiveness belief
(1) (2) (3)
All If Improved If Worsened
Change Frame 0.168∗ 0.274 0.228
(0.093) (0.216) (0.182)
Level Frame 0.017 0.144 -0.065
(0.155) (0.216) (0.241)
Points Exam 1 1.003∗∗∗ 1.693∗∗∗ 0.922
(0.272) (0.618) (1.621)
Points Exam 2 1.273∗∗ 0.187 1.259
(0.559) (1.095) (1.309)
Female -0.079 -0.147 0.063
(0.118) (0.102) (0.262)
ClassFE Yes Yes Yes
Pupil Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 161 88 73
adj. R2 0.0868 0.1192 -0.0763
Note: This table presents the effect of change frame and level
frame feedback on effectiveness belief using a linear regression
model including class fixed effects. Model 1 present results
for the whole sample in each early and late treatment classes,
model 2 present results for students who improved, and model
3 present results for students who worsened their performance
from the second last to the last exam. Dependent variable:
effort-effectiveness belief (standardized to zero mean and unit
standard deviation). Covariates: percentage points exam 1,
percentage points exam 2, gender, own room, foreign name,
siblings. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered
on classroom level and corrected using biased-reduced lineariza-
tion. The number of clusters is 10. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
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Table 3.17: Change Frame vs. Level Frame vs. Con-
trol - Dep. var. state self-esteem
(1) (2) (3)
All If Improved If Worsened
Change Frame -0.206 -0.437∗ -0.075
(0.130) (0.232) (0.249)
Level Frame -0.280∗ -0.442∗ -0.058
(0.142) (0.232) (0.263)
Points Exam 1 0.715 1.593 0.189
(0.673) (0.991) (2.276)
Points Exam 2 1.507∗∗∗ 0.251 1.640
(0.535) (1.234) (1.699)
Female -0.113 -0.011 -0.028
(0.168) (0.327) (0.201)
ClassFE Yes Yes Yes
Pupil Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 151 81 70
adj. R2 0.1321 0.1478 0.0568
Note: This table presents the effect of change frame and level
frame feedback on state self-esteem using a linear regression
model including class fixed effects. Model 1 present results
for the whole sample in each early and late treatment classes,
model 2 present results for students who improved, and model
3 present results for students who worsened their performance
from the second last to the last exam. Dependent variable:
state-self esteem (standardized to zero mean and unit standard
deviation). Covariates: percentage points exam 1, percentage
points exam 2, gender, own room, foreign name, siblings. Stan-
dard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered on classroom
level and corrected using biased-reduced linearization. The
number of clusters is 10. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.18: Change Frame vs. Level
Frame vs. Control - Dep. var. state
self-esteem (by gender)
(1) (2)
Boys Girls
Change Frame -0.549∗∗ 0.439∗
(0.270) (0.250)
Level Frame -0.464∗∗∗ -0.095
(0.150) (0.258)
Points Exam 1 0.867 0.771
(1.470) (0.740)
Points Exam 2 2.041∗ 0.712
(1.143) (0.493)
ClassFE Yes Yes
Pupil Controls Yes Yes
N 80 71
adj. R2 0.1819 0.1193
Note: This table presents the effect of change
frame and level frame feedback on state self-
esteem using a linear regression model includ-
ing class fixed effects. Model 1 present results
for boys, model 2 present results for girls.
Dependent variable: state self-esteem (stan-
dardized to zero mean and unit standard de-
viation). Covariates: percentage points exam
1, percentage points exam 2, gender, own
room, foreign name, siblings. Standard er-
rors are reported in parentheses, clustered on
classroom level and corrected using biased-
reduced linearization. The number of clus-
ters is 10. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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3.7.7 Sub-group Analyses
Table 3.19: Change Frame vs. Level Frame vs. Control - Class-Level
Treatment: Early Timing (Interaction with gender)
Dep. Var.: Points in Exam 3 Dep. Var.: Grade in Exam 3
All If Improved If Worsened All If Improved If Worsened
Change Frame 0.059∗∗ 0.050 0.084∗∗ -0.372∗∗ -0.185 -0.688∗∗
(0.024) (0.054) (0.041) (0.149) (0.380) (0.318)
Change Frame X Female -0.051∗ -0.119∗ -0.006 0.351∗ 0.592∗ 0.246
(0.028) (0.064) (0.058) (0.199) (0.350) (0.420)
Level Frame 0.074∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.066 -0.451∗∗∗ -0.609∗∗∗ -0.437
(0.011) (0.031) (0.049) (0.079) (0.216) (0.314)
Level Frame X Female -0.073∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.023 0.417∗∗ 0.973∗∗∗ 0.122
(0.031) (0.053) (0.074) (0.202) (0.286) (0.481)
Points Exam 1 0.363∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ -2.605∗∗∗ -2.430∗∗ -3.701∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.123) (0.161) (0.425) (0.939) (1.158)
Points Exam 2 0.293∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.148 -1.988∗∗∗ -2.297∗∗∗ -0.515
(0.074) (0.117) (0.147) (0.541) (0.842) (1.129)
Female 0.049 0.094∗ 0.030 -0.289 -0.569∗ -0.199
(0.038) (0.054) (0.055) (0.224) (0.311) (0.363)
ClassFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pupil Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 160 87 73 160 87 73
adj. R2 0.518 0.443 0.597 0.543 0.494 0.620
Note: This table presents the effect of change frame and level frame feedback interacted
with students’ gender when given 1-3 days in advance using a linear regression model
including class fixed effects.Column 1 and 4 present the results for the whole sample,
columns 2 and 5 present the results for students whose rank improved from exam 1 to
exam 2, and columns 3 and 6 present results for students whose rank worsened from exam
1 to exam 2. The dependent variable in columns 1, 2, and is percentage points in exam
3. The dependent variable in columns 4, 5, and 6 is grades in exam 3. (Larger grades are
worse grades.) Covariates: percentage points exam 1, percentage points exam 2, gender,
own room, foreign name, siblings, grade in exam 1 (5 categories), grade in exam 2 (5
categories). Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered on classroom level and
corrected using biased-reduced linearization. The number of clusters is 10. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.20: Change Frame vs. Level Frame vs. Control - Class-Level
Treatment: Late Timing (Interaction with gender)
Dep. Var.: Points in Exam 3 Dep. Var.: Grade in Exam 3
All If Improved If Worsened All If Improved If Worsened
Change Frame -0.013 -0.004 -0.030 0.210 0.053 0.316
(0.030) (0.063) (0.037) (0.166) (0.413) (0.196)
Change Frame X Female 0.020 0.072 0.006 -0.208 -0.363 -0.036
(0.062) (0.070) (0.068) (0.425) (0.466) (0.466)
Level Frame -0.014 -0.041 0.018 0.186 0.355 0.020
(0.024) (0.032) (0.064) (0.191) (0.245) (0.386)
Level Frame X Female -0.017 0.086 -0.073 -0.024 -0.840 0.443
(0.050) (0.075) (0.092) (0.382) (0.523) (0.640)
Points Exam 1 0.122 0.094 0.412∗∗∗ -1.522∗∗∗ -2.265 -3.014∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.321) (0.129) (0.578) (1.487) (0.779)
Points Exam 2 0.435∗∗∗ 0.433 0.227 -2.790∗∗∗ -2.057 -1.571∗∗
(0.114) (0.286) (0.141) (0.491) (1.408) (0.783)
Female -0.041 -0.104∗∗ 0.001 0.234 0.588∗∗ -0.041
(0.030) (0.043) (0.060) (0.251) (0.267) (0.428)
ClassFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pupil Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 159 76 83 159 76 83
adj. R2 0.353 0.187 0.451 0.386 0.285 0.427
Note: This table presents the effect of change frame and level frame feedback interacted
with students’ gender when given immediately before the exam using a linear regression
model including class fixed effects.Column 1 and 4 present the results for the whole sample,
columns 2 and 5 present the results for students whose rank improved from exam 1 to exam
2, and columns 3 and 6 present results for students whose rank worsened from exam 1 to
exam 2. The dependent variable in columns 1, 2, and is percentage points in exam 3. The
dependent variable in columns 4, 5, and 6 is grades in exam 3. (Larger grades are worse
grades.) Covariates: percentage points exam 1, percentage points exam 2, gender, own
room, foreign name, siblings. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered on
classroom level and corrected using biased-reduced linearization. The number of clusters
is 9. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.21: Change Frame vs. Level Frame vs. Control - Class-Level
Treatment: Early Timing (Interaction with preference for competition)
Dep. Var.: Points in Exam 3 Dep. Var.: Grade in Exam 3
All If Improved If Worsened All If Improved If Worsened
Change Frame 0.038 -0.073 0.127∗∗ -0.318 0.381 -0.949∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.067) (0.054) (0.265) (0.412) (0.292)
Change Frame X High Comp. -0.005 0.100 -0.096 0.193 -0.436 0.766∗∗
(0.062) (0.063) (0.070) (0.352) (0.388) (0.367)
Level Frame 0.047 -0.017 0.122 -0.301 0.053 -0.818∗
(0.054) (0.074) (0.077) (0.343) (0.446) (0.459)
Level Frame X High Comp. -0.020 0.039 -0.119 0.110 -0.216 0.741
(0.071) (0.075) (0.098) (0.470) (0.458) (0.603)
High Competitiveness -0.031 -0.093∗ 0.045 0.157 0.509∗ -0.306
(0.043) (0.049) (0.056) (0.279) (0.290) (0.340)
Points Exam 1 0.334∗∗∗ 0.288∗ 0.537∗∗∗ -2.401∗∗∗ -2.160∗ -4.075∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.159) (0.110) (0.527) (1.141) (0.768)
Points Exam 2 0.317∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.111 -2.177∗∗∗ -2.604∗∗∗ -0.245
(0.065) (0.132) (0.113) (0.497) (0.975) (0.826)
Female -0.002 -0.016 0.015 0.028 0.057 -0.040
(0.026) (0.055) (0.021) (0.165) (0.340) (0.113)
ClassFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pupil Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 160 87 73 160 87 73
adj. R2 0.519 0.424 0.626 0.546 0.474 0.650
Note: This table presents the effect of change frame and level frame feedback interacted
with students’ preference for competition when given 1-3 days in advance using a linear
regression model including class fixed effects.Column 1 and 4 present the results for the
whole sample, columns 2 and 5 present the results for students whose rank improved from
exam 1 to exam 2, and columns 3 and 6 present results for students whose rank worsened
from exam 1 to exam 2. The dependent variable in columns 1, 2, and is percentage points
in exam 3. The dependent variable in columns 4, 5, and 6 is grades in exam 3. (Larger
grades are worse grades.) Covariates: percentage points exam 1, percentage points exam
2, gender, own room, foreign name, siblings. Standard errors are reported in parentheses,
clustered on classroom level and corrected using biased-reduced linearization. The number
of clusters is 10. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
95
Table 3.22: Change Frame vs. Level Frame vs. Control - Class-Level
Treatment: Early Timing (Interaction with confidence in math ability)
Dep. Var.: Points in Exam 3 Dep. Var.: Grade in Exam 3
All If Improved If Worsened All If Improved If Worsened
Change Frame 0.052 0.004 0.084∗∗ -0.454∗ -0.005 -0.836∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.078) (0.039) (0.245) (0.489) (0.222)
Change Frame X High Math Conf. -0.025 0.006 -0.005 0.407 0.038 0.436
(0.062) (0.096) (0.074) (0.349) (0.574) (0.449)
Level Frame 0.062∗ 0.064 0.044∗ -0.486∗ -0.445 -0.418∗∗
(0.037) (0.097) (0.025) (0.258) (0.616) (0.178)
Level Frame X High Math Conf. -0.038 -0.048 0.022 0.375 0.333 0.058
(0.050) (0.099) (0.067) (0.316) (0.618) (0.423)
High Math Confidence 0.009 -0.026 0.005 -0.150 0.151 -0.128
(0.036) (0.071) (0.071) (0.235) (0.442) (0.470)
Points Exam 1 0.363∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗ -2.669∗∗∗ -2.463∗∗ -3.710∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.136) (0.125) (0.450) (1.021) (0.959)
Points Exam 2 0.311∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.162 -2.115∗∗∗ -2.714∗∗ -0.753
(0.063) (0.149) (0.147) (0.476) (1.093) (1.087)
Female 0.006 -0.007 0.021 -0.023 0.004 -0.103
(0.027) (0.053) (0.023) (0.173) (0.338) (0.150)
ClassFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pupil Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 160 87 73 160 87 73
adj. R2 0.509 0.413 0.591 0.542 0.471 0.619
Note: This table presents the effect of change frame and level frame feedback interacted
with students’ confidence in math ability when given 1-3 days in advance using a linear
regression model including class fixed effects.Column 1 and 4 present the results for the
whole sample, columns 2 and 5 present the results for students whose rank improved from
exam 1 to exam 2, and columns 3 and 6 present results for students whose rank worsened
from exam 1 to exam 2. The dependent variable in columns 1, 2, and is percentage points
in exam 3. The dependent variable in columns 4, 5, and 6 is grades in exam 3. (Larger
grades are worse grades.) Covariates: percentage points exam 1, percentage points exam
2, gender, own room, foreign name, siblings. Standard errors are reported in parentheses,
clustered on classroom level and corrected using biased-reduced linearization. The number
of clusters is 10. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
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Table 3.23: Change Frame vs. Level Frame vs. Control - Class-Level
Treatment: Early Timing (Interaction with locus of control)
Dep. Var.: Points in Exam 3 Dep. Var.: Grade in Exam 3
All If Improved If Worsened All If Improved If Worsened
Change Frame 0.057 0.024 0.084 -0.374 -0.134 -0.600
(0.051) (0.102) (0.058) (0.354) (0.730) (0.367)
Change Frame X Internal LOC -0.034 -0.032 -0.003 0.271 0.269 0.023
(0.076) (0.113) (0.074) (0.481) (0.762) (0.454)
Level Frame 0.032 0.045 0.019 -0.262 -0.377 -0.151
(0.048) (0.083) (0.065) (0.308) (0.581) (0.420)
Level X Internal LOC 0.019 -0.027 0.064 -0.030 0.298 -0.433
(0.065) (0.094) (0.100) (0.391) (0.659) (0.586)
Internal LOC 0.025 0.047 -0.005 -0.200 -0.419 0.111
(0.053) (0.096) (0.067) (0.344) (0.652) (0.416)
Points Exam 1 0.344∗∗∗ 0.327∗ 0.450∗∗∗ -2.515∗∗∗ -2.446∗∗ -3.585∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.167) (0.134) (0.485) (1.208) (1.019)
Points Exam 2 0.293∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗ 0.175 -1.966∗∗∗ -2.306∗∗ -0.640
(0.063) (0.145) (0.130) (0.495) (1.070) (1.011)
Female 0.002 -0.008 0.015 0.007 0.009 -0.043
(0.031) (0.052) (0.019) (0.203) (0.324) (0.098)
ClassFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pupil Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 160 87 73 160 87 73
adj. R2 0.514 0.406 0.602 0.540 0.469 0.621
Note: This table presents the effect of change frame and level frame feedback interacted
with students’ locus of control when given 1-3 days in advance using a linear regression
model including class fixed effects.Column 1 and 4 present the results for the whole sample,
columns 2 and 5 present the results for students whose rank improved from exam 1 to exam
2, and columns 3 and 6 present results for students whose rank worsened from exam 1 to
exam 2. The dependent variable in columns 1, 2, and is percentage points in exam 3. The
dependent variable in columns 4, 5, and 6 is grades in exam 3. (Larger grades are worse
grades.) Covariates: percentage points exam 1, percentage points exam 2, gender, own
room, foreign name, siblings. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered on
classroom level and corrected using biased-reduced linearization. The number of clusters
is 10. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
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Chapter 4
Salience of Ability Grouping and Biased Belief
Formation
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, economists have discovered the importance of ability beliefs and
social identity for explaining the motivation of individuals to invest in their human
capital and to sort into different career paths (Akerlof and Kranton, 2002; Ben-
abou and Tirole, 2002, 2016; Heckman et al., 2006; Dohmen and Falk, 2010, 2011).
Whether someone decides to pursue a college degree or to apply for a demanding
job depends on how they judge their academic and work-related abilities. In these
situations our abilities affect our chances of success and thus our beliefs about them
influence the expected payoff of our decisions. Two people with the same abilities
may have very different beliefs about them and thus make very different decisions
and have very different outcomes in life. While individual characteristics, such
as gender (Reuben et al., 2017) and family background (Filippin and Paccagnella,
2012) are known to be correlated with confidence in abilities, the mechanisms bring-
ing about these differences are not well understood. Situational factors, such as the
presence of good or bad feedback have been found to influence people’s beliefs about
their abilities but the effects of more complex social influences, such as the abilities
of people in one’s immediate environment have only recently attracted the interest
of economists.
When people judge their own ability, they may infer their ability level from
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comparisons with people in their peer group. For example, someone who finds out
that he can do better math than most of his peers may be led to think that he is
a good at mathematics and may enjoy it more. However, the person at some point
likely encounters another group of people who are on average better at mathematics
than he and he might learn that membership in the two groups depends in some
way on their mathematics ability. Is it still beneficial for the individual’s confidence
to be in a weaker group, or not, when both the own as well as other groups can be
observed? In other words: Do individuals assign correct weights to ability signals
that come from within-group and between-group comparisons?
These questions are important because in different areas of life, such as work and
education, groups of different abilities are deliberately formed, often with the inten-
tion of improving overall individual performance. However, the empirical evidence
suggests that ability grouping may have negative effects on performance (Hanushek
and Wößmann, 2006; Malamud and Pop-Eleches, 2011; Guyon et al., 2012; Kerr
et al., 2013), although experimental studies that control for environmental factors
have found positive effects (Duflo et al., 2011; Booij et al., 2017). More recently,
Murphy and Weinhardt (2014) as well as Elsner and Isphording (2017) identified
positive effects of having weaker students within one’s group on one’s long-term
academic outcomes and suggest that higher confidence in abilities due to favorable
within-group comparisons are the driving force behind this finding. Additionally,
experimental studies have shown that between-group comparisons may matter for
academic performance. If a person is a member of a group that stereotypically is
worse at a given task, salience of this fact may have a negative effect on this per-
son’s outcomes (Coffman, 2014; Dee, 2014). In many real-world situations people
may have some idea about both their standing within their group and how their
group compares to other groups (cf. Trautwein et al., 2006), however the inter-
action of within-group and between-group information on ability beliefs is not yet
well explored. The net effect of assignment to a weaker group on confidence may
be negative or positive, depending on the information available to people as well as
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how they interpret it.
In this paper, we study the effects of assignment to a weaker group versus a
stronger group on confidence and subsequent performance in a laboratory experi-
ment. In our setting, group assignment depends imperfectly on ability so that the
ability distributions of the two groups overlap. This implies that the ability signal
from group assignment is noisy, which, on the one hand, increases uncertainty that
leaves room for interpretation by the subjects and, on the other hand, generates ran-
domness of group assignment that allows for the causal identification of the effect of
group assignment on ability beliefs and subsequent performance. We randomly vary
whether subjects only receive information about their performance relative to their
group or whether they learn additionally whether they were assigned to a weaker or
a stronger group and that group assignment depends imperfectly on ability. This
allows us to study the causal effects of assignment to a weaker or a stronger group,
and its interaction with salience of ability grouping, on confidence in ability and
subsequent test outcomes.
We find, first, that the effect of assignment to a weaker group on confidence
depends on the salience of ability grouping. When ability grouping is non-salient, it
does not matter for subjects’ confidence whether they were assigned to the weaker
or the stronger group. However, when ability grouping is salient, assignment to
the weaker group makes people less confident in their abilities. Second, subjects
on average gave quite correct estimates of their ability rank, when grouping was
non-salient. However, when grouping was salient, subjects who were assigned to the
stronger group were significantly overconfident while subjects who were assigned
to the weaker group were significantly underconfident, indicating that people over-
weighed ability signals coming from between-group information. Also, subjects who
learned they were assigned to the weaker group were more underconfident than sub-
jects who learned they were assigned to the stronger group were overconfident. This
difference cannot be explained by lower ability subjects reporting less correct beliefs,
rather, it shows that people overweighed negatively surprising information as com-
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pared to positively surprising information. Third, results also suggest that higher
ability subjects perform worse if they learn they were assigned to a weaker group,
while lower ability subjects perform better when learning that they were assigned
to a weaker group. We do not find this difference when ability grouping is non-
salient. These findings indicate that when people are sorted into different ability
groups, within-group and between-group information interact in complex ways to
affect ability beliefs and subsequent performance.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to show causal effects of ability grouping
on ability beliefs. It shows that both within-group and between-group information,
which may not be processed symmetrically, matter for people’s beliefs about their
abilities. The results of this study demonstrate that the effects of one’s group’s
abilities on beliefs in own ability and subsequent performance are sensitive to infor-
mation about the group assignment process. For this reason, one should be careful
when interpreting effects of peer group ability on performance from field experiments
in which the rules determining group assignment are non-salient (as e.g. in Duflo
et al. 2011; Carrell et al. 2013; Booij et al. 2017) as these effects may not hold once
people understand that groups of different abilities were formed deliberately.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the related literature,
Section 3 describes the experimental design, Section 4 presents and discusses the
results and Section 5 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
Higher confidence in one’s abilities has been found to have beneficial effects on one’s
educational and labor market outcomes (Heckman et al., 2006; Cebi, 2007; Heineck
and Anger, 2010). Recent evidence also suggests that confidence in one’s abilities
may be influenced by the abilities of people in one’s peer group. Murphy and
Weinhardt (2014) find that, controlling for own ability as measured by standardized
test scores at age 11, an increase in rank during one’s primary school class has a
large and significant positive effect on test scores at age 14. The authors also find
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that the development of subject-specific confidence is the most likely driver of these
effects. Similarly, Elsner and Isphording (2017) find that, controlling for own ability,
students who have a higher rank within their cohort in high school perceive their
intelligence to be higher, have higher expectations about their future careers and
are more likely to go to college and complete a degree. These studies run counter
to the received wisdom from the peer effects literature that better peers are better
for academic performance but provide evidence in favor of the so called “big-fish-
little-pond effect” (Marsh, 1987), a popular proposition claiming that assignment to
a peer group with lower skills increases one’s confidence in ability1 that is based on
theories of social comparison processes (Festinger, 1954).
On the contrary, the experimental literature highlights the importance of between-
group comparisons. For example, people infer individual characteristics from group
characteristics, which may lead to self-stereotyping (Coffman, 2014; Dee, 2014).
While the traditional economic approach assumed that people form rational expec-
tations about a group member in terms of the aggregate distribution of the charac-
teristics of his group (e.g. Phelps 1972; Arrow 1973, for an overview of the literature
see Fang and Moro, 2011), the social cognition approach, which has influenced be-
havioral economics, holds that people form intuitive generalizations that allow them
to save mental resources but which may lead to biases in beliefs. The generaliza-
tions are based on real differences between groups and as such contain a “kernel of
truth” but they are selective and may exaggerate between-group differences while
tending to underweigh within-group differences (Schneider, 2004). Several studies
have provided evidence in support of this hypothesis. Recently, Dee (2014) presents
empirical evidence from a framed field experiment that self-stereotyping effects can
1Trautwein et al. (2006) qualify this statement based on correlations between confidence in
mathematics ability and mathematics test scores of students in German secondary schools. In
their study, schools are either in the high, middle, or low ability track or comprehensive schools
that incorporate all three tracks. Controlling for math ability, within tracked schools, students’
confidence is higher in schools of lower ability tracks. However, in comprehensive schools where
different ability tracks can be found under the same roof, making ability tracking highly observable
for students every day, controlling for ability, students’ confidence in the higher and the lower tracks
did not differ significantly. These observations support the central assumption of this study that
both within-group and between-group comparisons of abilities as well as the salience of ability
tracking should matter for students’ confidence in their abilities.
102
be relevant in an education context: Students at a selective college were randomly
assigned to a treatment that primed their awareness of a negatively stereotyped
identity (here: a student-athlete). This social-identity manipulation reduced the
test performance of athletes relative to non-athletes in spite of causing them to at-
tempt to answer more questions. Similarly, Coffman (2014) finds that, conditional
on measured ability, individuals are less willing to contribute ideas in areas that
are stereotypically outside of their gender domain, which is largely driven by self-
assessments rather than by fear of discrimination, and cannot be easily corrected by
providing contrary feedback. Furthermore, Albrecht et al. (2013) show that individ-
uals from groups that perform badly on average receive low evaluations, even when
it is known that the individuals themselves perform well. This shows that people
incorporate group information when evaluating individuals even in cases where it is
irrelevant. However, Fryer et al. (2008) cannot reproduce the standard finding that
female performance declines in absolute terms when the experimental instructions
include a passage emphasizing that men outperform women on a given test.
There is a trade-off between a favorable within-group comparison and a favor-
able between-group comparison of abilities as the the within-group effect (“big-fish-
little-pond-effect”) runs counter to the between-group effect, also called the effect of
“stereotype threat”: One can either be “a bigger fish in a smaller pond” or “a smaller
fish in a bigger pond” and it is not ex-ante clear which is better for confidence in
abilities. When assigning correct weights to within-group and between-group abil-
ity signals, it should not matter for one’s confidence whether one is assigned to the
weaker or the stronger group as between-group information would counterbalance
within-group information. However, subjects could possibly place a greater weight
on within-group or between-group information, on positive (Eil and Rao, 2011; Mo-
bius et al., 2011; Grossman and Owens, 2012; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015) or negative
(Ertac, 2011) information, or exhibit other forms of biased belief formation (see e.g.
Albrecht et al. 2013; Butler 2016).
Furthermore, negative information about one’s abilities could both induce higher
103
(Kuhnen and Tymula, 2012; Azmat et al., 2016; Fischer and Wagner, Chapter 3
of this thesis) or lower (Buser, 2016) subsequent performance, depending on how
subjects’ effort depends on their ability beliefs. Overall, there is mixed evidence on
the association between feedback and performance (Kluger and DeNisi, 1998; Hattie
and Timperley, 2007), possibly because the relationship between ability beliefs and
effort is complex. In recent years, a number of studies has highlighted the importance
of distinguishing between confidence in abilities that are complements and confidence
in abilities that are substitutes to effort (Santos-Pinto 2008; Ederer 2010; Caliendo
et al. 2015; Spinnewijn 2015; Fischer and Sliwka in Chapter 5 of this thesis). In
a setting of human capital investment, Fischer and Sliwka (Chapter 5) distinguish
between confidence in learning ability – the belief that one can raise one’s probability
of being successful by exerting effort – and confidence in prior knowledge – the
belief that one’s probability of being successful is already high prior to investing any
additional effort. The authors show experimentally that the use of feedback that
raises confidence in learning ability increases motivation to strive towards a better
outcome. However, the use of feedback that raises confidence in prior knowledge
decreases motivation to strive towards a better outcome for individuals for whom
success was more likely at baseline. Fischer and Sliwka’s notion of confidence in
the effectiveness of effort is equivalent to Benabou and Tirole’s (2002, 2003) notion
of confidence as an agent’s (rational) belief in her own marginal product of effort
and possibly captures ability beliefs positively related to educational outcomes, as
e.g. in Heckman et al. (2006), Cebi (2007), Heineck and Anger (2010), Murphy and
Weinhardt (2014), and Elsner and Isphording (2017). In contrast, their notion of
confidence in the baseline probability of success possibly describes the kind of belief
measured in studies that find higher confidence to have negative effects on people’s
outcomes (see e.g. Camerer and Lovallo (1999), Malmendier and Tate (2005), and
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)). The current study uses within- and between-
group information to manipulate people’s confidence in their learning ability which,
according to theory, is complementary to effort. We therefore expect feedback that
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bolsters this ability belief to positively influence effort and in turn performance.
4.3 Experimental Procedure
The experiment was conducted in November 2016 at the Cologne Laboratory of
Economic Research2 using the experimental software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Participants were recruited using the software ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) and, upon
arrival, were randomly assigned to one of 32 terminals that were divided by panels.
Before the experiment started, participants received instructions that communica-
tion with each other and the use of mobile phones or pens was not permitted and
that compliance with this rule would be monitored during the whole experiment.
These, and all of the following instructions were given on-screen. Participants were
also informed that they would receive 4 euros for participating in the experiment and
that they could earn additional money by correctly answering questions in several
“learning tests”. They then received instructions for the first learning test, including
the task and the reward scheme, and had to correctly solve a sample question before
they could proceed to the test.
First test Each task consisted in assigning to a city name the first digit of its
corresponding four digit fictitious “city code”. The test consisted of 36 tasks and
subjects earned 0.10 euros for each correctly solved task. Before the test phase,
there was a 10 minutes learning phase during which subjects could study the city
name and code pairs. As shown in Figure 4.7 in Appendix 4.7.1, during the learning
phase city names were listed alphabetically in three columns and the corresponding
city codes were displayed next to them for three seconds when the button with the
respective name was pressed.3 Subjects could press these buttons as often as they
wanted, without incurring any costs, and in quick succession such that several codes
were be displayed at once. Subjects who did not want to study could leave the study
2Financial support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) through grant FOR1371 is
gratefully acknowledged.
3This feature was meant to capture subjects’ intensity of learning.
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screen and spend time looking at comics but could return to studying at any time
without this having any implications for them beyond the loss of time. This element
was introduced to allow for opportunity costs of studying. During the 6 minutes
test phase (see Figure 4.8 in Appendix 4.7.1), city names were displayed in random
order and the correct digit had to be filled in next to them.
Feedback stage (treatment randomization) After the first test, subjects were
informed that they would receive feedback about their “learning ability” relative to
the other participants based on their result in the learning test. On the next screen,
subjects received their feedback. The assignment mechanism of the feedback was as
follows: Subjects were randomly assigned to one type of “ability grouping system”,
which was either “Non-salient Grouping” or “Salient Grouping”. Next, the
experimental software assigned each subject either to the “Stronger Learners”
or the “Weaker Learners” group. Here, the probability of assignment differed
depending on a person’s performance in the first test. Those who in the first test
performed in the upper half relative to the other participants in the session (per-
centile rank <0.5 relative to all) were assigned to “Stronger Learners” with a
probability of 2/3 and were assigned to “Weaker Learners” with a probability
of 1/3. On the contrary, those who in the first test performed in the lower half (per-
centile rank >0.5 relative to all) were assigned to “Stronger Learners” with a
probability of 1/3 and were assigned to “Weaker Learners” with a probability
of 2/3. Depending on the group someone was assigned to, the experimental software
then computed a person’s rank within her group and determined whether this rank
was in the upper (percentile rank <0.5 relative to group) or the lower half (percentile
rank >0.5 relative to group).
As summarized in Table 4.1 subjects received different information, depending on
the treatment (i.e. “ability grouping system”) they were assigned to (The messages
displayed to subjects in each treatment can be found in Table 4.7.1 in Appendix
4.7.1.):
Non-salient Grouping: Subjects received feedback relative to their group, which
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they knew was half the session’s participants and did not learn anything about the
characteristics of the group.
Salient Grouping: Subjects received both feedback relative to their group and, on
the same screen, they also received information about whether they were assigned to
the “Stronger Learners” or the “Weaker Learners” group, which they knew
consisted of half the session’s participants. They also knew that their assignment
depended imperfectly on their ability as they were told that “a better result makes
it much more likely to be assigned to the stronger learners”. Table 4.1 summarizes
the information provided in each treatment.
Table 4.1: Information by Treatment
Treatment: Non-salient grouping Salient grouping
Information: upper/lower half ingroup
upper/lower half in
group +
stronger/weaker group
Belief elicitation After receiving feedback, subjects were asked to estimate their
rank with respect to their performance and their effort (in terms of clicks on city
names in the learning phase) in the first test relative to the other participants in
the room (session). They knew that for each of the two rank estimates they would
earn one euro if it was correct.
Second test and questionnaire After indicating their beliefs the next screen
informed subjects that the second test was of the same type, length and duration
as the first test but that this time they would earn 0.20 euros (as compared to 0.10
euros in the first test) for each correctly solved task. They were also informed that,
unlike after the first test, they would not be able to earn any money by estimating
their performance or effort rank relative to other participants. After having read
these instructions subjects proceeded to the learning stage of the second test. As
can be seen in Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.13 in Appendix 4.7.1, the second test looked
identical to the first test, it only contained other city names and numbers. When
the test was designed, the questions were randomly assigned to test 1 and test 2 in
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order to create “parallel” tests of the same difficulty. After the second test, subjects
were asked to indicate in which of the two tests they believed they performed better
and in which they had invested more effort. They could earn 0.50 euros for each
correct answer. They then filled in a short demographic survey and learned their
earnings from each stage of the experiment.
4.4 Experimental Results
The experiment lasted approximately 50 minutes and participants on average earned
11.41 euros. In total 7 sessions were conducted, which were orthogonal to treatments
to rule out self-selection. All participants were university students, who were on
average in their 6th semester of study. 49 percent of participants were female. On
average, 19.8 out of 36 questions in the first test and 22.7 out of 36 questions in the
second test were answered correctly. There were 79 participants in the non-salient
grouping treatment and 78 participants in the salient grouping treatment.4
In Section 4.4.1 we will analyze the effect of salience of ability grouping and
assigned group on confidence. Separately for salient and non-salient grouping, we
will then explore the response of people with higher and lower ability to higher and
lower group assignment. In Section 4.4.2 we will then shed light on the mechanisms
underlying the observed results. In particular, we will (i) address the question to
what extended the observed responses are rational given the information provided
to people and (ii) investigate whether information processing is affected differently
by positive and negative within-group and between-group information. In order to
do so, we will derive rank predictions conditional on feedback and will then study
how well different groups match their predicted ranks. Finally, in Section 4.4.3 we
4A treatment where participants were not assigned to a group was also conducted to check
whether these two treatments lead to an overall distortion of beliefs. In this benchmark treatment
subjects received feedback about whether their performance was in the upper or lower half relative
to the whole session. 63 subjects originally participated in this treatment, however only 36 obser-
vations are usable due to a programming error. This error affected participants randomly, so that
this treatment is still completely balanced to the other two treatments, as can be seen in Table
4.6 in Appendix 4.7.2. It may thus, as intended, serve to benchmark the distortions caused by the
two treatments relevant to our research question.
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will analyze the effects of group assignment and salience of ability grouping on test
outcomes.
We expect, based on prior research (Murphy and Weinhardt, 2014; Elsner and
Isphording, 2017), that when subjects only learn about their standing within their
group, they become more confident when they are assigned to the weaker group.
However, when learning about both their standing within their group and their
group’s standing relative to another group, this effect disappears if subjects assign
correct weights to within-group and between-group ability signals, as in this case
between-group information counterbalances within-group information (cf. Trautwein
et al., 2006). However, if subjects overweigh between-group information, the effect
of weaker group assignment is negative, while if they overweigh within-group in-
formation the effect of weaker group assignment is still positive. Furthermore, the
current study gives people feedback about their “learning ability” in order to influ-
ence people’s beliefs in the marginal productivity of learning effort, which according
to theory (e.g. Fischer and Sliwka in Chapter 5 of this thesis), is positively related
to learning effort. We therefore expect feedback that strengthens this ability belief
to positively influence performance.
4.4.1 Effects of Salience of Ability Grouping and Group As-
signment on Confidence
Our first variable of interest is confidence, which we define as
Confidence = Rank −RankBelief.
Recall from Section 4.3 that we elicited the RankBelief by asking subjects to
estimate their rank in the first test relative to all other participants in their session.
Likewise, the Rank measures a subject’s actual performance in the first test relative
to all other participants in the same session. Thus, our confidence measure is very
intuitive as it captures the degree to which subjects overestimate or underestimate
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their performance relative to the other participants: If someone overestimates his
performance relative to the other participants he will have Confidence > 0, while
if he underestimates his performance relative to the other participants he will have
Confidence < 0.
In the following, we will study the causal effects of salience of ability grouping as
well as its interaction with assigned group on confidence. Then, we will study these
two effects, as well as the overall effect of group assignment, separately for higher
and lower ability subjects. Note that while the causal effect of salience as well as its
interaction with group assignment can be studied for the whole sample, the causal
effect of group assignment by itself has to be studied separately for the higher and
lower ability subjects as these two groups had different assignment probabilities.5
5Higher ability subjects (who performed above the median in the first test) had a probability
of being assigned to the stronger group that was twice as large as the probability of the lower
ability subjects (who performed below the median in the first test). This means that, as intended,
individuals in the weaker group had on average lower ability than individuals in the stronger group.
Our confidence measure captures ability beliefs relative to true ability, so group differences in ability
are controlled for in the graphs. However, as subjects had to state their beliefs in terms of ranks
(#ranks = #subjects in session), the belief scale is restricted from above and from below, which
means that higher ability subjects are more restricted in their possibility to report overconfidence
than in their possibility to report underconfidence, while lower ability subjects are more restricted
in their possibility to report underconfidence than in their possibility to report overconfidence.
This may induce the overconfidence of higher ability subjects and the underconfidence of lower
ability subjects to be underestimated. Within these two groups, the probability of being assigned
to any of the two groups was perfectly random so that the restriction with respect to reporting
overconfidence and underconfidence affected people assigned to the stronger group and the weaker
group equally. Hence, by analyzing the effects of group assignment separately for higher and lower
ability subjects, we can identify the causal effects of assignment to the weaker or stronger group
on confidence.
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Figure 4.1: Effects of Salience of Ability Grouping and Group Assignment on Con-
fidence
Panel A: By Salience
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Panel B: By Group Assignment and Salience
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Note: Panel A shows the effect of salience of ability grouping on confidence. Panel B shows
the interaction effect of salience of ability grouping and group assignment on confidence.
As can be seen in Panel A of Figure 4.1, confidence was higher when ability
grouping was non-salient than when ability grouping was salient. Man-Whitney U
(M-W U) tests6 show that this difference is weakly significant. As can be seen in
Panel B of Figure 4.1 subjects who were assigned to the weaker group but did not
know that their group was the weaker one were more confident than subjects who
were assigned to the weaker group and knew that their group was the weaker one
(M-W U test: p=0.00). On the contrary, when one was assigned to the stronger
group, knowing whether one’s group was the stronger one did not significantly affect
one’s confidence (M-W U test: p=0.32).
6All tests in this paper are two-sided, unless stated otherwise.
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Table 4.2: Effects of Salience of Ability Grouping and Group Assignment on Confi-
dence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Confidence If Lower A. If Higher A. If Lower A. If Higher A.
Non-salient Grouping 0.949 3.349∗∗ 3.952∗∗ 10.10∗∗∗
(0.55) (2.54) (2.07) (5.02)
Stronger Group 3.282∗ 4.191∗∗∗ 6.839∗∗∗ 10.65∗∗∗
(1.78) (3.25) (2.71) (6.36)
Non-salient Gr. × Stronger Group -7.482∗ -11.07∗∗∗
(-1.97) (-4.33)
Observations 76 81 76 81
R2 0.117 0.242 0.173 0.413
Note: This table presents the effect of non-salient versus salient ability grouping and
assignment to a stronger versus a weaker group using a linear regression model including a
constant, session fixed effects and robust standard errors. Dependent variable: confidence.
Columns 1 and 3 (2 and 4) show results for lower (higher) ability subjects. t statistics are
reported in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
In Table 4.2 we analyze, separately for higher and lower ability individuals, the
effects of salience, of group assignment, as well as of the interaction between the two.
The regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares and contain heteroscedastic-
ity robust standard errors as well as session dummies and a constant, but no other
control variables. Thus, all the coefficients show causal effects of our intervention.
As can be seen in Columns 1 and 2 both lower and higher ability subjects were on
average more confident (by 3.3 and 4.2 ranks, respectively) if they were assigned
to the stronger group. These effects are marginally and highly significant, respec-
tively. However, only higher ability subjects are affected by the salience of ability
grouping overall. Thus, the difference in confidence shown in Panel A of Figure 4.1
are largely driven by the response of higher ability subjects. They were on average
3.3 ranks more confident when ability grouping was non-salient. Columns 3 and 4
present results for the interaction effects between group assignment and salience of
the assignment mechanism. Qualitatively, lower and higher ability subjects respond
similarly but the effects seem to be larger for higher ability subjects. When ability
grouping is salient, both lower and higher ability subjects are more confident when
they are assigned to the stronger group (by 6.8 and 10.7 ranks, respectively). Both
effects are highly significant. Those who were assigned to the weaker group were
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more confident (by 4.0 and 10.1 rank, respectively) when they did not learn that
their group was the weaker one. These effects are significant at the 5% and the 1%
level, respectively. F-tests show that when ability grouping was non-salient, it did
not matter for lower or higher ability subjects whether they were assigned to the
weaker or the stronger group (for both p=0.81). Hence the differences presented in
Panel B of Figure 4.1 are driven by both lower and higher ability subjects.7
4.4.2 Mechanisms
The above results show that when group assignment is salient, assignment to the
weaker group causes individuals to be less confident than assignment to the stronger
group. Furthermore, weaker group assignment causes subjects to be less confident
when grouping is salient than when grouping is non-salient. The mechanisms un-
derlying these observations can be further explored on three levels. First, we can
investigate to what extend salient and non-salient ability grouping leads to a de-
calibration of beliefs, i.e. to what extend they make people overconfident or under-
confident.8 Second, we can explore to what extend non-salient and salient ability
grouping lead people to state “irrational”9 beliefs, i.e. rank beliefs that could not
possibly be correct given the feedback someone received. Third, we can shed light
on how non-salient and salient ability grouping affect the distributions of beliefs.
This may help us to better understand the average treatment effects as well as the
7Interestingly, higher but not lower ability subjects’ beliefs in their intensity of effort (in terms
of clicks), when ability grouping was salient, responds significantly to group assignment: When
learning they were assigned to the weaker group, higher ability subjects believe to have exerted
less effort than when learning they were assigned to the stronger group. This may indicate that
higher ability subjects attribute weaker group assignment more strongly to effort (rather than to
ability) than lower ability subjects.
8In the benchmark treatment, in which people were not assigned to different groups and received
feedback relative to the whole session, people’s mean confidence was 0.31, which is not significantly
different from 0 (t-test: p=0.69). Hence, without ability grouping, subjects were on average well
calibrated.
9The feedback given to each person implied that there were certain ranks they were definitely
not occupying. As people were paid for correct rank estimates, it was never optimal for one’s
monetary payoff to report rank beliefs that are definitely false. However, one could think of a
model where an agent benefits from incorrect beliefs, e.g. with respect to his self-image or his
motivation. In this case, false beliefs could possibly be optimal. In our setting, we will abstract
from this possibility and will call beliefs “irrational” if they indicate a rank that was impossible
for a person given the information they had received.
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decalibration of beliefs.
Overconfidence and underconfidence When grouping is salient, confidence
could be lower with weaker group assignment than with stronger group assign-
ment due to (1) weaker group assignment making people underconfident and/or (2)
stronger group assignment making them overconfident. Panel B of Figure 4.1 sug-
gests that the effect is driven mostly by salient grouping making people assigned
to the weaker group underconfident, while they seem well calibrated when grouping
is non-salient. Furthermore, when ability grouping is salient, people tend to be on
average less confident than when ability grouping is non-salient. This could be due
to (1) non-salient grouping making people overconfident and/or (2) salient group-
ing making people underconfident. Panel A of Figure 4.1 suggests that while with
non-salient grouping people have on average quite correct beliefs, they seem to be
very underconfident on average with salient ability grouping.
Using one-sided t-tests of the means of the four groups (stronger group–non-
salient / weaker group–non-salient / stronger group–salient / weaker group–salient)
in Panel B of Figure 4.1 against the null hypothesis that people have correct beliefs
(Confidence=0) reveals that when grouping was non-salient, subjects were neither
significantly overconfident when assigned to the weaker group (p=0.30) nor signif-
icantly underconfident when assigned to the stronger group (p=0.36). However,
if grouping was salient, subjects who were assigned to the weaker group were sig-
nificantly underconfident (p=0.00) and subjects who were assigned to the stronger
group were weakly significantly overconfident (p=0.08). Furthermore, a M-W U
test reveals that if grouping was salient, people who were assigned to the weaker
group were significantly more underconfident than people who were assigned to the
stronger group were overconfident (p=0.03). This shows that people assigned a
larger weight to the ability signal from group assignment when it was negative than
if it was positive.
Overall, people become more decalibrated by salient than by non-salient ability
grouping. When ability grouping is salient, they are more decalibrated if they are
114
assigned to the weaker group than if they are assigned to the stronger group.
“Irrational” beliefs In the following, we will address the question to what extend
the stronger decalibration from salient than from non-salient grouping is “irrational”
given the feedback information subjects received. The feedback given to each person,
while imprecise about their relative position, ruled out certain ranks for them.Thus
some rank beliefs were “irrational” for them to hold. We will also shed light on
the mechanisms that may explain why, when ability grouping is salient, weaker
group assignment leads people to become more decalibrated than stronger group
assignment.
Note that the feedback types explained in Section 4.3 are not equal to the four
groups analyzed above (stronger group–non-salient / weaker group–non-salient /
stronger group–salient / weaker group–salient). This is because in the non-salient
grouping treatment (stronger group–non-salient / weaker group–non-salient) sub-
jects did not learn their group assignment but only which half they occupied within
their group. Hence, the two feedback types with non-salient grouping are “upper
half within group” and “lower half within group”, which we will call “Non-salient
Grouping – 1” and “Non-salient Grouping – 2”, respectively. By contrast, in the
salient grouping treatment, people learned both whether their group was the weaker
or the stronger one as well as their half within their group. Thus, with salient
grouping, we have four feedback types: “upper half in stronger group”, “lower half
in stronger group”, “upper half in weaker group” and “lower half in weaker group”,
which we will call “Salient Grouping – 1”, “Salient Grouping – 2”, “Salient Group-
ing – 3”, and “Salient Grouping – 4”, respectively. Furthermore, subjects knew that
their group assignment depended imperfectly on their ability. Hence, they knew
that stronger group assignment did not necessarily imply that one’s performance
was above average, while weaker group assignment did not necessarily imply that
one’s performance was below average.
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Figure 4.2: Information Content of Feedback and Distribution of Beliefs
Group
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Note: This table indicates the likelihood, conditional on feedback, of being ranked in a
given quartile (dark gray: likely, light gray: possible, white: impossible). The numbers
indicate the percentage of people believing to be ranked in a given quartile, conditional
on feedback.
Figure 4.2 shows the six different types of feedback that were given during the
experiment. For example, if someone was in the non-salient ability grouping treat-
ment he was either told that he was in the upper half within his group or that
he was in the lower half within this group. If he was in the upper half within his
group (feedback type “Non-salient Grouping – 1”), and the ability distributions of
the two groups were not too different, he was likely in the upper half with respect
to all the participants in the session. However, it was theoretically possible that his
group was much worse than the other group. In this case, being in the upper half
within this group could possibly entail being only in the 3rd quartile with respect
to all participants. However, even if his group was so bad compared to the other
group that the two groups’ ability rank distributions did not overlap, given that
he was told he was in the upper half within his group, it was impossible that he
occupied an ability rank in the 4th quartile (percentile ranks >= 0.75) with respect
to all people in the session. Applying the same reasoning to the other five types
of feedback as well produces the different zones (likely range, possible (less likely)
range, impossible range) that are indicated by the different shadings for the four
quartiles. The numbers in Table 4.2 indicate the percentage of people, in a given
feedback category, who reported a rank belief in the respective quartile. To give
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an applied example, consider subjects who were in salient grouping and were told
that they occupied a rank in the upper half of the stronger group (feedback type
“Salient Grouping – 1). Among them 72.22 percent indicated a rank belief in the
first quartile (for them, the likely range), while 27.78 percent reported a rank belief
in the second quartile (for them, the possible range). None of these people reported
a rank in the 3rd or 4th quartile. We can conclude that none of the people who
received this type of feedback reported an “irrational” belief.
With non-salient grouping, the two groups (“upper half within group” and “lower
half within group”) have similar belief distributions over the likely, possible and
impossible range. However, with salient grouping, the picture is different. Here,
of those who were assigned to the weaker group 16.7 and 9.5 percent, respectively,
report beliefs in the impossible range while none of those assigned to the stronger
group do so. Furthermore, those who were assigned to the weaker group seem to state
fewer beliefs in the possible range than those assigned to the stronger group. Among
those of the weaker group, the proportion of people stating a belief in the likely range
seems to be larger (at 77.77 and 80.95 percent, respectively) than among those of
the stronger group (52.38 and 72.22 percent, respectively). In the following, we will
study how similar, overall and within the four quartiles, the belief distributions of
people who received the different types of feedback are.
Belief distributions by feedback types As as shown in Table 4.2, people
who received the different feedback types had different ranges of likely, possible,
and impossible beliefs. To illustrate this, Figure 4.14 in Appendix 4.7.3 shows the
expected ability rank distributions by feedback type resulting from our assignment
mechanism. We can see that the expected rank distributions for subjects who re-
ceived feedback types “Non-salient Grouping – 1” and “Non-salient Grouping – 2”,
and likewise for “Salient Grouping – 1” and “Salient Grouping – 4” as well as for
“Salient Grouping – 2” and “Salient Grouping – 3” are mirror images of each other.
Hence, within these pairs of feedback types the rank distributions that subjects
had to match with their beliefs were the same except for being inverted. Thus, a
117
straightforward way for testing whether the belief distributions differed from each
other, conditional on feedback, within each of the three pairs is to invert the elicited
rank beliefs of one of the groups within each of the pairs. Next, we can run statistical
tests for the equality of distributions.
Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 show the inverted belief distributions from the feedback
types whose expected rank distributions are shown on the right hand side of Figure
4.14 in Appendix 4.7.2 mapped onto the belief distributions from the feedback types
whose expected rank distributions are shown on the left hand side. Furthermore,
they are depicting the expected rank distributions that are shown in Figure 4.14,
which are identical within each pair after the right hand side distributions have
been inverted. As can be seen in Figure 4.3, which corresponds to comparison
“A” in Figure 4.2 and Panel A in Figure 4.14, with non-salient grouping, when
people receive positive feedback (Non-salient Grouping – 1 (NSG–1)), they have
a very similar belief distribution, conditional on feedback, as people who receive
negative feedback (Non-salient Grouping – 2 (NSG–2)). Subjects in NSG–1 seem
largely not to take into consideration that they could occupy a rank in the lower
half while subjects in NSG–2 seem to largely ignore their rank could be in the upper
half with respect to the whole session. A Kolmogorov–Smirnov test shows that
the two distributions are not significantly different overall (p=0.58)10. Testing the
distributions in the four quartiles separately reveals that the 1st quartile of NSG–1
is not significantly different from the 4th quartile of NSG–4 and the 2nd quartile of
NSG–1 is not significantly different from the 3rd quartile of NSG–2. However, while
NSG–1 has no observations in the 3rd and the 4th quartile NSG–2 has observations
both in the 2nd and in the 1st quartile (as can also be seen in Figure 4.2) .
10For all Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests in the paper exact p-values from combined (two-sided) tests
are reported
118
Figure 4.3: Comparison of Beliefs in Non-Transparent
grouping (A)
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Note: This graph shows the distributions of the rank beliefs
of subjects who received feedback type “Non-Salient Grouping
– 1”, the inverted rank beliefs of subjects who received feed-
back type “Non-Salient Grouping – 2”, and the (inverted) ex-
pected ability rank distribution for subjects who received feed-
back type “non-Salient Grouping – 1 ” (“Non-Salient Grouping
– 2 ”).
As can be seen in Figure 4.4, which corresponds to comparison “B” in Figure
4.2 and Panel B in Figure 4.14, with salient grouping, when people get extreme
feedback (“upper half in stronger group” or “lower half in weaker group”) and it is
negative (Salient Grouping – 4 (SG–4)), “lower half in weaker group”), they tend to
interpret it more extremely than when they get positive feedback (Salient Grouping
– 1 (SG–1), “upper half in stronger group”). However, among those who get negative
feedback some take into account the possibility that they might have been in the
upper half overall (inverted percentile rank >0.5). When people get extreme positive
feedback they seem to have surprisingly correct beliefs overall. However, they seem
to ignore the possibility that they might have performed in the lower half (percentile
rank >0.5). Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests show that the two distributions are not
significantly different overall (p=0.25). Testing the four quartiles separately reveals
that the 2nd quartile in SG – 1 and the 3rd quartile in SG – 4 ((inverted) percentile
rank >0.25 and <0.5) are weakly significantly different from each other (p=0.09).
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Furthermore, the distributions are different in the 3rd quartile in SG – 1 and the
2nd quartile in SG – 4 ((inverted) percentile rank >0.50 and <0.75), as SG–1 does
not have any observations in the 3rd quartile while SG–4 has observations in the 2nd
quartile (as can also be seen in Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.4: Comparison of Beliefs in Transparent grouping
(Extreme Feedback) (B)
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Note: This graph shows the distributions of the rank beliefs
of subjects who received feedback type “Salient Grouping – 1”,
the inverted rank beliefs of subjects who received feedback type
“Salient Grouping – 4”, and the (inverted) expected ability rank
distribution for subjects who received feedback type “Salient
Grouping – 1” (“Salient Grouping – 4”).
As can be seen in Figure 4.5, which corresponds to comparison “C” in Figure
4.2 and Panel C in Figure 4.14, with salient grouping, when people get positive
feedback about their group but negative feedback about their standing within their
group (Salient-grouping – 2 (SG–2), “lower half in stronger group”), many of them
correctly take into account that they might in fact have performed in the lower half
relative to the whole session. However, when people get negative feedback about
their group but positive feedback about their standing within their group (Salient-
grouping – 3 (SG–3), “upper half in weaker group”), they largely ignore the possibil-
ity that they might have performed in the upper half overall. Kolmogorov–Smirnov
tests show that the belief distributions with these two ambivalent feedback types
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are significantly different overall (p=0.039). Testing the four quartiles separately
reveals that the 2nd quartile of SG–2 and the 3rd quartile of SG–3 as well as the 3rd
quartile of SG–2 and the 2nd quartile of SG–3 are not significantly different from
each other. The 1st quartile of SG–2 has no observations while the 4th quartile of
SG–3 does. Furthermore, the 4th quartile of SG–2 does have observations while the
1st quartile of SG–3 does not (as can also be seen in Figure 4.2). Those who received
“lower half in stronger group” feedback seem to correctly take into account that the
partial randomness of our group assignment mechanism implies that one may have
below average performance in spite of being assigned to the stronger group. On the
contrary, those who received “upper half in weaker group” feedback seem to ignore
the partial randomness of our group assignment mechanism and that they may well
have above average performance in spite of being assigned to the weaker group. Note
that the group who seems to ignore the partial randomness of assignment has on
average higher performance in the first test than the group who takes it into account
(M-W U: p=0.062). Thus, the resulting more decalibrated beliefs among those re-
ceiving bad between-group and good within-group information than those receiving
good between-group and bad within-group information cannot be explained by the
former having lower ability as measured by the test (which may be correlated with
the ability to understand the feedback). Rather, negatively surprising group as-
signment seems to lead to a larger decalibration of beliefs than positively surprising
group assignment.
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of Beliefs in Transparent grouping
(Ambivalent Feedback) (C)
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Note: This graph shows the distributions of the rank beliefs
of subjects who received feedback type “Salient Grouping – 2”,
the inverted rank beliefs of subjects who received feedback type
“Salient Grouping – 3”, and the (inverted) expected ability rank
distribution for subjects who received feedback type “Salient
Grouping – 2” (“Salient Grouping – 2”).
Implications of these findings will be discussed in Section 4.5 together with the
results for performance.
4.4.3 Effects of Salience of Ability Grouping and Group As-
signment on Performance
We will now analyze whether ability grouping affects participants’ outcomes in the
second test. First, we will compare the test score averages between people in the
non-salient and the salient grouping treatment. Then we will look at the interaction
effects between the assigned group and salience of group assignment on average test
scores. Note that the bar graphs in Figure 4.6 are showing raw scores from the
second test. As can be seen in Figure 4.6, there is neither a significant overall effect
of salience of ability grouping nor an interaction effect of salience of ability grouping
with group assignment on performance.
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Figure 4.6: Effects of Salience of Ability Grouping and Group Assignment on Per-
formance
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Note: Panel A shows the effect of salience of ability grouping on test scores. Panel B
shows the interaction effect of salience of ability grouping and group assignment on test
scores.
In Table 4.3 the treatment effects of ability grouping on performance are analyzed
separately for lower and higher ability subjects (who had below and above median
performance, respectively, in the first test). Interestingly, we find opposite and
significant effects for the two groups that are disguised when looking at the average
over both groups as in Figure 4.6. As can be seen in Columns 1 and 2, while lower
ability subjects perform significantly worse (by 3.1 points), higher ability subjects
perform significantly better (by 2.7 points) with non-salient ability grouping than
with salient ability grouping. Columns 3 and 4 show that when assigned to the
weaker group, lower ability subjects benefit from learning that their group is the
weaker one (by 4.1 points), while higher ability subjects suffer from learning that
their group is the weaker one (by 6.6 points).11
Hence, we find that salient ability grouping has a positive effect on the perfor-
mance of lower ability individuals while it has a negative effect on the performance
of higher ability individuals. This is driven by opposite effects for these groups when
11We do not find that people’s effort, in terms of revealing information by clicking on city names
in the learning phase, which was meant to measure the intensity of their learning, responded to
our treatments (see Table 4.7 in Appendix 4.7.3). We infer that subjects rather responded to
the intervention by adjusting their mental efforts and that it may be better use of the revealed
information that improves test outcomes.
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they are assigned to the weaker group. While the performance of lower ability indi-
viduals increases when they learn that they were assigned to the weaker group, the
performance of higher ability individuals decreases when they learn that they were
assigned to the weaker group. This suggests that, in our setting, higher confidence
in ability as measured by the learning test does not clearly result in better test
outcomes. In fact, only for higher ability subjects confidence and subsequent perfor-
mance are positively correlated, while they are negatively correlated for lower ability
subjects. For the whole sample, confidence predicts subsequent outcomes negatively
(p=0.027, see Table 4.8 in Appendix 4.7.3). Although we intended our feedback
about performance in the “learning test” to influence subjects’ beliefs about their
marginal productivity of effort, which we expected to be positively related to effort,
our feedback possibly (also) influenced a different type of belief.12
Table 4.3: Effects of Salience of Ability Grouping and Group Assignment on Per-
formance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Test Score If Lower A. If Higher A. If Lower A. If Higher A.
Non-salient Grouping -3.053∗∗ 2.743∗ -4.067∗∗ 6.581∗∗
(-2.14) (1.74) (-2.22) (2.59)
Stronger Group -1.783 0.406 -2.984 4.080
(-1.13) (0.26) (-1.33) (1.53)
Non-salient Grouping × Stronger Group 2.528 -6.293∗
(0.83) (-1.82)
Observations 76 81 76 81
R2 0.144 0.099 0.153 0.142
Note: This table presents the effect of non-salient versus salient ability grouping and
assignment to a stronger versus a weaker group using a linear regression model including
a constant, session fixed effects and robust standard errors. Dependent variable: test score.
Columns 1 and 3 (2 and 4) show results for lower (higher) ability subjects. t statistics are
reported in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
4.5 Discussion
We studied the causal effects of assignment to a weaker or a stronger group as
well as its interaction with salience of the assignment mechanism on confidence in
12The belief we manipulated does not seem to be (only) a person’s baseline belief in receiving a
good outcome, which Fischer and Sliwka (Chapter 5 of this thesis) show may be negatively related
to subsequent performance, because we find the inverse relationship for higher and lower ability
subjects compared to what they find.
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learning ability and outcomes in a subsequent learning test. To do so, we designed
a feedback intervention that gave people imprecise feedback about either (1) their
standing within their group (whether they performed in the upper or the lower half
relative to their group) or (2) their standing within their group plus their group’s
standing relative to another group (whether their group was stronger or weaker than
the other group). We expected, based on empirical research that finds that students
become more confident in their academic abilities when they have worse classmates
(Murphy and Weinhardt, 2014; Elsner and Isphording, 2017), that when only learn-
ing about their standing within their group, subjects would become more confident
when they were assigned to the weaker group. Furthermore, when learning about
both their standing within their group and their group’s standing relative to another
group, this effect should be expected to disappear if subjects assign correct weights
to within-group and between-group ability signals, as in this case between-group
information would counterbalance within-group information. However, if subjects
overweigh between-group information, the effect of weaker group assignment would
be negative, while if they overweigh within-group information the effect of weaker
group assignment would still be positive.
Our results show that, in the setting we studied, when the group assignment
mechanism was non-salient, it did not matter for subjects confidence whether they
were assigned to the weaker or the stronger group. The signs of the effects suggest
that in this case subjects were slightly more confident when assigned to the weaker
group, however the effect sizes are so small that it would need a much larger sam-
ple size to possibly find a significant effect. Furthermore, we find that if the group
assignment mechanism was salient, weaker group assignment made people less con-
fident. This effect is highly significant and much larger than the positive effect of
weaker group assignment when the assignment mechanism was non-salient. We find
this effect both for lower and higher ability individuals, although it seems to be
even stronger for the latter. We also find that subjects are on average less confi-
dent when the group assignment mechanism is salient than when it is non-salient.
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This is found to be the case due to salient grouping causing subjects’ beliefs to be-
come decalibrated, especially when learning they were assigned to the weaker group.
When grouping was non-salient, subjects on average gave quite correct estimates of
their ability rank. However, when grouping was salient, subjects who were assigned
to the stronger group were significantly overconfident while subjects who were as-
signed to the weaker group were significantly underconfident, indicating that people
overweighed ability signals coming from between-group information.
When ability grouping was salient, subjects assigned to the weaker group were
more underconfident than subjects assigned to the stronger group were overconfi-
dent, indicating that people overweighed negative information as compared to pos-
itive information. Some of those who are told they are in the weaker group report
“irrational” rank beliefs (i.e. beliefs that must be false given the subject’s infor-
mation), while none of those who are told they were in the stronger group do so.
When comparing people who received extreme feedback (“upper half in stronger
group” and “lower half in weaker group”) we find that, conditional on feedback,
these groups did not have significantly different belief distributions although they
represented the two extremes of the ability distribution. However, when it comes to
ambivalent feedback, we find more decalibrated beliefs among those receiving bad
between-group and good within-group information (“upper half in weaker group”)
than those receiving good between-group and bad within-group information (“lower
half in stronger group”), which cannot be explained by lower abilities of the for-
mer group as compared to the latter. Thus, group assignment information seems
to lead to stronger decalibration of beliefs if it is negatively surprising than if it is
positively surprising. This is in line with the finding that people’s beliefs respond
more strongly to negative information (Ertac, 2011) but contradicts the possibly
more common finding that people incorporate positive information into their beliefs
more strongly than negative information (Eil and Rao, 2011; Mobius et al., 2011;
Grossman and Owens, 2012; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015).
With respect to test outcomes, we find that salient ability grouping has a positive
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effect on the performance of lower ability individuals while it has a negative effect
on the performance of higher ability individuals. This is driven by opposite effects
for these groups when they are saliently assigned to the weaker group. While the
performance of lower ability individuals increases when they learn that they were
assigned to the weaker group, the performance of higher ability individuals decreases
when they learn that they were assigned to the weaker group. Past research has
also variously found that performance increases (Kuhnen and Tymula, 2012; Azmat
et al., 2016; Fischer and Wagner, Chapter 3 of this thesis) or decreases (Buser,
2016) in response to negative performance information. Our findings suggest that
in our setting, higher confidence in learning ability as measured by the test does not
have clear benefits for people in terms of improving their test outcomes. In fact,
confidence overall predicts subsequent test outcomes negatively.
4.6 Conclusion
To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the causal effects of within-
group and between-group information on people’s ability beliefs and performance.
Overall, our results suggest that ability grouping may have negative effects on peo-
ple’s confidence in their ability, especially for those who are assigned to a weaker
group. Being part of a weaker peer group should not generally be expected to make
people more confident. Our results imply that the positive effect of weaker peers on
confidence if relative ability between groups is non-salient may be greatly outweighed
by the negative effect of having weaker peers when people know that their peers are
relatively weaker compared to another group. In line with past findings (Coffman,
2014), negative information about one’s group may lead people to self-stereotype,
i.e. to believe that one has worse characteristics than one actually does. Our results
also suggest that, in settings where ability grouping is done visibly, forming ability
groups may risk harming those people who are negatively surprised by weaker group
assignment more than it may benefit those who are positively surprised by stronger
group assignment.
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The results of this study demonstrate that the effects of one’s group’s abilities
on beliefs in own ability and subsequent performance are sensitive to information
about the group assignment process. Because of this, one should be careful when
interpreting effects of peer group ability on performance from field experiments
where the group assignment mechanism is non-salient (as e.g. in Duflo et al., 2011;
Carrell et al., 2013; Booij et al., 2017) as other effects may prevail once people find
out that groups of different abilities were deliberately formed.
Overall, our findings suggest that the relationship between ability beliefs and
motivation are complex and should be further investigated in future research. Our
study may help to understand the effects of ability grouping in the field by isolating
the effects it may have on ability beliefs. However, we caution that our results are
based on a laboratory experiment that studies the effects in an abstract setting and
further research needs to be done to confirm that our findings hold in educational
or workplace settings.
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4.7 Appendix to Chapter 4
4.7.1 Details on the Experimental Procedure
Test and Feedback Screens
Figure 4.7: Test 1 (Test Phase)
Figure 4.8: Test 1 (Learning Phase)
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Figure 4.9: Sample Feedback: Non-salient Grouping
Figure 4.10: Sample Feedback: Salient Grouping
Figure 4.11: Sample Feedback: No Grouping
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Figure 4.12: Test 2 (Test Phase)
Figure 4.13: Test 2 (Learning Phase)
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Treatment Messages
Table 4.4: Message by Treatment
Treatment: Non-salient grouping Salient grouping
Message:
“The participants in this
room were divided into
two equally sized
groups. With your
learning ability you
occupy a ranking in the
upper [lower] half within
your group.”
“The participants in this room
were divided into to equally sized
groups: The stronger learners
and the weaker learners. There,
a better result makes it much
more likely to be assigned to the
stronger learners. You were
assigned to the stronger (weaker)
learners. With your learning
ability you occupy a rank in the
upper [lower] half among the
stronger (weaker) learners.”
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4.7.2 Summary Statistics and Balance Checks
Table 4.5: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Points Test 1 19.881 7.676 3 36 193
Points Test 2 22.668 7.888 0 36 193
Better Half 0.508 0.501 0 1 193
Confidence -0.451 6.406 -20 19 193
Decalibration 4.793 4.261 0 20 193
Effort 1 239.539 117.775 51 898 193
Effort 2 242.518 120.898 56 672 193
Non-salient Tracking 0.409 0.493 0 1 193
Salient Tracking 0.404 0.492 0 1 193
Stronger Group 0.497 0.502 0 1 157
Better Half in Group 0.409 0.493 0 1 193
Extreme Feedback 1.538 0.505 1 2 39
Ambivalent Feedback 1.462 0.505 1 2 39
Female 0.492 0.501 0 1 193
Semester 5.611 3.483 1 15 193
School GPA 2.574 6.424 0 90 193
Profit 11.41 2.295 5.8 17.6 193
Session 1 0.145 0.353 0 1 193
Session 2 0.135 0.342 0 1 193
Session 3 0.155 0.363 0 1 193
Session 4 0.135 0.342 0 1 193
Session 5 0.15 0.358 0 1 193
Session 6 0.119 0.325 0 1 193
Session 7 0.161 0.368 0 1 193
Humanities 0.098 0.299 0 1 193
Social Science 0.078 0.268 0 1 193
Law 0.109 0.312 0 1 193
Busines Administration 0.295 0.457 0 1 193
Economics 0.161 0.368 0 1 193
Medicine 0.062 0.242 0 1 193
Natural Sciences 0.078 0.268 0 1 193
Other Fields 0.119 0.325 0 1 193
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Table 4.6: Balance Check
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-
Transparent
Tracking
Transparent
Tracking
No Tracking Overall (1) vs. (2),
p-value
(1) vs. (3),
p-value
(2) vs. (3),
p-value
Female 0.481 0.513 0.472 0.492 0.692 0.931 0.690
(0.057) (0.057) (0.084) (0.036)
Points Test 1 20.418 19.628 19.250 19.881 0.513 0.478 0.801
(0.907) (0.791) (1.391) (0.553)
School GPA 2.101 1.982 2.092 2.051 0.239 0.936 0.399
(0.068) (0.075) (0.100) (0.045)
Semester 5.532 6.000 4.944 5.611 0.408 0.362 0.156
(0.358) (0.438) (0.534) (0.251)
Field of Study 4.304 4.782 4.611 4.554 0.201 0.479 0.710
(0.252) (0.274) (0.322) (0.163)
Session No. 4.177 3.872 3.944 4.010 0.357 0.566 0.856
(0.235) (0.233) (0.303) (0.146)
N 79 78 36 193
Proportion 0.409 0.404 0.187 1.000
Standard errors in parentheses.
4.7.3 Simulations and Further Results
Figure 4.14: Expected Ranks by Feedback Type
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Note: This figure shows the distributions of the expected ability
ranks by feedback type. The graphs are based on simulations
applying our ability group assignment mechanism to 64,000 ob-
servations.
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Table 4.7: Effort Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Effort If Lower Ability If Higher Ability If Lower Ability If Higher Ability
Non-salient Grouping 29.90 -13.18 34.34 17.08
(1.17) (-0.46) (0.97) (0.38)
Stronger Group -43.74 -14.50 -38.48 14.46
(-1.56) (-0.52) (-1.06) (0.32)
Non-salient Gr. × Stronger Group -11.06 -49.62
(-0.20) (-0.76)
Observations 76 81 76 81
R2 0.181 0.128 0.181 0.135
Note: This table presents the effect of non-salient versus salient ability grouping and
assignment to a stronger versus a weaker group using a linear regression model including
a constant, session fixed effects and robust standard errors. Dependent variable: effort in
terms of clicks. Columns 1 and 3 (2 and 4) show results for lower (higher) ability subjects.
t statistics are reported in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 4.8: Correlation between Confidence and Subsequent Perfor-
mance
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Test Score All If Lower Ability If Higher Ability
Confidence -0.205∗∗ -0.148 0.0312
(-2.32) (-1.27) (0.24)
Observations 157 76 81
R2 0.081 0.096 0.064
Note: This table presents the correlation between confidence and subse-
quent performance using a linear regression model including a constant,
session fixed effects and robust standard errors. Dependent variable:
test score. Column 1 shows results for all subjects, and columns 2 and 3
show results for lower and higher ability subjects, respectively. t statis-
tics are reported in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Chapter 5
Confidence in Knowledge or Confidence in the
Ability to Learn: An Experiment on the Causal
Effects of Beliefs on Motivation
Co-authored with Dirk Sliwka1
5.1 Introduction
Motivational beliefs are held to be a strong determinant of important life out-
comes such as educational attainment and professional development. However, there
seems to be disagreement in the public realm on which beliefs about ourselves are
beneficial for us. Folk wisdom tells us that holding a very favorable opinion of our
abilities may often breed failure as it tempts us to rest on our laurels and lowers
our motivation to work hard towards our goals and the economics literature, too,
mostly emphasizes the negative effects of too much confidence. However, many pop-
ular self-help books claim that increasing our self-confidence makes us more likely to
be successful in life.2 In educational settings, optimistic beliefs about ourselves are
widely thought to foster skill development and a quick search on the internet will
turn up many school-related websites and workshop offers claiming that fostering
children’s confidence will improve their motivation to learn. However, there seems
to be disagreement about whether praise for performance, effort, or progress is best
1My co-author and I contributed equally to the design and implementation of the study, to the
data analysis, and to writing the paper. The theoretical model is by my co-author.
2The claim “confidence breeds success” produces 329 hits on Google Books and a search on
Amazon.com for “confidence” in the sub-category “Books - Self-Help - Success” produces 783 hits.
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to raise confidence and motivation to learn.
A straightforward conjecture is that some of the disagreement in the popular
discourse about the relationship between feedback, confidence, and performance
is caused by the tendency to subsume different types of beliefs under the notion
of “confidence”. Different types of feedback may influence beliefs about different
dimensions of a person’s skills and abilities and conditional on circumstances a shift
in a belief about a given skill dimension may or may not raise motivation to exert
effort.3
The key purpose of this paper is to distinguish two dimensions of confidence –
confidence in one’s level of prior knowledge and confidence in one’s learning ability –
and to study causal effects of changes in these dimensions of a person’s confidence on
investments in human capital. Reinforcement of confidence in these two dimensions
likely has very different effects, as the first dimension is related to one’s ex-ante
probability of passing a test while the second one is related to how much one’s
passing probability increases when exerting learning efforts. We first illustrate these
belief dimensions in a simple formal model and then study the effects of exogenous
variation in both dimensions in a lab experiment.
The motivational role of confidence has attracted substantial interest from dif-
ferent fields in economics in recent years. Bénabou and Tirole (2002, 2003), for in-
stance, have studied formal models in which agents are uncertain about the marginal
returns to their effort. These models yield a precise notion of confidence as an agent’s
belief in her own marginal product of effort. A higher confidence then naturally in-
duces an agent to work harder on a task.4 The recent literature on the economics of
education has studied specific personality traits that predict important life outcomes
(Heckman et al., 2006; Cebi, 2007; Heineck and Anger, 2010; Heckman and Kautz,
2012). Internal locus of control and self-esteem, psychological constructs intended to
3Indeed, the literature in psychology indicates that there is mixed evidence on the associa-
tion between different types of feedback and performance (Kluger and DeNisi, 1998; Hattie and
Timperley, 2007).
4See, for instance, Koch et al. (2015) for an overview on these and related models from the
perspective of the economics of education.
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capture a person’s beliefs about the ability to affect outcomes, feature prominently
among these traits. There is also empirical evidence that socially disadvantaged
children (Filippin and Paccagnella, 2012), and girls (Reuben et al., 2017) are less
confident about their academic ability and that this has negative effects on their
educational decisions and expected earnings.
In our experiment students have to decide how intensively they want to prepare
for a test. They pass the test and earn a reward if their performance reaches a certain
threshold. Based on the analysis of a simple formal model we hypothesize that a
higher confidence in the level of prior knowledge causes students with low levels of
knowledge to invest more. This is because it subjectively moves them closer to the
passing threshold and raises the probability that an additional remembered item
is pivotal to passing the test. For students with high levels of prior knowledge we
expect the opposite, i.e. that raising their confidence in knowledge even further
will lower their effort to prepare for the test because it subjectively moves them
further away from the passing threshold such that learning becomes less relevant
for whether someone passes or fails the test. For the other dimension – confidence
in learning ability – we expect that raising this dimension of confidence will have
a monotonic effect and cause students to invest more effort in learning because the
perceived marginal cost of effort to generate “knowledge” decreases.
To study the causal effects of the two dimensions of confidence, we exogenously
vary feedback scores subjects receive about their performance in two prior tests.
One of these tests measures their prior knowledge, the other test measures the
ability to memorize information. After completing these two tests, each subject
privately receives a feedback score for each of the tests. Subjects know that each
feedback score is the sum of their true score in the respective test and a random
noise term. We then elicit subjects’ confidence by asking them to estimate their
own rank in the first two tests. Subjects can then buy pieces of information and
memorize these to prepare for a final test in which they earn a fixed amount of
money if their performance exceeds a specific threshold. The random component
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in the feedback scores thus generates exogenous variation in the agents’ confidence
in the two dimensions, which we use as instrumental variables to estimate causal
effects of confidence on investment decisions and test outcomes.
We find that a higher confidence in learning raises learning investments irre-
spective of the prior level of knowledge. Confidence in knowledge, however, has a
negative effect on investments of individuals with above average prior knowledge and
a positive effect on investments of individuals with below average prior knowledge.
With respect to test outcomes, we find that raising the confidence in learning of
individuals with below average prior knowledge improves their rank in the final test
and their probability of passing it, however, we do not find a beneficial effect for
individuals who already had above average prior knowledge. Mirroring the effects
of confidence in knowledge on effort, we find that raising confidence in knowledge
of individuals with above average prior knowledge decreases their outcomes in the
final test whereas it has the opposite effect on individuals with below average prior
knowledge.
This paper makes two contributions. First, it shows theoretically and experimen-
tally that in situations where choices involve effort, confidence should be viewed as a
multidimensional concept (even if the effort choice is unidimensional) and that gen-
eral statements about the motivational effects of confidence are misleading. In order
to explain the effects of confidence on motivation to exert effort, and on learning in
particular, we have to understand which roles effort and ability play in achieving a
goal. An important implication of this is also that interventions aimed at raising
confidence should be carefully designed and evaluated because they might affect sev-
eral beliefs that interact in different ways with motivation to exert effort. Second, we
develop a deception-free experimental approach to study the causal effect of beliefs
on effort by generating exogenous variation in two dimensions of confidence. For this
reason, we can rule out that, for instance, unobserved psychological dispositions that
may be correlated with confidence drive the association between confidence, moti-
vation to exert effort, and performance. By studying the effects of confidence on
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learning decisions and test outcomes, our study links the literature on experiments
in education to the literature on motivational beliefs and socio-emotional skills.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the
related literature on the determinants of effort provision in educational and similar
settings. Section 3 presents a model and derives best responses and hypotheses from
it. Section 4 presents the experimental design. Section 5 presents the results and
Section 6 concludes.
5.2 Related Literature
Our research is closely related to the game theoretical and behavioral economic
literature on confidence and incentives. As stated above, “confidence in learning
ability” in our setting is equivalent to Benabou and Tirole’s (2002, 2003) notion
of confidence as an agent’s (rational) belief in her own marginal product of effort.
We study the interplay between this type of confidence and confidence in prior
knowledge as well as the impact of both on investment incentives.5
The effects of beliefs in and feedback about ability have been explored in several
theoretical papers. The role of feedback in tournament settings has, for instance,
been explored by Aoyagi (2010) and Gershkov and Perry (2009). Most closely related
to our study is the analysis by Ederer (2010) who studies the effect of interim
feedback (about interim outcomes) on effort and shows that when effort and ability
are complements feedback should induce competing effects as it informs agents about
their relative standing (which reduces incentives) as well as their ability (which may
increase incentives). In a principal-agent setting, Santos-Pinto (2008) shows that a
worker’s overestimation of his ability is beneficial for the principal when ability and
effort are complements but not when they are substitutes. Our experiment provides
causal empirical evidence for the relevance of disentangling different ability beliefs.
In the context of job search on the labor market, contributions by Caliendo
5 Compte and Postlewaite (2004) depart even further from a neoclassical framework by assuming
that confidence, influenced by an agent’s past successes and failures, raises the (factual) probability
of success of an agent.
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et al. (2015) and Spinnewijn (2015) have studied the role of different dimensions of
confidence on search efforts. Most closely related to our model is the analysis of
Spinnewijn (2015), who studies how biased beliefs in two dimensions influence job
search: “baseline beliefs” – the beliefs about the baseline job finding probability for
given search efforts, and “control beliefs” – the beliefs about the increase in the job
finding probability when searching more intensively. We study the effect of baseline
belief (concerning prior knowledge) and control belief (concerning ability to learn)
on learning effort and provide causal evidence on their impact in an educational
setting.
A number of empirical and experimental papers have studied the effect of feed-
back about (relative) performance on educational outcomes. Tran and Zeckhauser
(2012) find that students perform significantly better in a final English test when
they are told their rankings on practice tests than students in the control group who
only receive private feedback about their test score. Bandiera et al. (2015) exploit
rule differences between university departments concerning the provision of feedback
to students and find that students who receive their individual exam grade prior to
writing a long essay do better in it than students who do not. Azmat and Iriberri
(2010), in a natural field experiment set in a high school, find that students who
repeatedly receive information about the average grade of their class in addition to
information about their own grade, receive 5 percent better grades. In Azmat et al.
(2016), however, a random sample of college students who receive information about
their position in the distribution of grades repeatedly over a period of three years
are found to do worse during the first six months. As the authors argue, students
in their sample were initially underconfident. Thus learning that they were doing
better than expected had a negative impact on performance. In line with this ar-
gument, Kuhnen and Tymula (2012), who study effort reactions to rank feedback
in the lab, find that individuals who ranked better than expected decrease output,
whereas those who ranked worse than expected increase output. In contrast to these
studies, we do not vary feedback on the relative rank in the relevant test but go one
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step back and manipulate the beliefs a person holds about her knowledge and abil-
ity to learn in order to shed light on the behavioral mechanisms by which feedback
affects behavior.
Finally, although incentive compatible measurement of beliefs is common in eco-
nomic laboratory studies, there are very few studies which generate exogenous vari-
ation in beliefs in order to study the causal effect of beliefs on actions. Mobius et al.
(2011) repeatedly give noisy feedback about whether one performed in the better or
the worse half of participants in an IQ test. The authors use the random variation
in the feedback to estimate the causal effect of confidence in own ability on the aver-
sion to receiving information about ability and find that a lower confidence induces
a stronger aversion to receiving information about one’s own ability. Schwardmann
and Van der Weele (2016) investigate the hypothesis that overconfidence serves to
more effectively persuade others and also manipulate subjects’ confidence in their
own intelligence using noisy feedback. Costa-Gomes et al. (2014) study the causal
effect of beliefs in a trust game by inducing a zero-mean random shift that exoge-
nously increases or reduces the trustee’s level of re-payment. Then the authors use
the random shift as instrumental variable to estimate the causal effect of beliefs
about the trustee’s transfer share on the trustor’s choice. Our study is the first that
uses noisy feedback to manipulate two different belief dimensions in order to study
the causal effect of ability beliefs on learning investments and test outcomes.
5.3 An Illustrative Model
Consider the following simple illustrative model which can be interpreted as an
analysis of a reaction function in a standard Lazear and Rosen (1981) tournament
in which we allow the agent’s beliefs to vary with respect to (i) the costs of effort
(ability a) and (ii) a potential handicap/or lead (prior knowledge k). In contrast to
the standard tournament literature we do not analyze the equilibrium behavior of
a small set of players but follow Casas-Arce and Martínez-Jerez (2009) in studying
a “population tournament” where the threshold necessary to win the prize is deter-
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ministic. The model’s purpose is to illustrate how changes in these two forms of
“confidence” should affect the efforts exerted to win the prize.
A risk neutral agent can invest effort to raise her human capital. Human capital
is measured by “pieces of knowledge”. An agent’s posterior knowledge is the sum
of her prior knowledge k and knowledge acquired through learning ∆. Knowledge
acquisition is costly and the agent’s cost function is
c (∆, a)
where a measures the agent’s ability to acquire further knowledge. We assume that
∂c
∂∆ ,
∂2c
∂∆2 > 0 and
∂c
∂∆∂a < 0 such that the marginal costs of knowledge acquisition
are smaller for more able agents. The agent is uncertain about both, her prior
knowledge k and the ability to acquire further knowledge a. She knows that both
are distributed according to the cumulative distribution functions Fa (a) and Fk (k) .
The agent receives informative signals s = (sa, sk) such that ∂E[a|sa,sk ]∂sa > 0 and
∂E[k|sa,sk ]
∂sk
> 0. Note that we can decompose
a = E [a |sa, sk ] + εas
k = E [k |sa, sk ] + εks
where εas and εks are uncorrelated with the signals (sa, sk) and have mean zero (by
the law of iterated expectations).6 Assume that εas and εks have unimodal densities
with g′εas (0) = g′εks (0) = 0. Denote the conditional expectations as
kˆ = E [k |sa, sk ]
aˆ = E [a |sa, sk ]
such that kˆ and aˆ describe the agent’s own mean belief in her knowledge and costs of
6To see, for instance, that Cov [sa, εas] = Cov [sa, a− E [a |sa, sk ]] = 0 note that by
the law of iterated expectations E [sa (a− E [a |sa, sk ])] = E [E [sa (a− E [a |sa, sk ]) |sγ , sk ]]=
E [saE [(a− E [a |sa, sk ]) |sa, sk ]] = 0.
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knowledge acquisition respectively. The decomposition allows us to do comparative
statics with respect to kˆ and aˆ, which capture an agent’s confidence in the two
dimensions.
The agent attains a certain educational outcome, such as passing an admission
test to an education program, or being awarded an academic title, if k + ∆ exceeds
a threshold value τ .7 In this case she will receive a reward B. The agent’s objective
function can thus be denoted as
max
∆
Pr
(
kˆ + εks + ∆ > τ
)
B − E [c (∆, a) |sa, sk ] .
In order to guarantee that this optimization problem has a unique solution we
assume that
max
ε
(
−g′εks (ε)
)
B < min
∆,a
E
[
∂2c (∆, a)
∂∆2
]
(5.1)
which will, for instance, hold if ∂2c(∆,a)
∂∆2 is bounded from below by a constant and
the signal sk is not too precise.8
The first derivative of the objective function is
gεks
(
τ − kˆ −∆
)
B − E
[
∂c (∆, aˆ+ εa)
∂∆
]
and by condition (5.1) the objective function is strictly concave. We can now show:
Proposition 1 Knowledge acquired through learning ∆
(
aˆ, kˆ
)
is strictly increasing
in the agent’s confidence in her ability to acquire knowledge aˆ. It is strictly increasing
in the agent’s confidence in prior knowledge kˆ if and only if kˆ is smaller than a cut-
off value and otherwise strictly decreasing.
7Note that here we treat τ as an exogenous constant. If we consider a tournament setting τ
will be determined in equilibrium by the choices of the other agents. In a tournament between a
continuum of agents where a fixed fraction can win a prize the equilibrium threshold will indeed
be deterministic (see, for instance Casas-Arce and Martínez-Jerez (2009)).
8This condition will guarantee that the objective function is strictly concave. Intuitively, if there
is sufficient uncertainty on k then εks will have a large variance. If, for instance, εks is normally
distributed a large enough variance will guarantee that the slope of the density function will not
be too steep.
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Proof:
By implicit differentiation we obtain
∂∆
(
aˆ, kˆ
)
∂a
= − −E
[
∂c(∆,aˆ+εa)
∂∆∂a
]
−g′εks
(
τ − kˆ −∆
)
B − E
[
∂2c(∆,aˆ+εa)
∂∆2
] > 0
as the denominator is negative by condition (5.1). And
∂∆
(
aˆ, kˆ
)
∂kˆ
= − −g
′
εks
(
τ − kˆ −∆
)
B
−g′εks
(
τ − kˆ −∆
)
B − E
[
∂2c(∆,aˆ+εa)
∂∆2
] (5.2)
such that
∂∆
(
aˆ, kˆ
)
∂kˆ
> 0⇔ g′εks
(
τ − kˆ −∆
)
< 0
which, as gεks (ε) has a unique mode at 0, is equivalent to
τ > kˆ + ∆
(
aˆ, kˆ
)
.
The right hand side is strictly increasing k as ∂∆(aˆ,kˆ)
∂k
> −1. To see the latter, note
that
∂∆
(
aˆ, kˆ
)
∂kˆ
= − −g
′
εks
(
τ − kˆ −∆
)
B
−g′εks
(
τ − kˆ −∆
)
B − E
[
∂2c(∆,aˆ+εa)
∂∆2
] > −1⇔
g′εks
(
τ − kˆ −∆
)
B < g′εks
(
τ − kˆ −∆
)
B + E
[
∂2c (∆, aˆ+ εa)
∂∆2
]
which always holds. Hence, condition (5.2) holds for sufficiently small k and will
not hold above a threshold level.9
To illustrate the result, consider the following parametric example. Assume that
the agent’s cost function is c (∆, a) = c−a2 ∆
2 and that the agent believes that k is
normally distributed with mean kˆ and variance V [εks] = σ2εk . As the cost function
is linear in a, expected costs are equal to c−aˆ2 ∆
2. The agent’s objective function is
9Note that this threshold will be strictly positive if τ > k + ∆
(
aˆ, kˆ
)
for k = 0. A sufficient
condition for this is that the objective function is downward sloping in ∆ at ∆ = τ for k = 0, which
is the case when gεks (0)B < E
[
∂c(∆,aˆ+εa)
∂∆
]
. This will hold if the signal on k is not too precise.
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thus
max
∆
Pr
(
εks > τ −∆− kˆ
)
B − c− aˆ2 ∆
2.
The first derivative of the objective function10 becomes
1
σεk
φ
τ −∆− kˆ
σεk
B − (c− aˆ) ∆ = 0,
where φ (ε) is the pdf of a standard normal distribution. While this equation has
no closed form solution we can use this expression to plot ∆ as an implicit function
of a and ∆ for specific examples.11
Figure 5.1: Learning Investments as a Function of Perceived Ability and Knowledge
Hence, a higher confidence in the ability to learn always leads to higher learning
investments as it lowers the perceived marginal costs of learning efforts. This is es-
sentially the motivational effect of self-confidence stressed, for instance, by Benabou
and Tirole (2002). However, confidence in prior knowledge has a positive effect only
for agents with low prior knowledge but reduces the incentives to learn for those
with higher prior knowledge. The intuition is the following: If an agent has rather
low confidence in her initial knowledge she thinks that the likelihood of achieving the
educational outcome is small. In turn, the expected marginal gains from learning are
small. Raising the confidence in knowledge raises the perceived likelihood to jump
the threshold and consequently increases the marginal returns to learning efforts.
10Condition (5.1) that guarantees an internal solution here becomes 1σ2εk
1√
2pi e
− 12B < c − aˆ, i.e.
the objective function will be strictly concave if aˆ is not too large.
11The plots use values B = 10, σ2εk = 1,
τ = 3, c = 8 and the condition guaranteeing a strictly concave objective function requires that
aˆ < 8− 1√2pi e−
1
2 10 = 5. 580 3.
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If, however, the agent believes that she has a very high level of prior knowledge,
her perceived likelihood of attaining the outcome even at lower learning investments
increases. In turn, the incentive to invest in acquiring further knowledge decreases.
Based on this illustrative model, we designed an experiment that enables us to
clearly disentangle confidence in prior knowledge and confidence in the ability to
learn and allows us to measure the causal effect of confidence in both dimensions.
5.4 Experimental Design
We have to keep in mind that confidence is inherently an endogenous variable as
it will always be affected by unobserved experiences, abilities, and other traits of
the respective subjects, which could also affect the outcome variables through differ-
ent unobserved behavioral channels. Hence, merely detecting a correlation between
confidence and behavior does not allow to infer causality. In order to avoid this prob-
lem, we have developed an experimental design in which we generate instrumental
variables, that is variables that are (i) cleanly exogenous but (ii) directly affect con-
fidence. We then use these variables to investigate the causal effects of confidence
on behavior. In the following we will explain in detail how we implemented this
idea.
We invited university students to the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Re-
search.12 Upon arrival, registered participants were randomly assigned a computer.
Before the experiment started, students were informed that they were prohibited to
talk to each other, to use electronic devices or pen and paper during the experiment
and that anyone who violated this rule would be excluded from the experiment.
We monitored compliance with the rule during the entire session. Participants were
informed that they would receive the regular show-up fee of 2.50 euros and that they
could earn additional money during the experiment.13
12The laboratory uses the recruitment software ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) for managing the subject
pool. The experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Financial support of the
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) through grant FOR1371 is gratefully acknowledged.
13A detailed description of the experiment’s timeline, tests, feedback, and belief elicitation can
be found in appendices 5.7.5 and 5.7.6.
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The timeline of the experiment is illustrated in Figure 5.2 and can be summarized
as follows: Before the main intervention, subjects take part in a memory and a
knowledge test. Then they learn a feedback score about their performance in each
test and these feedback scores are the sum of the respective test outcomes and
random noise terms. Hence, this stage constitutes our treatment variation: The
noise terms exogenously vary information that should affect subjects’ confidence in
the two dimensions. In a next step we elicit subjects’ beliefs about their relative
standing in both domains, which was incentivized by paying them for accuracy of
beliefs. These are the main belief variables we use in our analysis as measures of
confidence in the two dimensions. Then subjects can undertake a costly investment
in further knowledge to prepare for a final test in which they can earn a substantial
amount of money when passing a threshold. The learning investment as well as the
test results will constitute our outcome variables.
Figure 5.2: Timeline of the Experimental Procedure
5.4.1 Stages of the Experiment
Measurement of Prior Knowledge and Learning Ability: After the in-
troduction, participants saw a description of the test they were about to take first,
which was either a “knowledge test” or a “memory test”. The order of the tests was
randomized within each session to eliminate possible order effects. In the knowledge
test subjects had to rank 60 cities according to their numbers of inhabitants within
triples of cities, i.e. they had to state which city is the largest and which one is the
smallest among three cities and would earn a piece rate of 0.10 euros for each correct
set. In the memory test subjects first saw a list of 36 cities with a (fictitious) city
code belonging to each city. This list was displayed on the screens for 15 minutes
and subjects were not allowed to take notes. After this they had to rank cities within
triples according to these city codes and would earn 0.20 euros for each correct set.
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Hence, the knowledge test measured subjects’ prior knowledge and the memory test
measured their capacity to memorize information. The memory test closely resem-
bles tests used by psychologists to test working memory capacity (Wilhelm et al.,
2013) and was designed such that it covers the same domain (numbers attached to
city names) as the knowledge test and in order to make one’s performance in it seem
as relevant as possible with respect to one’s later learning decision for a test in this
domain.14
Both tests were incentivized with a piece rate. Participants took the two tests
one after another and after each test were asked how many triples they believed to
have solved correctly, immediately afterwards they were also asked how many triples
they believed other participants on average solved correctly. In both cases answers
were not incentivized and participants were informed that their answer did not have
any effect on the further course of the experiment. A detailed overview of the tests
and stages of the experiment can be found in Appendices 5.7.5 and 5.7.6.15 Then
participants were informed there will be a “Test 3 (main test)”, and that, unlike in
the first two tests, they would earn 10 euros if they performed better than half of
participants in the session who did the tests in the same order as them. They were
also informed that they could prepare for this third test.
Feedback stage: Participants were informed that before preparing for the
third test, they would receive feedback about their outcomes in the first two tests
in the form of a “knowledge score” and a “memory score”. As explained to the
participants, each score was the sum of a participant’s number of correct sets in the
respective test and a noise term uniformly and independently distributed between
14Working memory capacity is a strong predictor of ability to acquire knowledge and new skills,
independently of IQ (Alloway and Alloway, 2010). See Ackerman et al. (2005) for an overview.
15We measured beliefs twice. Once before giving feedback (unincentivized) and once afterwards
(incentivized - see details below). Note that the beliefs elicited after the feedback intervention are
crucial for our design, as they serve as a measure of confidence that can be affected by the treat-
ment intervention (i.e. the noisy feedback). We use the unincentivized measures only descriptively
in order to evaluate how certain subjects were about their test outcomes. In fact, the correlation
between beliefs about performance in the memory test (elicited after the test but before the feed-
back score was give) and in the knowledge test are 0.53 and 0.18, respectively. Thus, uncertainty
about own ability and knowledge is generally high prior to learning the test score – which is a
precondition for our feedback manipulation to work.
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-2 and +2 such that each of the values (-2, -1, 0, 1, 2) is drawn with a probability of
20 percent and added to the true score.16 The randomly distributed noise term thus
creates exogenous variation in feedback about knowledge and learning ability while
avoiding any form of deception. Then the personal feedback scores and average
feedback scores of participants in past sessions were displayed on the same screen.17
As already noted above, the exogenous variation in the personal feedback scores
allows for the estimation of causal effects of the agents’ confidence on behavior,
a central contribution of our study, and thus an important design feature of our
experiment.
Measurement of confidence: Participants were asked to estimate their
rank in the knowledge and in the memory test relative to those participants in the
room who worked on the two tests in the same order as them. They were informed
that they could earn one euro, respectively, for estimating their rank in each test
correctly.18 Our design thus allows us to measure both the perceived level of ability
(which is the focus of many economic studies of situations where a choice does not
entail a decision about effort), and the perceived effectiveness of effort to raise the
level of ability (the focus mainly of psychological studies employing non-incentivized
questionnaires to measure self-efficacy and locus of control (Eccles and Wigfield,
2002)) in an incentive compatible manner.
Investment stage: After participants learned their knowledge score and their
memory score they were shown a screen explaining the main “combined knowledge
and memory test” in detail. Participants were informed that this test was based on
16For a similar approach compare, for instance, Grossman and Owens (2012) who study agent’s
reactions to noisy feedback about their own performance. Note that the incentives in rank order
tournaments are not affected by random noise (For a summary of the literature see Dechenaux
et al. (2015).)
17We always displayed the same average results from a pilot study to keep the frame of reference
of the personal feedback constant between the experimental sessions. Participants in the pilot
study were recruited from the same subject pool as participants in the experiment and results were
very similar.
18This method is easy to explain and elicits the mode of an agent’s subjective beliefs in an
incentive compatible manner and is robust to risk aversion. To see that, note that an agent who
has to state an estimate r, the value of a random variable x, and receives 1 euro when reporting
correctly should report argmaxrPr (r = x)u(1)+(1− Pr (r = x))u(0), which is equal to the mode
of the distribution. Since the range of beliefs in our context is small due to a limited number of
ranks, the chances of having an exact estimate are reasonable.
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the same field of knowledge and had the same length and structure as the initial
knowledge test, i.e. they would have to rank sets of three cities according to the
size of their populations. This time, however, they would earn a prize of 10 euros
when doing better in this test than half of participants in the session who did
the first two tests in the same order as them. Furthermore, they were told that
they could prepare for it by acquiring information relevant to pass the test. To be
specific, subjects had a budget of 3 euros to buy information about cities’ numbers
of inhabitants in packages of 10 cities for 0.5 euros per package. They could buy
a maximum of 6 packages, together covering all the cities in the test. The decision
on how many packages to buy was a one-shot decision, i.e. subjects had to state in
advance how many packages they wanted to acquire 19 They knew that all cities they
could “buy” were part of the later test and each package – when fully memorized –
would allow to completely answer at least 3 assignments (triples) in the later test.
The acquired packages were then displayed in a 15 minutes learning phase before
the final test. In this phase subjects also had the possibility to click on a button
in order to look at cartoons displayed on the screen (and subjects knew this before
they acquired information).20 Hence, subjects faced two kinds of costs of learning,
direct (and measurable) monetary costs for buying information and (unobservable)
mental costs of memorizing the information displayed on the screen.
Final test: Finally, participants took the third combined knowledge and mem-
ory test in which they had to rank sets of three cities according to the size of their
populations. The test is not a pure knowledge test as it includes many smaller cities
where a prior pilot has shown that even very knowledgeable subjects may not be able
to rank all tuples perfectly without further acquired knowledge from the investment
stage. The key idea of the third test is that both, prior knowledge of geography and
knowledge acquired during the experiment matter for success. Subjects earned 10
euros if they performed better than the average of participants in the session who
19The part of the budget that was not spent, was added to the payoff in the end of the experiment
and subjects were aware of this.
20This provided them with a task when they finished memorizing or wanted to take a break and
induced some opportunity costs of effort.
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did the tests in the same order as them.
After the test, participants filled in a questionnaire. In the very end they were
informed about how much money they had earned (and how they had performed)
in each stage of the experiment.
5.5 Experimental Results
Our main interest is in the size of the learning investment that participants make to
prepare for the final test and how this investment is causally affected by confidence in
gains and confidence in levels, i.e. beliefs about learning ability and prior knowledge.
The key hypotheses are: (i) confidence in the ability to learn should raise learning
efforts irrespective of the prior level of knowledge and (ii) confidence in knowledge
should increase the incentives to learn for subjects with low prior knowledge and
decrease incentives for subjects with high prior knowledge. We measure confidence as
agents’ beliefs about their relative rank in the memory and knowledge tests elicited
after they have learned the respective feedback scores. We ran 16 experimental
sessions in May and June and 8 sessions in October 2015. In total 645 people
participated in them.21 The average total payoff was 11.29 euros (including a 2.50
euros show-up fee), the standard deviation of payoffs was 5.01 euros. Subjects on
average earned 1.03 euros in the memory test, 0.89 euros in the knowledge test and
5.00 euros in the final test. Sessions lasted approximately one hour and 10 minutes.
63 percent of participants were female. All participants were university students.
The mean semester they were in was 6.5.
21Instrumental variable regressions allow us to estimate the causal effect of beliefs on behavior
but come along with a substantial loss in statistical power (See, for instance Cameron and Trivedi
(2005, section 4.9.3). ) the extent of which is hard to gauge in advance without prior knowledge
about the variance in the respective test scores and the outcome variable. For this reason we
decided to run additional sessions in October 2015 to collect more observations. We can use 615
observations in our estimates as we have some missing data due to cases in which subjects did not
submit their answers.
152
5.5.1 Descriptive Analysis
Figure 5.3: Actual Ranks Versus Rank Beliefs
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Note: This figure shows ordinal ranks versus rank beliefs with respect to the memory and the
knowledge test elicited after giving feedback (1 is best).
We begin by descriptively studying the relationship between rank beliefs elicited
after the feedback intervention and actual ranks as well as the correlation between
these beliefs and investment behavior. The sunflower plots in Figure 5.3 show that
subjects on average estimate their rank fairly well as most observations are close
to the 45 degree line. The correlation of the rank belief in the memory test with
the actual rank in the test is 0.75, whereas the correlation of the rank belief in the
knowledge test with the actual rank in this test is 0.60. The regression lines in both
plots are largely below the 45 degree line indicating that participants on average
slightly overestimate their relative performance in both tests (by 0.7 and 1.5 ranks
in the memory test and the knowledge test, respectively).22
22With respect to unincentivized estimates elicited before the feedback intervention, the corre-
lation of beliefs in own performance with one’s actual performance (in correct answers) were 0.53
and 0.18 for the memory and the knowledge test, respectively. The correlation between beliefs
about one’s group‘s average performance and one’s group’s actual average performance is 0.10
with respect to the memory test and -0.03 with respect to the knowledge test. Thus, uncertainty
was generally high before the intervention, particularly so with respect to others’ performance
and the prior knowledge dimension. Participants before the intervention were on average slightly
underconfident with respect to their own performance (by 0.2 and 1.5 points in the memory and
the knowledge test, respectively) and slightly overestimated their group’s average performance (by
0.7 and 0.12 points, respectively).
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Figure 5.4: Association of Confidence in Learning Ability and in Prior Knowledge
with Investment in Learning
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Note: This figure shows quadratic predictions of learning investment as a function of confidence in
learning ability and confidence in prior knowledge.
Figure 5.4 shows quadratic predictions of investment behavior as a function of
the respective belief measured in percentile ranks. To facilitate interpretation of
coefficients we computed inverted rank beliefs and standardized them to percentile
ranks such that the maximum possible level of confidence is 100 and the minimum
possible level of confidence is 0.
They thus show the quadratic approximation of the expectation about the level
of investment conditional on the two confidence dimensions. As can be seen in the
left panel of Figure 5.4, there is a monotonically increasing relationship between
confidence in learning ability and monetary investments in learning. The better a
person thinks her memory is compared to other people, the larger the amount of
costly information she acquires for the study period. The right panel of Figure 5.4
shows that the relationship between the belief in level of prior knowledge and the
investment in studying is hump shaped. Investment seems to be the highest if the
person thinks that her knowledge is about average.23
In the following we will investigate whether these correlations between beliefs
and investments are indeed driven by a direct causal effect of beliefs on investments.
23A fractional polynomial plot shows nearly exactly the same hump shaped pattern.
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In order to do so, we will first check whether our random feedback manipulation
affects beliefs as expected. After ensuring that it does, we will use our manipulation
to instrument the beliefs in instrumental variable regressions explaining behavior
and outcomes. By doing so, we will only use the exogenous component of beliefs,
uncorrelated with other unobserved individual traits, to explain behavior.
5.5.2 Effect of the Feedback Manipulation on Beliefs
In order to identify the effect of our feedback manipulation on participants’ beliefs,
we first regress our incentivized measures of confidence in learning ability and con-
fidence in knowledge (i.e. the subjects’ beliefs about their respective rank in the
considered dimension elicited after the feedback, inverted and standardized to per-
centile ranks) on the exogenously varied noise terms. We thus estimate the following
specification by ordinary least squares, which will also constitute the first stage in
our instrumental variable (IV) regressions below:
Confidencei = α + βNoiseTermMemoryi+
γNoiseTermKnowledgei + δControlsi + i (5.3)
In these, as well as in all of the following regressions, we include the results of the
memory and the knowledge test. Additionally, we include dummies for gender, field
of study, semester of study, school GPA, income and session as control variables in
all regressions.24 All regressions also include a constant.
The results are reported in Table 1 and show that the respective noise term in-
deed has a strong effect on the participants’ beliefs about their memory and their
knowledge. A one unit increase in the noise term in the memory feedback on aver-
age causes participants to believe that their memory is 7.6 percentile ranks better
whereas a one unit increase in the noise term in the knowledge feedback on average
24Tables in appendix 5.7.4 report the regressions without these control variables.
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Table 5.1: First Stage Regressions
(1) (2)
Confidence Memory Confidence Knowledge
Noise Term Memory 7.620∗∗∗ -0.142
(16.30) (-0.30)
Noise Term Knowledge -0.442 5.853∗∗∗
(-0.93) (12.87)
Sum Memory Test 8.564∗∗∗ -0.392
(33.77) (-1.64)
Sum Knowledge Test -0.453 5.886∗∗∗
(-1.40) (17.42)
Female -0.796 -5.040∗∗∗
(-0.55) (-3.48)
R2 0.767 0.625
Sample Size 615 615
Note: OLS estimates with robust standard errors; t statistics in parentheses; both re-
gressions contain a constant; additional control variables: dummy variables for gender,
field of study (10), semester of study (22), school GPA (25), income (14) and session
(24); ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
causes participants to believe their knowledge is 5.9 percentile ranks better. Note
that both coefficients have about the same magnitude as the respective coefficients
of the true outcomes of the ability tests. Hence, our manipulation worked and the
exogenous variation in feedback scores indeed affects beliefs. In the following two
subsections, we can now use the manipulation to study the causal effect of confidence
in learning ability and prior knowledge on investment behavior and test outcomes.
5.5.3 Causal Effect of Beliefs on Learning Investments
By studying whether our treatment affected behavior through affecting beliefs we
can address the question of whether the relationships presented in Figure 5.4 indeed
reflect causal effects. This will allow us to test the hypotheses stated in section 3. In
order to do so, we run an instrumental variable regression of beliefs on investments
where the two beliefs are instrumented by the two noise terms. The first stage of
the IV regression is given by equation 5.3. As to the second stage, we start by
estimating the specification
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Investmenti = α + βConfidenceMemoryi+
γConfidenceKnowledgei + δControlsi + i (5.4)
on the whole sample, including our battery of control variables. Given the hump
shaped prediction with respect to the effect of confidence in prior knowledge and the
availability of only two instruments, we then split the sample at the median outcome
of the knowledge test25 and estimate effects for the worse half and the better half
separately. The results are reported in Table 2.
Table 5.2: Confidence on Investment (IV)
(1) (2) (3)
Invest. (All) Invest. (Better) Invest. (Worse)
Confidence Memory 0.00792∗∗ 0.00949∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗
(2.42) (2.00) (2.67)
Confidence Knowledge -0.00138 -0.00871∗ 0.0147∗∗
(-0.32) (-1.76) (2.24)
Sum Memory Test 0.0596∗ 0.0212 0.0350
(1.92) (0.48) (0.85)
Sum Knowledge Test -0.0159 -0.0822∗ -0.115∗∗
(-0.54) (-1.94) (-2.42)
Female 0.00669 -0.124 0.232∗∗
(0.08) (-1.23) (2.02)
R2 0.319 0.391 0.486
Sample Size 615 353 262
F-Test (weak ID), Memory 136.6 56.55 52.08
F-Test (weak ID), Knowledge 83.17 54.33 26.71
Note: Two-stage least squares estimates with robust standard errors; t statistics in parentheses;
all regressions contain a constant; additional control variables: dummy variables for gender,field of
study (10), semester of study (22), school GPA (25), income (14) and session (24); Model 1: whole
sample; Model 2: performance at or above the median in knowledge test; Model 3: below median
performance in knowledge test; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Column (1) of Table 2 shows that confidence in learning ability significantly
increases investment whereas the effect of confidence in levels of prior knowledge is
insignificant when looking at the whole sample. Since we expected a positive effect
for individuals with low prior knowledge and a negative effect for individuals with
high prior knowledge, we split the sample. In columns (2) and (3) we can see that
25Median performance was 9 correct sets and we have 119 observation exactly at the median.
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both in the better and in the worse half of participants, confidence in learning ability
has a positive effect on learning investment. In line with our predictions, we also
observe that confidence in levels of knowledge has a negative effect on individuals
with above average levels of prior knowledge but a positive effect on individuals with
below average levels of prior knowledge. More specifically, for confidence in learning
ability we find that an increase of confidence by 10 percentile ranks raises investment
in learning by about 9 euro cents for the better half of students and about 12 euro
cents for the worse half of students. These effects are significant at the 5 percent
and the 1 percent level, respectively. For confidence in knowledge we find that an
increase of confidence by 10 percentile ranks lowers investment in learning by about
9 euro cents for students with above average level of prior knowledge but raises
investment in learning by about 15 euro cents for students with below average level
of prior knowledge. These effects, respectively, are significant at the 10 percent and
the 5 percent level. F-tests indicate that our instruments are sufficiently strong.
The experimental results show that beliefs about abilities causally affect how
much a person invests in learning. We find that people on average make larger
investments in learning the better they believe their learning ability to be. We also
find evidence in favor of the hypothesis that increasing the confidence in prior knowl-
edge reduces incentives for individuals whose knowledge is already above average but
increases incentives for individuals whose knowledge is below average.
5.5.4 Causal Effect of Beliefs on Test Outcomes
We are also interested in whether the behavioral change we brought about by chang-
ing confidence beliefs has an effect on students’ outcomes in the final test. We begin
by estimating how beliefs causally affect the rank one received in the final test. Note
that the first stage of the IV regressions is again given by equation 5.3. The second
stage is given by:
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Ranki = α + βConfidenceMemoryi+
γConfidenceKnowledgei + δControlsi + i (5.5)
As can be seen in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3, for the better half of participants
in the knowledge test we find no effect of confidence in learning ability26 but we do
find a negative effect of confidence in knowledge again. As confidence in knowledge
increases by one percentile rank the outcome in the final test decreases by about 0.3
percentile ranks. For the worse half of participants in the knowledge test we find
that as confidence in learning ability increases by one percentile rank the outcome
in the final test increases by about 0.3 percentile ranks, while as confidence in prior
knowledge increases by one percentile rank the outcome in the final test increases
by about 0.5 percentile ranks.
We then use an IV probit estimation method based on Newey (1987) to test
whether beliefs also causally affect the probability of passing the test. The first
stage is again given by equation 5.3. The second stage is a probit regression of the
form
Pr(y = 1|x) = G(α + βConfidenceMemoryi+
γConfidenceKnowledgei + δControls+ i) (5.6)
As can be seen by looking at columns (3) and (4) of Table 3, and analogously
to the results in columns (1) and (2), we find that raising the confidence in mem-
ory increases the passing probability of people who performed in the worse half in
the knowledge test, whereas raising the confidence in prior knowledge decreases the
26Hence, for subjects in the better half, the effect of a higher confidence in learning ability on
higher learning investments does not translate into better test outcomes. One possible explanation
is a physical limitation to the subjects’ short term working memory. While more confident subjects
were further motivated to acquire knowledge (and thus invested more), they may have been unable
to memorize this information appropriately in the given time frame.
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passing probability of above average and increases the passing probability of below
average performers in the knowledge test. We do not find a significant effect of con-
fidence in memory for individuals who performed in the better half in the knowledge
test.
Table 5.3: Confidence on Rank and Probability of Passing Final Test (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rank Rank Pr. Pass. Pr. Pass.
(Better) (Worse) (Better) (Worse)
Confidence Memory -0.108 0.320∗∗ -0.00106 0.0267∗∗
(-0.66) (2.26) (-0.12) (2.13)
Confidence Knowledge -0.297∗ 0.549∗∗ -0.0190∗ 0.0398∗∗
(-1.68) (2.36) (-1.93) (2.23)
Sum Memory Test 3.478∗∗ 0.722 0.111 -0.0846
(2.23) (0.53) (1.30) (-0.71)
Sum Knowledge Test 1.071 -2.137 0.0458 -0.120
(0.71) (-1.28) (0.53) (-0.92)
Female -10.13∗∗∗ 0.496 -0.502∗∗∗ -0.299
(-3.02) (0.14) (-2.64) (-0.94)
R2 0.234 0.375
Sample Size 353 262 339 235
F-Test (weak ID), M. 56.55 52.08
F-Test (weak ID), K. 54.33 26.71
Note: Models 1 and 2: two-stage least squares estimates with robust standard errors; Models 3
and 4: Newey’s two-step estimator for binary endogenous variables; t statistics in parentheses; all
regressions contain a constant; additional control variables: dummy variables for gender,field of
study (10), semester of study (22), school GPA (25), income (14) and session (24); Models 1 and 3:
performance at or above the median in knowledge test; Model 2 and 4: below median performance
in knowledge test; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
5.6 Conclusion
We studied the causal effects of confidence in prior knowledge and in the ability to
learn in a lab experiment. Based on a simple formal model, we hypothesized that a
higher confidence in one’s level of prior knowledge causes students with low levels of
knowledge to invest more. This is because it raises the probability that an additional
remembered fact is pivotal to passing the test. For students with high levels of prior
knowledge we expected the opposite, i.e. that raising their confidence in knowledge
would lower their effort to prepare for the test because it subjectively moves them
further away from the passing threshold such that learning becomes less relevant
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for whether someone passes or fails the test. For the other dimension, confidence in
one’s learning ability, we expected that raising this dimension of confidence would
cause students to invest more effort in learning irrespective of the prior knowledge
because the perceived marginal cost of effort decreases.
Our results support these hypotheses. Confidence in learning ability, indeed,
raises learning investments irrespective of the prior level of knowledge, whereas con-
fidence in prior knowledge has a negative effect on individuals with above average
prior knowledge and a positive effect on individuals with below average prior knowl-
edge on investments. Some of the behavioral effects of our feedback intervention are
also reflected by the test outcomes. Raising confidence in learning ability improves
the rank and increases the probability of an individual with below average prior
knowledge passing the test, whereas we do not find a significant effect for the rank
or passing probability of above average individuals. Furthermore, raising confidence
in prior knowledge improves the rank and increases the probability that an indi-
vidual with below average prior knowledge passes the test, whereas it worsens the
rank and decreases the passing probability of individuals with above average prior
knowledge.
We thus have shown that confidence affects investments in learning in very dif-
ferent ways depending on the specific dimension the belief refers to. People invest
more in learning when their confidence in the ability to learn is raised and we find
no evidence of a detrimental effect of “too much confidence” in learning ability. Of
course, we caution that we studied a lab experiment in a specific content area, and
further work has to be done to investigate the validity of the results in other contexts.
However, the results already show that generalized statements about the role of con-
fidence can be misleading and confidence should be viewed as a multidimensional
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concept.27
Insights about the different effects of confidence in learning ability and confidence
in prior knowledge have implications not only for the design of interventions aimed
at positively affecting academic motivation but also for subjective performance eval-
uation policies in firms and other organizations. A large literature in psychology and
economics has, for instance, stressed that subjective performance evaluations tend to
be biased and, in particular, evaluators often tend to be too lenient (see e.g. Murphy
and Cleveland 1995; Prendergast 1999). Our results imply that rater leniency (i.e.
the tendency to assign too generous performance ratings) can raise motivation when
the rater assesses an individual’s ability to learn. However, leniency in the rating of
a skill level can reduce the motivation as it may signal that one has “already done
enough”. Hence, while raising confidence in the ability to acquire a certain skill or
achieve an outcome can be beneficial, raising confidence in the skill itself or the level
of past achievements can be detrimental.
Finally, we note that while we wanted to identify the causal effect of confidence
on performance, we did not intend to evaluate the usefulness of confidence manip-
ulations in real world settings. The confidence manipulation through noise terms
added to test results is designed as a research tool that makes it possible to study
causal effects of confidence. It is not meant as an intervention that should be imple-
mented to raise confidence in field settings but we believe that our work can inform
the optimal design of interventions that aim at influencing confidence to raise mo-
tivation in the field. For instance, our results indicate that interventions that raise
the confidence in the ability to learn and grow should be beneficial. Our results are
thus well in line with the idea of inducing a “growth mindset”, i.e. the belief that
intelligence is malleable rather than fixed, which has been shown to raise educational
27Interestingly, we find that women are significantly less confident than men with respect to
their prior knowledge (skill level) but not so with respect to their memory (ability to acquire
new skills). This further hints towards the importance of a multidimensional understanding of
confidence for explaining gender effects in competitive settings. In settings where skill level is
important, women are observed to shy away from competition, partly due to lower confidence
(Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). It should be further explored what happens in settings where
beliefs about the ability to learn play a role.
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outcomes (Yeager et al., 2014; Paunesku et al., 2015; Alan et al., 2016). However,
our results also show that interventions that raise confidence in traits that directly
contribute to outcomes (such a prior knowledge) may be detrimental.
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5.7 Appendix to Chapter 5
5.7.1 Descriptive Statistics and Figures
Figure 5.5: Rank Beliefs
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Note: Distributions and means of rank beliefs elicited after giving feedback. (1 is best)
Figure 5.6: Investment (in Euros)
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Table 5.4: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Noise Term Memory -0.03 1.42 -2 2 644
Noise Term Knowledge 0.01 1.4 -2 2 644
Belief Memory 54 28.54 6.25 100 644
Belief Knowledge 58.32 21.51 7.69 100 644
Sum Memory Test 5.15 2.55 0 11 644
Sum Knowledge Test 8.87 2.18 0 16 644
Sum Test 3 10.72 2.52 1 20 644
Investment 1.36 0.95 0 3 644
Prob. of Passing Test 3 0.5 0.5 0 1 644
Profit 11.29 5.02 3.2 19.4 644
Female 0.63 0.48 0 1 644
School GPA 2.05 0.6 1 3.5 623
Humanities 0.16 0.37 0 1 644
Social Sciences 0.09 0.29 0 1 644
Law 0.05 0.22 0 1 644
Business 0.26 0.44 0 1 644
Economics 0.13 0.34 0 1 644
Medicine 0.05 0.21 0 1 644
Natural Sciences 0.08 0.27 0 1 644
Psychology 0.01 0.12 0 1 644
Other Subjects 0.14 0.35 0 1 644
Non-Student 0.02 0.13 0 1 644
Semester 1 0.06 0.24 0 1 635
Semester 2 0.11 0.31 0 1 635
Semester 3 0.06 0.23 0 1 635
Semester 4 0.12 0.33 0 1 635
Semester 5 0.08 0.27 0 1 635
Semester 6 0.13 0.33 0 1 635
Semester 7 0.08 0.27 0 1 635
Semester 8 0.1 0.31 0 1 635
Semester 9 0.06 0.24 0 1 635
Semester 10 0.05 0.22 0 1 635
Semester 11 0.04 0.2 0 1 635
Semester 12 0.03 0.18 0 1 635
Semester 13 0.02 0.14 0 1 635
Semester 14 0.01 0.11 0 1 635
Semester 15 0.01 0.1 0 1 635
Semester 16 0.01 0.1 0 1 635
Semester 17 0 0.06 0 1 635
Semester 18 0.01 0.08 0 1 635
Semester 19 0 0.04 0 1 635
Semester 20 0 0.04 0 1 635
Semester 21 0 0.06 0 1 635
Semester 23 0 0.04 0 1 635
Session 1 0.04 0.19 0 1 644
Session 2 0.04 0.19 0 1 644
Session 3 0.04 0.2 0 1 644
Session 4 0.03 0.17 0 1 644
Session 5 0.04 0.19 0 1 644
Session 6 0.05 0.21 0 1 644
Session 7 0.03 0.18 0 1 644
Session 8 0.04 0.19 0 1 644
Session 9 0.05 0.21 0 1 644
Session 10 0.05 0.21 0 1 644
Session 11 0.05 0.22 0 1 644
Session 12 0.03 0.17 0 1 644
Session 13 0.05 0.22 0 1 644
Session 14 0.04 0.2 0 1 644
Session 15 0.03 0.16 0 1 644
Session 16 0.03 0.18 0 1 644
Session 17 0.05 0.21 0 1 644
Session 18 0.05 0.22 0 1 644
Session 19 0.05 0.22 0 1 644
Session 20 0.05 0.21 0 1 644
Session 21 0.04 0.2 0 1 644
Session 22 0.05 0.22 0 1 644
Session 23 0.04 0.2 0 1 644
Session 24 0.05 0.21 0 1 644
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5.7.2 OLS Regressions of Beliefs on Behavior and Outcomes
Table 5.5: Confidence on Investment (OLS)
(1) (2) (3)
Invest. (All) Invest. (Better) Invest. (Worse)
Belief Memory 0.00871∗∗∗ 0.00637∗∗ 0.0120∗∗∗
(3.97) (2.03) (3.38)
Belief Knowledge 0.00239 0.00234 0.000527
(1.11) (0.78) (0.15)
Sum Memory Test 0.0552∗∗ 0.0550 0.0189
(2.15) (1.53) (0.47)
Sum Knowledge Test -0.0380∗ -0.146∗∗∗ -0.0379
(-1.84) (-3.47) (-0.89)
Female 0.0264 -0.0559 0.205
(0.32) (-0.50) (1.51)
R2 0.323 0.421 0.528
Sample Size 615 353 262
Note: OLS estimates with robust standard errors; t statistics in parentheses; all regressions
contain a constant; additional control variables: dummy variables for gender, field of study (10),
semester of study (22), school GPA (25), income (14) and session (24); * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
Table 5.6: Confidence on Outcomes (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rank (Better) Rank (Worse) Prob. Pass. (Better) Prob. Pass. (Worse)
Belief Memory -0.0501 0.103 -0.0000928 0.00961
(-0.50) (1.00) (-0.02) (1.51)
Belief Knowledge -0.0158 0.283∗∗ -0.00992∗ 0.0210∗∗∗
(-0.14) (2.15) (-1.91) (2.79)
Sum Memory Test 3.149∗∗∗ 2.368∗∗ 0.107∗∗ 0.0472
(2.83) (2.09) (2.03) (0.70)
Sum Knowledge Test -0.481 -1.090 -0.00528 -0.0569
(-0.32) (-0.65) (-0.08) (-0.66)
Female -8.536∗∗ 0.786 -0.446∗∗ -0.222
(-2.23) (0.19) (-2.45) (-0.87)
R2 0.254 0.405
Chi2 84.89 137.9
Sample Size 353 262 339 235
Note: OLS estimates with robust standard errors; t statistics in parentheses; all regressions
contain a constant; additional control variables: dummy variables for gender, field of study (10),
semester of study (22), school GPA (25), income (14) and session (24); * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
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5.7.3 Reduced Form Estimates
Table 5.7: Noise Terms on Investment (OLS)
(1) (2) (3)
Invest. (All) (OLS) Invest. (Better) (OLS) Invest. (Worse)(OLS)
Noise Term Memory 0.0606∗∗ 0.0660∗ 0.0917∗∗
(2.21) (1.74) (2.01)
Noise Term Knowledge -0.0116 -0.0534 0.0797∗
(-0.42) (-1.53) (1.84)
Sum Memory Test 0.128∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(8.35) (4.90) (4.96)
Sum Knowledge Test -0.0276∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.0572
(-1.65) (-3.65) (-1.34)
Female 0.00732 -0.0847 0.231∗
(0.09) (-0.77) (1.71)
R2 0.305 0.423 0.506
Sample Size 615 353 262
Note: OLS estimates with robust standard errors; t statistics in parentheses; all regressions
contain a constant; additional control variables: dummy variables for gender, field of study (10),
semester of study (22), school GPA (25), income (14) and session (24); * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
Table 5.8: Noise Terms on Outcomes (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rank (Better) (OLS) Rank (Worse)(OLS) Prob. Win. (Better) (Probit) Prob. Win. (Worse)(Probit)
main
Noise Term Memory -0.703 2.408∗ -0.00914 0.182∗∗
(-0.55) (1.66) (-0.15) (2.17)
Noise Term Knowledge -1.861 2.979∗∗ -0.118∗ 0.219∗∗∗
(-1.46) (1.98) (-1.96) (2.77)
Sum Memory Test 2.679∗∗∗ 3.065∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(3.74) (4.08) (3.16) (2.92)
Sum Knowledge Test -0.587 0.168 -0.0589 0.0237
(-0.44) (0.10) (-0.94) (0.29)
Female -8.407∗∗ 0.348 -0.401∗∗ -0.302
(-2.19) (0.08) (-2.19) (-1.21)
R2 0.261 0.404
Chi2 83.82 133.6
Sample Size 353 262 339 235
Note: OLS estimates with robust standard errors; t statistics in parentheses; all regressions
contain a constant; additional control variables: dummy variables for gender, field of study (10),
semester of study (22), school GPA (25), income (14) and session (24); * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
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5.7.4 Results Without Session Dummies and Demographic
Control Variables
Table 5.9: First Stage Regressions Without Additional Control Variables
(1) (2)
Confidence Memory Confidence Knowledge
Noise Term Memory 7.468∗∗∗ -0.582
(18.04) (-1.39)
Noise Term Knowledge -0.684∗ 6.239∗∗∗
(-1.70) (14.96)
Sum Memory Test 8.551∗∗∗ -0.204
(34.89) (-0.87)
Sum Knowledge Test -0.412 5.909∗∗∗
(-1.40) (19.71)
Constant 13.88∗∗∗ 6.864∗∗
(4.50) (2.36)
R2 0.727 0.530
Sample Size 644 644
Note: OLS estimates with robust standard errors; t statistics in parentheses;∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5.10: Confidence on Investment (IV) Without Additional Control Variables
(1) (2) (3)
Invest. (All) Invest. (Better) Invest. (Worse)
Confidence Memory 0.00906∗∗∗ 0.00646 0.0118∗∗
(2.67) (1.34) (2.42)
Confidence Knowledge -0.000832 -0.00581 0.00627
(-0.21) (-1.14) (0.91)
Sum Memory Test 0.0531∗ 0.0718 0.0373
(1.68) (1.61) (0.83)
Sum Knowledge Test -0.00194 -0.0467 -0.0662
(-0.07) (-1.07) (-1.37)
Constant 0.666∗∗∗ 1.557∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗
(4.05) (3.98) (2.16)
R2 0.164 0.137 0.175
Sample Size 644 374 270
F-Test (weak ID), Memory 164.4 87.01 80.77
F-Test (weak ID), Knowledge 112.4 78.50 36.53
Note: Two-stage least squares estimates with robust standard errors; t statistics in parentheses;
Model 1: whole sample; Model 2: performance at or above the median in knowledge test; Model
3: below median performance in knowledge test; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5.11: Confidence on Rank and Probability of Passing Final Test (IV) Without
Additional Control Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rank Rank Pr. Pass. Pr. Pass.
(Better) (Worse) (Better) (Worse)
Confidence Memory -0.114 0.258∗ -0.00288 0.00704
(-0.76) (1.74) (-0.42) (0.99)
Confidence Knowledge -0.199 0.370∗ -0.0128∗ 0.0151
(-1.25) (1.69) (-1.71) (1.49)
Sum Memory Test 3.750∗∗∗ 1.024 0.126∗ 0.0297
(2.70) (0.72) (1.93) (0.45)
Sum Knowledge Test 0.973 -0.794 0.0215 -0.0573
(0.68) (-0.50) (0.34) (-0.77)
Constant 51.81∗∗∗ 24.15∗∗ 0.261 -0.989∗∗
(3.85) (2.24) (0.45) (-2.02)
R2 0.0334 0.0756
Sample Size 374 270 374 270
F-Test (weak ID), M. 87.01 80.77
F-Test (weak ID), K. 78.50 36.53
Note: Two-stage least squares estimates with robust standard errors; t statistics in parentheses;
Model 1: whole sample; Model 2: performance at or above the median in knowledge test; Model
3: below median performance in knowledge test; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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5.7.5 Timeline of the Experiment
1. Measurement of Prior Knowledge and Learning Ability: Subjects
take two tests (incentivized with piece rate, the order is randomized to control
for ordering effects):
• „knowledge test“: participants have to solve 20 sets of three German
cities each by indicating which is the largest, which is the second largest
and which is the third largest in terms of population within each triple
• „memory test“: participants for 15 minutes see a screen with a list of 36
German cities with (arbitrary) four digit „cities codes“ which they can
memorize, then they have to solve 12 sets of three cities each by indicating
which one has the largest, which one has the second largest, and which
one has the third largest city code
• Immediately after each test participants estimate their number of cor-
rect sets and other‘s average number of correct sets in each test (belief
elicitation, unincentivized)
2. Information on further course (introduction of combined test): Sub-
jects are informed that there will be a third test and that they earn a prize
if their outcome is above average. They are explained how they can prepare
for it. Furthermore, they are told that they will receive feedback and given an
explanation of how the feedback is computed.
3. Feedback stage: Subjects receive noisy feedback about their performance
in both tests (treatment variation)
4. Measurement of confidence (belief elicitation, both tests, incentivized):
Subjects estimate their rank in both tests
5. Investment stage (information acquisition): Subjects receive a budget of 3
euros from which they can buy information on cities in increments of 0.5 euros
or 10 cities (behavioral outcome variable)
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6. Measurement of outcomes (combined knowledge and memory test): Sub-
jects take the third test (economic outcome variables)
5.7.6 Details on the Tests, Feedback, Elicitation of Beliefs,
and Investment Stage
The experiment was conducted in German, so in the following we give the English
translation of the texts. All the cities used in the experiment come from the set of
the 200 largest cities in Germany. We pretested all instructions and tests to ensure
that they are understandable and produced a sufficient variance of results so that
relative performance/ability could be measured precisely. Before the tests started,
an introductory screen described the test and how money could be earned. We also
made sure that subjects understood the rules of the tests by including a sample
exercise before each test and subjects could only start the test after answering it
according to the rules.
Description of Knowledge Test
The instruction on the introductory screen to the knowledge test said:
“In the following you can earn money by ordering three cities, re-
spectively, according to their number of inhabitants. In total there
are 20 sets of 3 cities each. For each completely correct set you will
receive 0.10 euros. If the set was not answered completely correctly
you will not receive any money for it. You have 6 minutes to work
on the test. Write a 1 in the field next to the city you belief is the
largest of the three, write a 2 in the field of the intermediate city and
write a 3 in the field next to the smallest city.”
On the test screen itself a summary of the instructions and the payment scheme was
given. A countdown clock was shown. For example, a set of three cities looked like
this:
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Description of Memory Test
The instruction on the introductory screen to the memory test said:
“In the following you can earn money by ordering three cities, re-
spectively, according to their city codes. In total there are 12 sets of
3 cities each. For each completely correct set you will receive 0.20
euros. If the set was not answered completely correctly you will not
receive any money for it. You have 6 minutes to work on the test.
Since the city codes are generally not known, you will receive an al-
phabetically ordered list with all 36 cities and their respective city
codes. This list will be displayed to you in a learning phase of 15
minutes. You have the opportunity to memorize the ranking (rela-
tive size) of these city codes, in order to later order three cities each
according to this number. During the test this list will not be dis-
played anymore, so that only your memory will help you to do the
ordering. Note-taking is not allowed.Violation of this rule will lead
to the exclusion from this and future experiments.
Write a 1 in the field next to the city which according to your memory
has the largest city code, write a 2 in the field of the city with the
second largest city code and write a 3 in the field next to the city
with the smallest city code.”
On the learning and test screens a summary of the instructions and the payment
scheme was given. A countdown clock was shown. The sets of three cities in the
memory test looked the same as in the knowledge test but none of the city names
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were used twice. Information displayed in the learning phase looked like this:
Description of Feedback
After subjects have been told that there will be a third “main test” and that they
can prepare for it, they are informed that they are about to receive feedback. Next,
they are shown a screen where the computation of the “feedback scores” is explained:
“The experimental software will now generate a knowledge score and
a memory score for each participant. The knowledge score is being
computed based on a participant’s number of correct answers in the
knowledge test whereas the memory score is computed based on a
participant’s number of correct answers in the in the memory test.
In expectation, each score is equal to the participant’s actual number
of correct answers. The experimental software will soon let you know
your score.
Computation of the feedback scores:
Your scores are composed of the following:
Knowledge score = number of your correct sets in the knowledge test
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+ random variable X
Memory Score = number of your correct sets in the memory test +
random variable Y
The random variables X and Y can each assume values between -2 and
+2, that means each of the values (-2, -1, 0, +1, +2) is equally likely
(i.e. occurs with a probability of 20%). Furthermore, the random
variables X and Y are independent of each other, that means also all
combinations of values of the random variables X and Y are equally
likely.”
On the Next screen, subjects receive the following information:
“The knowledge score can help you to assess your knowledge of cities
relative to other participants whereas the memory score can help
you to assess your memory capacity relative to other participants.
The two scores give your number of correct sets in each test with
a certain imprecision but in expectation equal the actual number of
your correct answers.”
The feedback screen displayed both a participant’s two scores and the respective av-
erage score of participants in earlier experimental sessions: “Your [knowledge/memory]
score is [x]. The average [knowledge/memory] score of the other participants in ear-
lier experiments is [9.1/5.1]” It looked like this:
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Elicitation of Beliefs
The elicitation screen contained the following text:
“Half of participants in this room worked on the two tests in the
same order as you. How do you assess your own results in both tests
relative to theses participants? Please estimate your rank below. For
each estimate you will earn one euro if you guess the rank exactly
right. There are [x] participants in your group.
The participant with the highest number of points occupies rank 1,
the participant with the lowest number of points occupies rank [x].”
Then participants could indicate their rank beliefs in the knowledge and the memory
test by selecting a number on two lines of radio buttons. The number of radio
buttons was automatically adjusted to the number of people in each of the two
groups per session.
Investment Stage
The decision screen contained the following information:
“Description of test 3: combined knowledge and memory
test
In the following you can earn money by ordering three cities, respec-
tively, according to their numbers of inhabitants. In total there are
20 sets of 3 cities each. You have 6 minutes to work on the test.
The cities are German cities of comparable size and prominence as
the cities in the knowledge test about the numbers of inhabitants.
However, no of these cities will be in the test again.
If your result is above average, that is if you get more correct answers
than the average of the participants in the room who worked on the
first two tests in the same order as you, you will receive 10 euros, if
not you will receive zero euros.
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You have the possibility to improve you knowledge of the cities in a
learning phase.
Description of preparation for test 3
In order to prepare for test 3, you may buy information about cities’
numbers of inhabitants. In order to do so you receive, independently
of your performance until now, a budget of 3.00 euros. The part of
the budget that you do not spend, will be added to your payoff in
the end of the experiment. All cities you can buy are part of the test.
You can buy packages of 10 cities each. Each package allows you to
completely answer at least 3 assignments (sets).
Example for information you can buy:
Innsbruck 121,329
Following your selection, for 15 minutes the program will show in
alphabetical order your acquired packages of cities with their respec-
tive numbers of inhabitants. This information you may memorize so
that you can better order cities according to their size in the main
test. Note-taking is not allowed. Violation of this rule will lead to
the exclusion from this and future experiments.”
Below this text, subjects were asked to decide how many cities they want to buy and
indicate their choice with the respective radio button. They have to make a choice
between buying 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, or 60 cities. Each ten cities cost 0.5 euros.
Below the radio buttons it said:
“Please note: Your further payoff depends on whether you belong to
the better half of the group who worked on the first two tests in the
same order as you. You cannot earn additional money by estimating
your rank correctly. In case you find the study time of 15 minutes
too long, you can also spend time looking at comics.”
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A reminder of their knowledge and memory score is displayed in the upper right
corner of the screen.
This is how the screen looked like:
Description of Test 3
Test 3 looked the same as the first two tests and contained 20 sets of three cities
each. Within each set participants had to order cities according to their numbers of
inhabitants. A summary of the instructions and the payment scheme was given.
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